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CHAPTER 1
REALIGNMENTS AND A CHANGING ELECTORATE 
Virtually every election since the mid 1960s has been hailed as some kind of 
realignment, somewhere in the United States by someone. This proliferation of 
realignment variations has given us regional, rolling, hollow, major, minor, across-the- 
board, compensating, creeping, step, non-cridcal, top-down, incomplete, no majority, 
postindustrial, evangelical, southern, and policy realignments. Dealignment has also been 
used to explain electoral circumstances. There seem to be more disagreements among 
scholars about realignment than agreements. The confusion and lack of agreement over 
sometimes even the most fundamental foundations o f realignm ent could indicate a theory 
that has outlived its usefulness in explaining the behavior o f the electorate. Critical 
realignment theory, and its failure to appear in the contemporary electorate, is the focus of 
this work.
While there are many disagreements over what constitutes a ‘realignment’ and 
when and where they have occurred, there is broad agreement that there has not been an 
earthshattering, sudden movement o f a large part of the electorate since the New Deal. 
Why has no ‘critical realignm ent’ occurred? Why have we been in a prolonged period of 
dealignment? One o f the possible reasons why there has been no critical election, and 
thus a realignment, in the United States since the 1930s is that the electorate has changed
so substantially that critical realignment theory does not fit contemporary electoral 
circumstances.
When scholars have sought to solve the puzzle o f the absent critical realignment, 
they have primarily looked to political change, exploring such factors as election returns, 
partisan identification, divided government, and voter turnout. For example, many have 
documented the political changes that contribute to dealignment, such as increasing 
numbers o f independent voters, less partisan attachment and loyalty, spUt-ticket voting, 
and media-centered and image driven elections (Beck 1977; Ladd 1981; Norpoth and 
Rusk 1982; Carmines, Mclver, and Stimson 1987; Wattenberg 1996). Observed political 
changes are what has driven much of the realignment literature since the 1970s.' But, 
politics does not exist in a vacuum and critical realignments have always hinged on broad 
societal factors. The critical realignment preceding the Civil War involved the issues of 
slavery, secession, and recession (Sundquist 1983, 74-82). The critical realignment o f the 
1890s was largely about the dislocation o f the agrarian sector during industrialization 
(134-169). The Great Depression and the tearing of the social fabric it caused sparked the 
critical realignment of the 1930s (198-229). When scholars have looked back on 
electoral history and identified critical realignments, they have noted the importance of 
not only the political, but also the social environment (Key 1955, Sundquist 1983, 
Burnham 1970). However, when scholars o f electoral behavior assess the contemporary
‘To a large extent, this may be due to the increasing reliance of the subfield of 
electoral behavior on survey data. By the 1970s, there was sufficient data to establish a 
time series and document changes over time. Unfortunately, this reliance on survey data 
has led scholars in this area to focus more on the microanalysis of electoral behavior 
rather than the macroanalysis.
electorate, they often lose sight of the social forces that accompany political change. The 
impact that broad societal change may have on electoral politics needs to be explored 
further. If the electorate, or even a part of the electorate, has undergone a large scale 
social change, then what does this mean for theories o f electoral behavior? The paradigm 
for explaining electoral circumstances in the United States has been realignment theory. 
Does this paradigm still fit the circumstances o f the contemporary electorate?
Political scholars working outside the framework of realignment have increasingly 
noticed profound changes in contemporary society and the effect these social changes 
have on politics (Putnam 1993a, 1995a, 2000; Skocpol 1999; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady, 1995; Inglehart 1971,1977,1997). Since critical realignments o f the past have 
been accompanied by changing social forces, it is certainly the case that societal factors 
should be considered when seeking an explanation for the lack o f a critical realignment. 
What has been missing from the studies that attempt to explain the lack o f a critical 
realignm ent in the contemporary electorate is a discussion o f broad societal forces that 
may be at play and the impact these forces may have on this particular theory of electoral 
change. What has been missing, in short, is a theoretical finmework that addresses large- 
scale social change. This study seeks to examine critical realignment theory in a broad 
social perspective by using one such theory.
Broad social change has been examined both globally and within the United 
States (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1997; Bell 1973; Hunter 1991,1994; Putnam 1995b, 2000). 
However, few have brought together the political AND social changes that have been 
occurring within the American electorate and assessed the impact these changes might
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have on the state o f critical realignment theory, which is what this investigation seeks to 
do. Changes in social interactions, fundamental values, or even the way society views 
religion could profoundly alter not only the way segments o f  the electorate behave, but 
also who makes up the active electorate. But, there are several competing, though not 
wholly unconnected, broad theories concerning the state o f postmodern society.
Perhaps the best known theorist in this area is Robert Putnam. Working initially 
in Italy, Pumam documented that the more civic-minded and socially connected citizens 
o f northern Italy had better government than their fellow citizens in southern Italy. The 
reason, Pumam discovered, is because northern Italy is imbued with social capital - trust, 
social networks and norms o f reciprocity - which make democracy ‘work’ (1993a). Most 
recently, Putnam has documented the decline of social capital in the United States and its 
implications for democracy (1995a, 1995b, 2000). “It is commonly assumed that 
cynicism toward government has caused our disengagement from politics, but the 
converse is just as likely: that we are disaffected because as we and our neighbors have 
dropped out [and become civically disengaged], the real performance of government has 
suffered” (2000, 347). Social disengagement, he feels, has led to poor government and 
political disengagement. As society’s store of social capital declines, democracy may be 
imperiled. As government begins to malfunction, there are fewer and fewer people who 
participate and perform the important function o f overseeing government to insure that it 
does not overstep its bounds.
Despite the appeal o f Pumam’s theory, his is not the theoretical framework o f 
social change utilized. This is not to say that Putnam’s insights might not be useful in
helping to explain the lack of critical realignments. Part o f V.O. Key’s criteria for a 
critical election is an electorate that is intensely involved (1955). The declining rates of 
both political and social engagement that Putnam documents have certainly affected this 
aspect o f critical elections. However, Putnam has little to say regarding the active 
electorate’s partisanship and how increasing disengagement might affect it. Since this 
work is concerned with the partisan changes in the electorate, Putnam’s theory is less 
useful for the task at hand. There is, however, another theory of broad social change 
which has direct implications for critical realignment theory because it does address how 
the changing social environment affects the partisanship of the electorate. This 
framework is Ronald Inglehart’s theory o f value change in postindustrial society.
Inglehart sees changing features in western industrial societies evidenced by 
increasing postmaterialist values (1971,1977, 1997). The value change he identifies has 
political implications because he sees a new cleavage forming that is taking the place of 
traditional partisan cleavages. Inglehart argues that society’s values are changing from 
being materialist (values that emphasize economic and physical security) to 
postmaterialist (values that emphasize quality o f life and self-expression) in substantial 
portions o f the industrialized West’s electorates. If, over the last several decades, 
society’s values became more postmaterialist and this value orientation affected the 
nature o f partisanship as Inglehart asserts, then the status o f traditional theories o f voter 
behavior, in particular critical realignment theory, may be jeopardized in an electorate 
whose patterns o f partisanship have fundamentally changed since V.O. Key formulated 
his theories o f critical elections (1955) and secular realignment (1959).
There are several reasons why Inglehart’s theory o f  value change serves as the 
theorietical fiamework for this examination o f critical realignm ent theory in social 
perspective. First, critical realignment theory is based upon the partisanship o f the active 
electorate. It is crucial for critical realignment theory to be able to identify the partisan 
nature of cleavages within society. Putnam, and others working in the same theoretical 
vein, have much to say about disengagement, but less to say about the partisanship o f 
those who are engaged. Secondly, Inglehart’s theory is arguably the best articulated and 
quantifiable theory o f social change. The survey instrument that Inglehart formulated for 
identifying one’s value orientation has been included in the American National Election 
Studies and Inglehart has been quite detailed in describing the expected characteristics 
and behavior o f materialists and postmaterialists. Further, Inglehart believes the 
importance o f economic issues are being eclipsed by quality o f life issues for postmaterial 
voters. When critical elections and the realignments that cause them have occurred, they 
have always had an economic element^ Therefore, it is plausible that if  economic issues 
are less important, critical elections might be less likely to occur. Another reason why 
Inglehart is the chosen firamework is the link the two theories have to societal cleavages 
and their partisan nature. Both Inglehart’s conception of value change and critical 
realignment theory are based upon cleavage behavior and have certain expectations 
regarding the partisanship o f groups. Finally, the onset of dealignment in the mid 1960s 
and 1970s corresponds to the time period when Inglehart believes postmaterialist values 
began to make an impact in the electorate. Inglehart, with a co-author, is the originator of
H am indebted to Keith Gaddie for the illumination o f this fact.
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the term "dealignment" and he obviously sees a  connection between the rise o f 
postmaterialist values and the impact they have upon partisan identities (Inglehart and 
Hochstein 1972). For these reasons, the social change framework for this examination of 
critical realignment theory’s status will be Inglehart’s concept of value change.
Overview
The following chapters will undertake a step-by-step examination of critical 
realignment theory’s status in the contemporary electorate in light o f the changes that 
Ronald Inglehart sees occurring in postindustrial society. Chapter Two reviews the two 
theories, critical realignment theory and higlehart’s theory o f value change, and the 
expectations they have for cleavage behavior in the electorate and its partisanship. In 
Chapter Three, partisan voting trends are examined with an eye toward Inglehart’s value 
change theory and the implications it holds for critical realignment theory. Substantial 
changes are found in cleavage behavior that indicate the concept of critical realignment in 
the United States, a theory formulated in the 1950s, should not be applied to current 
electoral circumstances. It may be beneficial to speak o f realignments occurring within 
cohesive groups, such as white Southern voters, or white evangelical Christians; it is not 
beneficial to seek to apply the firamework of realignment to the entire United States like a 
blanket without attention to the individual groups that are partisanly aligned, which is 
what many seek to do when they declare a ‘realignment.’ In addition. Chapter Three 
finds that the changes evident in group electoral behavior do not seem to be caused by 
Inglehart’s theory o f value change as he measures the phenomenon and theorizes about it. 
Since Inglehart’s measure o f social change was not fi-uitfid, party platform analysis over
time is utilized as an alternative indicator o f social change. Chapter Four investigates the 
party platforms of the two major parties for possible reasons why many cleavages 
dissipated in the 1990s yet others remained strong. It is found that beginning  in 1992, the 
two parties’ approach to political issues, such as the economy, social welfare policy, and 
government administration become less distinct, but their stances on cultural issues in the 
area o f civil rights and liberties were quite polarized. Based on this evidence, there may 
be a kernel o f truth in Inglehart’s basic theory that quality o f life issues are beginning to 
take precedence over economic ones, at least when viewed solely from the content of 
party platforms. Cultural issues on which the two parties now polarize are seen as quality 
o f life issues for many voters.^
Chapter Five draws conclusions from the analysis of cleavage behavior and 
political party platforms. The electorate has changed; substantial portions o f it have 
become increasingly less partisan over time. These changes suggest that we need to 
adjust our thinking about critical realignment theory. The 1990s witnessed a 
disintegration of many partisanly aligned cleavages that would preclude a critical 
realignment from occurring in the present partisanly splintered electorate. In addition, the 
parties in the 1990s began to polarize on issues that many segments o f the electorate did
^This characterization, however, is problematic if  Inglehart’s theory is taken in 
finer detail because he narrowly conceptualizes quality of life issues. For example, 
abortion is certainly not an economic issue. Inglehart does sees it as a quality of life issue 
but he characterizes those who oppose abortion as materialists and those who support 
abortion rights as postmaterialists rather than characterizing all those who feel abortion is 
a defining issue as postmaterialists. Regardless of the side of the debate one chooses in 
the abortion battle, one should be characterized as a postmaterialist because one is 
choosing a  quality o f life issue over economic issues, but this is not Inglehart’s view 
when his theory is closely scrutinized. See Inglehart 1997,271, 276-279.
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not deem to be o f primary importance (cultural issues) and became less distinct on the 
issues they did consider to be o f primary importance (political issues). Groups that 
remained partisanly cohesive in the 1990s were the very groups to which cultural appeals 
have the most allure and these were the issues upon which the parties polarized. Thus, 
many voters could be partisanly ambivalent because the political issues they seemingly 
care most about are the issues on which the parties’ stances are similar. The evolution o f 
party platforms has loosely followed the broad outline o f Inglehart’s basic theory that 
quality o f life issues are eclipsing economic ones.'* Given, however, that Inglehart’s own 
measure of values is not congruent with his theoretical expectations, the theory must be 
revisited before applying it to the American electorate. Perhaps more instructive to the 
American case is Hunter’s culture wars thesis (1991, 1994). The two parties have begun 
to polarize on the issues over which Hunter believes the culture wars are being fought. In 
addition. Hunter may be more applicable because he believes the culture wars are elite 
driven. Since party platforms are elite-written documents, it could be that the changes in 
the way issues are addressed in the party platforms are largely elite-led and do not have 
broad mass appeal. This is substantiated by the fact that substantial portions of the 
electorate in the 1990s did not believe cultural issues were o f primary importance.
Because o f the changes observed in the electorate, critical realignment would 
seem to be a theory that can safely be put on the shelf, not to be taken down again until 
greater numbers o f identifiable groups become more partisanly attached. The two parties
‘*This is true i f  one takes the broad outlines o f the theory and not some o f the more 
specific aspects o f it, as noted above.
are polarized on certain issues, but these issues do not currently appeal to enough groups 
o f voters that a critical-election-prompting coalition could form. Enough groups within 
the contemporary electorate have become sufficiently apartisan that it makes little sense 
to speak o f an identifiable Democratic or Republican coalition large enough to form the 
basis for a critical realignment. While there are still groups that maintain strong partisan 
identities, the electorate as a whole is too partisanly splintered to satisfy the requirements 
for a critical realignment. If there were to be a  critical election that clearly produced a 
majority government, one would still need to identify the groups that contributed to that 
majority. One has to be able to identify the characteristics o f who is aligned with which 
party for one to cognitively make sense o f a realignment. Presently, the electorate does 
not meet this requirement.
10
CHAPTER 2
THE “SCHOLARLY MORASS” AND VALUE CHANGE
As research on realignments has accumulated and spawned a thousand types. 
Carmines and Stimson were prompted to label the situation a “scholarly morass” (1989, 
25). The label rings true as scholars disagree over when, where, how, and why 
realignments have occurred. Why has realignm ent theory become so disorderly and 
confused? Has realignment become a “scholarly morass” because it no longer fits with 
electoral circumstances due to some large-scale change in American society? That the 
character of American politics has changed in the last thirty years is not in doubt. The 
nature o f the transformation, however, is intensely debated. One change posited by 
political scientists is a cultural shift brought on by postindustrial society, where values are 
increasingly bifurcated along materialist and postmaterialist dimensions (Inglehart 1971, 
1977, 1997). Could this societal change be responsible for the difficulty realignment 
theory has had in explaining electoral circumstances? This chapter provides the context 
needed to answer this question.
Realignment of Electorates 
Realignment theory is concerned with the behavior o f the electorate. It is often 
caricatured as the result o f a  large number o f voters switching political party allegiance. 
Any time the partisan control o f Congress or the presidency changes hands, journalists
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often declare a realignment; it makes a nice headline. A central aspect o f much voting 
behavior literature (performed by scholars, not journalists) concerns realignments. The 
concept is constantly being reformulated to fit the latest election or the latest twitch, 
however slight, o f the electorate. This is largely due to a lack of definitional clarity, the 
lack o f a consistent measure o f evidence that would point to a realignment, and the failure 
o f a critical realignment to appear “on schedule.”
Realignment Characteristics 
Any discussion o f realignment, no matter what type, must begin with V.O. Key.
In two successive articles in ih& Journal o f  Politics, he identified two types of 
realignments, one that causes a critical election (often termed a critical 
realignment‘)(1955) and the other identified as a  secular realignment (1959). The key to 
distinguishing between critical realignment and secular realignment is time. A critical 
realignment happens abruptly over the course o f a few elections but the change wiU 
persist across many subsequent elections. With a secular realignment the change is made 
evident over the period o f many elections. No one election stands out as critical in the 
gradual realignment. The result of both types is the same, a profound and lasting change 
in partisan attachments. I f  one is plunging into the quagmire that realignment theory has 
become, it helps to keep in mind the definition o f the two types of realignments that Key 
posited.
^Key himself does not use the term ‘critical realignment’; he states that critical 
elections occur when there is a realignment. The ‘critical realignment’ terminology is 
Burnham’s (1970).
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Critical realignments
Key’s article, “A Theory o f Critical Elections” (1955) began the debate about 
realignments within the electorate. The underlying question addressed by Key is whether 
or not all elections are the same. Maybe, he suggested, some elections are more 
important, or at least digèrent, than other elections. Key posits that a critical election 
occurs when there is a realignm ent o f voters. Examining these “critical elections” could 
tell one something useful about the behavior o f voters. A realignment, and thus a critical 
election, will include three elements, according to Key:
1. The electorate’s involvement in the election is deep, intense, and high
2. Election results indicate that there has been a marked change in the electorate’s
cleavages
3. These changes persist over time (1955,4)
One must keep in mind what Key repeats, “Central to our concept o f  critical elections is a 
realignment within the electorate both sharp and durable” (1955, 11). In today’s 
realignment literature on the United States, many (both scholars and journalists) proclaim 
realignment at the slightest ripple in election returns. There is usually not an ensuing 
discussion of depth of concern, issue, or turnout. Realignments are often proclaimed after 
the results are in from a single election, but one election does not make a realignment. It 
is crucial for definitional clarity that time is allowed to pass to see i f  the new alignment 
persists in subsequent elections and thus signals that a critical election occurred because 
voters’ new alignments have endured. As Sundquist points out in his masterly work on 
realignments, “. . .  a voter who crosses the line to vote against the party he normally 
supports is not realigning  unless he makes a lasting shift o f  party loyalty and attachment.
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If the shift is temporary, he is merely deviating'" (1983,4).
Secular Realignments
Key termed the other type o f realignment secular realignment. Secular 
realignments occur when there are “long-term. . .  shifts in party attachment among the 
voters” (Key 1959, 198). A  prime example of a secular realignment is the shift of 
Southern white voters fi’om the Democratic party to the Republican party that began in 
the 1960s and was not fully complete until well into the 1990s (Petrocik 1987; Bullock 
1988; Miller and Shanks 1996; Gaddie and HofSnan 2001).
The Importance of Cleavages
Central to Key’s discussion o f realignment, whether critical or secular, is the 
concert of cleavages. Cleavages, according to Lipset and Rokkan, are divisions in 
society that stem from characteristics within the electorate (1967). Lipset and Rokkan 
identify four sets o f cleavages that are present in western electorates: center and 
periphery, church and state, rural and urban, and class (13-26). Thus, when Key speaks o f 
urban, immigrant Catholics voting preponderantly for the Democratic parly in the 1920- 
28 elections in New England while their rural, American-bom counterparts voted for the 
Republicans, he is speaking of cleavages and their effects on voting preferences. This is a 
crucial, and not often emphasized part o f Key’s conception o f realignment, both for 
critical and secular types. Key refers to electoral cleavages and in his criteria for a critical 
election, he states that “the voting reveals a sharp alteration o f the pre-existing cleavage
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within the electorate" (italics mine 1955,4)/ In his article on secular realignment, his 
definition states, “a secular shift in party attachment may be regarded as a movement o f 
the members o f 2t.population category‘s (italics mine 1959,199). Population categories 
form the bases for potential cleavages. Key delineates the categories on which a 
realignment might be based: “occupational group, income class, religious faith, or even 
the residents o f a geographical area” (199).^ Key also recognizes that cleavages may 
disintegrate over time (203,205). The rural-urban dimension is essential to Key’s
^One should note that the election o f 1896 is identified by Key as a critical 
election, and thus, a realignment took place (1955). Key does not believe that cleavages 
played a role in this election, but he can only examine the cleavages of religion, national 
origin, and industrialization and even these are based on the only reliable figures he has - 
population o f the town (14). “Perhaps the significant feature o f the 1896 contest was that, 
at least in New England, it did not form a new division in which partisan lines became 
more nearly congruent with lines separating classes, religions, or other such social 
groups”(12). Key concluded this because the Republicans benefitted fairly consistently 
across populations and even though this election is often presented as a contest between 
the haves and have-nots. Key does not find evidence of such in his data (13). He 
concludes, however, “Instead of a sharpening o f class cleavages within New England the 
voting apparently reflected more a sectional antagonism and anxiety, shared by all 
classes, expressed in opposition to the dangers supposed to be threatening firom the West” 
(16). It is important to note that Key is only examining election returns from New 
England states and his data is limited. Therefore, it would seem that the relevant cleavage 
for this election, to which Key alludes, would be a sectional one that would not be 
evident from the data Key examined.
^It should be recognized that Key (1966) would later emphasize the importance of 
analyzing voter behavior in relationship to issues, not group characteristics. Key states, 
“Not every election generates group-related issues which drive a wedge through the 
electorate along lines easily identifiable by gross characteristics of the electorate” (1966, 
70). However, examining the contemporary status of realignment theory, which I seek to 
do, necessitates looking at broad groups within the American electorate, their partisan 
attachments, and how these have changed over time. If  the postmaterialist-materialist 
value distinction does, in fact, cleave the electorate, one still needs to know ‘who’ the 
postmaterialists and materialists are. There is no other way to do this than to look at 
broad group characteristics.
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identification of cleavages. The rural-urban cleavage, however, ceases to be very useful 
once the vast majority of the population lives in cities.
What is it that is realigning? Voters, but specifically voters with certain 
characteristics. Who is realigning is only interesting if  one can identify the meaningful 
characteristics of the ‘who.’ Essentially, a realignment is a  realignment of the cleavage 
structure o f the electorate. It is a realignment of the partisan vote choices o f certain 
groups within society.
Further Articulation of the Theory
Key does not attempt to explain why realigning elections occur. He simply shows 
that they do occur and provides a  simple way to identify when they have occurred. The 
fact that realignments have become a part o f normal, every day political discourse 
indicates the impact o f Key’s theory. Certainly the theory, as set forth by Key, is only the 
beginning point for the study o f realignments, something he recognizes. Many scholars 
have taken up Key’s challenge to do further study in this area. Unfortunately, the theory 
has not progressed in a coherent manner.
Within the massive realignment literature, there are many disparate threads. 
Disagreements occur as to what constitutes a realignment and when they have occurred 
historically, though there is general agreement on three periods o f realignment. Most 
agree that a realignment o f voters occurred before and during the Civil War, when a third 
party, the Republicans, came to power. A second realignment is generally considered to 
have occurred in the 1890s in favor o f the Republicans. During this period the 
Republicans were predominantly in control of the major organs o f government and
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strengthened their position with this realignment. So, a change o f  dominant parties did 
not take place.** Finally, there is general agreement on a realignment occurring in the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, when the Democrats became the majority party. Dates are 
generalized because there is no broad agreement as to what specific election o f the period 
signaled the realignment. In fact, it is generally agreed upon that dates will vary with 
regions o f the country and their different circumstances (Key 1955; Campbell, et al.,
1960; Brady 1985). Beyond these three periods, there is little agreement on when 
realignments have occurred. Burnham identifies five realignments (1970, 1). Sundquist 
distinguishes between major (1850s, 1890s, 1930s) and minor (1910,1920) realignments 
(1983, 37). Brady (1985) and Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (1990) make persuasive cases 
for only the three generally agreed upon realignments.
In the landmark The American Voter, the authors contended that there is usually a 
catastrophic issue involved in electoral realignments (Campbell, et al. 1960, 534). The 
Michigan scholars also believed that an electoral realignment would actually occur over 
several elections, constituting an “electoral era.” For example, the New Deal realignment 
began in 1928 and did not reach its peak until 1936 (535). This is also consistent with 
Key’s findings in New England, where he determined that “the Roosevelt revolution of 
1932 was in large measure an A1 Smith revolution of 1928" (1955,4). Campbell, et al., 
find that it is not so much that already socialized voters switch party allegiances, though 
this does occur, but that those socialized during the elections of the realignment form a
“*For this reason, Gerald Pomper does not agree on this realignment period because 
his definition o f a realignment is based on a change in majority party (1968).
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lasting allegiance to the dominant party (1960, 535-536). Both Anderson (1979) and 
Erikson and Tedin (1981) conclude that critical elections are not caused by people already 
in the electorate changing their party identification; critical realignments are caused by the 
mobilization of new voters, either first time voters or newly re-active voters. Carmines, 
Mclver and Stimson also believe that the initial socialization is the key and that most 
voters do not switch horses in midstream, so to speak (1987). However, Key’s final work 
published after his death found, at least at the presidential level, “ . . .  that the shifting 
voter is far more numerous than is commonly supposed” (1966, 52). Sundquist also 
maintained that conversion is a process that is common. He concludes, “The weight of 
evidence supports a conclusion that both conversion and mobilization play substantial 
parts in the realignment, in proportions still indeterminate” (1983,230). More recently. 
Miller and Shanks have concluded that there was significant conversion of older voters in 
the 1980s (1996, 151-84).
Walter Dean Burnham examined what he termed critical realignments, echoing 
Key’s assertion that critical elections involve realignments. Building upon Key’s initial 
theory, he adds ideological polarization and periodicity (1970, 7-8). Polarization will 
occur first within the party or parties and then between them. Bumham, unlike the 
Michigan scholars, saw one characteristic of a realignment as an event where “large 
blocks o f the active electorate . . .  shift their partisan allegiance” (1970, 3). Bumham 
formulated the “party system” nomenclature where the five party systems are delineated 
with realignments. Consequently, he identifies realignments occurring with regularity in 
1800, 1828,1860, 1896, and 1932 (1970,1).
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Sundquist (1983) has examined realignment periods, o f  which he sees only three 
major ones - the Civil War era, the 1890s, and the New Deal - and determined that there 
are five key elements that cause a  realignment. These elements are the following:
1. An aU encompassing critical, cataclysmic issue
2. The issue polarizes the public
3. Party leaders are polarized by the issue
4. Parties are also polarized by the issue
5. Voters’ ties to the party they choose, according to their stance on the issue, are
strengthened and endure (41-46)
Both Sundquist and Bumham contribute to the discussion of realignments by delineating 
some common characteristics. For example, both see realignments occurring when there 
is some cataclysmic issue and the major parties polarize, thus giving voters a clear choice 
o f sides. Nevertheless, beyond the three generally agreed upon realignments, Sundquist 
and Bumham do not agree on occurrence.
Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1990) reformulated a portion of Key’s critical 
election theory. These authors see realignments as following critical elections, not 
occurring simultaneously with them. The ensuing realignment will come as a response to 
whether those elected in the critical election were successful in correcting the crisis or 
problem that was responsible for their election (30). If they are successful, then voters 
align with that party. If they are unsuccessful, the realignment does not materialize, but a 
critical election still occurred. According to this conception 1994 would classify as a 
critical election but one that failed to produce a critical realignment.
How to Identify a Realignment?
Not only do scholars disagree on when realignments have occurred, but they also
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disagree on how to measure and identify them. A debate surrounds what unit o f analysis 
should be used. Largely this depends on whether one thinks of realignments as local, 
state, regional, or national phenomena. There is not a consensus on whether individual or 
aggregate level data should be used. When Key wrote, he had only limited data available 
to him, aggregate election and population statistics. Since the advent of reliable survey 
data in the 1950s, most have come to use it as the basis o f their studies (Erikson and 
Tedin 1981; Petrocik 1987; Norpoth 1987; Wattenberg 1987; Carmines, Mclver, and 
Stimson 1987; Miller 1991). Bumham (1970) used congressional election returns. 
Nardulli used presidential election returns (1995). Bullock used office holding data at the 
presidential and both state and federal legislative level (1988). The most comprehensive 
examinations are to be found in Brady (1985) and Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1990). 
Brady not only used congressional election returns, but also incorporated institutional 
measures such as partisan polarization, committee turnover and policy change in the 
House of Representatives. Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1990) argued that one must look 
at more than just election returns to identify realignments. They also considered political 
leadership and government control in their analysis.
When Key examined critical elections, he used a regional perspective focusing on 
New England. There is much to suggest that this should be the preferred unit of analysis, 
especially given the diverse nature of states’ political culture (Elazar 1984). Brady (1985) 
incorporated regional analysis in his historical assessment o f realignments and found that 
only in the 1930s was there an across-the-board shift to the Democrats. The realignments 
o f the 1860s and the 1890s were both compensating realignments where the movement,
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both for and against the would-be majority party, was concentrated in specific regions. A 
regional perspective was also taken up by John Petrocik (1987) in his analysis o f the 
South and its contemporary shift to the Republican party. He adds something important 
to the realignment debate by concluding that realignments do not just have to be about 
who is the majority party (372-373). The South has been secularly realigning to the 
Republican party but the national dominance o f the Democrats remained at the time of his 
article. Kawato argues that “to focus on the national partisan vote deflects our attention 
from the diverse nature o f U.S. politics” (1987,1236). Scholars, therefore, should not 
focus on national realignments, but regional shifts, and at different electoral levels. 
Subsequently, Bullock looked at regional realignments by focusing on different election 
levels (1988). He found that Republican (secular) realignments seemed to be occurring at 
the regional level both for the South and the Mountain West (570). Most recently, 
Nardulli has argued for regional realignments, not just recently but throughout history 
(1995). He concluded that most realignments have been regional in nature.
Realignments: Running Behind 
Some see realignments as cyclical. Bumham was the first to expound this in 
relation to party systems. “ . . .  [Rjealignments do recur with rather remarkable regularity 
approximately once a generation, or every thirty to thirty-eight years” (1970,26). 
Accordingly, an election that would have realigned the electorate in the manner of a 
critical realignment should have occurred in the mid-1960s. The failure of this period, or 
even subsequent decades, to produce a critical election threw realignment theory into its 
present state of disarray, where every election is scrutinized as some new variant o f
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realignment.
Dealignment
The expected critical realignment did not occur in the 1960s, nor did it happen in 
the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s. Many began to argue that the 1960s began a period o f 
dealignment (Inglehart and Hochstein 1972; Beck 1977; Ladd 1981; Norpoth and Rusk 
1982; Carmines, Mclver, and Stimson 1987; Wattenberg 1987, 1996). Those who 
propose we are in a period of dealignment build upon the notion that voters have become 
less attached to the parties. However, dealignment also suffers from a lack of conceptual 
precision, much like realignment itself. As Shafer notes, in its common usage 
“[dealignment] is effectively a name, not a concept” (1991, 63).^ This is because there 
are two ways o f viewing dealignment, one within the realignment framework and the 
other outside the realignment framework.
Within the framework, one conceives o f dealignment as the period preceding a 
new realignment, where there is a gradual move from the old alignment but no new 
alignment has yet replaced it. It is expected the dealignment will, over a short period, 
give way to a new alignment. The first usage o f the term “dealignment” can be attributed 
to Inglehart and Hochstein, which they define as “declining rates of identification with 
any party” (1972, 345). Beck’s notion of realignment as a socialization process employs
^Shafer believes dealignment can come to be meaningful. “Either it must imply a 
gradual but general shift away from the beneficiary o f the last realignment, with partisan 
outcomes becoming gradually less favorable to the old majority party as the old 
realignment ebbs. Or it must imply that partisan attachments, as registered in partisan 
electoral outcomes, will become increasingly random” (1991,64). Unfortunately, 
dealignment has come to mean both.
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the same concept, although he does not use the term dealignment initially (1974). He 
employs it subsequently when analyzing the southern electorate (1977). Inglehart, who 
along with Hochstein first coined the term dealignment, still conceptualizes electoral 
behavior in the realignment/dealignment firamework (1984, 68; 1997, 311).
Outside the realignment firamework, one can conceive o f “dealignment” as simply 
being a prolonged period o f partisan detachment. There are many indicators that one can 
use to establish this detachment: rise of independent voters, image driven campaigns, 
split-ticket voting, party defectors, increasing incidences o f divided government, and 
declining turnout. Carmines, Mclver, and Stimson (1987) see the 1960s beginning a 
period where strong party identifiers declined, and those who still did identify with a 
party were more likely to split their tickets. This led to an electorate that became more 
volatile and less predictable. Wattenberg attributes dealignment to the media and 
candidate centered elections (1996). Politicians do not have to rely on their party to get 
out their message and thus, parties have become less relevant to both the politicians 
during the campaign, and the voters. Manza, Hout, and Brooks (1995) have begun the 
process o f applying modifiers to dealignment. They investigate evidence for a class 
dealignment.
The term ‘apartisans’ is used by Dalton and Wattenberg (1993, 206) to describe 
the new type o f voter that inhabits the durable dealignm ent in which we currently find 
ourselves. Thus, apartisanship would be a better way to conceptualize this period and 
could also alleviate the double role the term “dealignment’ has been filling. Both 
dealignment and what I am terming apartisanship involve weakening of party attachment
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but the temporal component is different, much like the difference between critical 
realignment and secular realignment. Apartisanship can serve as a steady state, although 
it is a constant state o f volatility in the electorate, and exists outside the popular 
realignment/dealignment framework. This would seem to indicate a different type of 
system than previous party systems in American history conceived o f as bracketed by 
critical realignments. As Niemi and Weisberg observe, “While most political scientists 
agree that party dealignment has been occurring since the mid-1960s, there is a lively 
controversy as to how to interpret this in the realignment framework” (1993, 325). 
Perhaps it is time to step outside the framework that critical realignm ent has so long 
provided. Maybe the electorate is so substantially changed, not only politically, but 
socially as well, that critical realignment theory is useful only as an historical construct. 
Political scientists need to “think outside the box” - the realignm ent box - into which 
every election since the mid-1960s has been forced.^
Rethinking Realignment 
There are those who argue that the realignment framework should be tossed onto 
the trash heap. Most who advocate an end to realignment theory are only talking about 
critical realignments and not secular ones, although they often do not make this clear. For 
example, Everett Carll Ladd discussed in a 1991 article how political scientists 
anticipating a critical realignment reminded him o f Estragon and Vladimir who were
®This is not to say that the concept o f realignment is no longer useful. In 
examining specific groups and their changing partisan identities, using the term 
realignment to describe changing partisan attachments is meaningful. Critical 
realignment, where the concept o f realignment is applied to the entire, or substantial 
sections, o f the electorate is the theory debated and focused upon here.
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‘Waiting for Godot’ to appear. He went on to say that ‘realignments’ (by which he meant
critical realignments) were no longer useful anymore. Four years later, Ladd would
subtitle an article “The Post-industrial Realignment Continues.” Simply to peruse the
titles o f these articles may cause one confusion. Ladd, in the second article is referring to
a type o f secular realignment he has formulated and the two articles are not as
inconsistent as the titles might indicate.
In Issue Evolution, Carmines and Stimson also argue for getting rid o f realignment
and replacing it with their concept of issue evolution (1989). However, issue evolution
turns out to be just a variation on secular realignment. Consider their lengthy definition
of what issue evolution is:
We define issue evolutions as those issues capable of altering the political 
environment within which they originated and evolved. These issues have 
a  long life cycle; they develop, evolve, and sometimes are resolved over a 
number of years. The crucial importance o f this issue type stems from the 
fact that its members can lead to fundamental and permanent change in the 
party system (1989, 11)
This sounds like a secular realignment. However, they believe their issue evolution
captures more of the nuances o f the electoral situation than does a realignment (194).
Geer also argues that realignment is no longer a relevant theory (1991). Using a
rational choice model, he postulates that parties want to win, and will move to the center
on most issues to capture the maximum number o f voters. If  parties no longer polarize,
realignments should no longer occur, and consequently the theory is no longer useful to
explain voter behavior. O f course, parties have always wanted to win, and Geer does
believe that there have been realignments in the past. The key to his theory is his notion
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of public opinion polls. When realignments have occurred, public opinion polls either 
did not exist or were not accurate. Therefore, parties lacked evidence on where the public 
stood on issues and tended to polarize, rather than moderate their views.
Another perspective comes from those who argue that partisanship has been 
replaced as the defining feature o f the American electorate. Ideology is increasingly more 
important than partisanship in the American electorate. Rabinowitz, Gurian, and 
MacDonald argue for dealignment, but at the same time see evidence o f  a secular 
realignment (1984). Nevertheless, the secular realignment is different because party is no 
longer the cue to which voters look. The cue is now ideology. McCloskey and Zaller 
(1984) also argue that ideology, not partisanship, is key to understanding the American 
electorate. Ladd would agree because his postindustrial realignment is also based on the 
idea that the electorate is less partisan and more ideological (1995). More recently, 
Levine, Carmines, and Huckfeldt (1997) found that “ideology exerts an increasing and 
distinct impact on partisanship over the past two decades” (28).
The Poverty o f Critical Realignment Theory 
Dynamics o f  the Party System is a substantial contribution to realignm ent 
literature. Still, it seems that James Sundquist unwittingly contributed to the confused 
state o f realignment theory in two ways (1983). First, he recommends jettisoning the 
distinction that Key made between secular and critical realignments. He believes, “it 
confuses more than it clarifies to treat the critical and the secular as separate types o f 
realignment rather than as phases o f a single process” (12). Second, Sundquist 
encourages the use of modifiers with realignment (10). “Without a modifier, indeed, the
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word realignment defined broadly is o f little analytical value” (14). Unfortunately, with 
so many apparently taking this advice to heart, the word realignment, defined in such 
varied ways is also o f little analytical value. The discipline has arrived at a place where 
each election is a different type o f ‘realignment’ with a different modifier. The outcome 
o f elections is diverse and no two are alike, but if  we are going to call each election a 
realignment of some sort, realignment broadly defined, becomes synonymous with 
‘election’.
To their detriment, most political scientists have limited their scope when 
studying realignment by focusing mainly on political factors that affect the electorate such 
as aggregate changes in independent voters, self-professed party identification, party 
defectors, election returns, voter turnout, divided government, and split-ticket voting. 
There are those who advocate a ‘holistic’ view of realignm ent and talk about including 
social change and social variables (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1990; Ladd 1991). Still, 
few studies of realignment have analyzed anything beyond the explicitly political 
environment.’ Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale advocate a more complex conceptualization
’ Notable exceptions that go beyond the explicitly political are Carmines and 
Stimson (1989) and Wattenberg (1996). Carmines and Stimson focus on the effect race 
has had on American politics. Wattenberg focuses on a social change (the rise of the 
mass media) and its effects on political parties and campaigns. He concludes that party 
decline is due to the mass media’s influence on campaigns. Politicians no longer depend 
on the party to get out their message. Rather than having a partisan contest between 
candidates, the contest focuses on the candidates themselves and the image that is 
projected by the candidate’s organization, not the party organization. It should be 
emphasized that there are studies o f  realignment that look at social variables (class, 
religion) and the changes these variables have undergone in partisan attachment. There is 
a  difference, however, in simply examining social variables and addressing changes in the 
broader social environment
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of realignment (1990). “Partisan realignments were initiated by shifts in the distribution 
of the popular vote in response to crisis conditions and widespread societal tension and 
dissatisfaction” (italics mine, 30). Indeed, their model is much more complex than most 
(Brady 1985 would be the exception) because they add considerations o f political 
leadership and government control. But, they do not include a measure of “societal 
tension and dissatisfaction.” They give lip-service to accounting for broad societal 
factors but their model still incorporates only political factors. Ladd, in his critique of 
critical realignment, suggested examining a combination o f societal and political factors 
when seeking to delineate party systems (1991). He states, “Each succeeding partisan 
era has differed significantly from each o f its predecessors because in important regards 
each succeeding societal era is unique” (emphasis original, 30). While political factors 
are important in assessing whether the electorate has undergone a partisan change, the 
root cause o f the change is likely societal. Therefore, one must go beyond just the 
political. Societal changes could be documented by examining changes in class structure, 
religious structure, values, social capital, patterns o f belonging to social organizations, or 
any number o f other societal factors.
It should be emphasized that at the root o f  broad political change, one can usually 
find social change. Historically, critical realignments have always been anchored in the 
social landscape o f the day and turned on a critical issue, whether it is slavery, monetary 
policy, or depression. Thus, it is vitally important to ask why critical realignments, which 
have played such a role in our history, have become historical artifacts. Are there no 
important issues? Is the electorate asleep or just ambivalent? Are political parties failing
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to polarize in their attempts to reach the median voter?
From the above review it should be evident that we are clearly left with more 
questions than answers regarding realignment. Returning to the basics o f realignment 
theory might be usefid, therefore, which would necessitate going back to Key. Important 
to Key, but left out of today’s studies, is the notion o f intense involvement by the 
electorate. Also important to Key was the notion of cleavages. In fact, a realignment is 
meaningful because cleavages exist and one can readily distinguish which groups are 
aligned with a particular party. Electoral cleavages need to be re-evaluated. If there are 
changes occurring in values as Inglehart posits (1971, 1977, 1997), then we may be 
experiencing a new era of political behavior on the part of the electorate where the 
importance o f traditional cleavages like race, religion, social class, are being replaced by a 
new value cleavage within western societies. If there is a new era o f political behavior 
brought on by broad social changes, then the political theories of the previous era may 
have been rendered irrelevant in their application to the contemporary electorate.
Social Change
A separate stream o f scholarship has examined social and cultural characteristics 
within the electorate. The initial, path breaking work in this area is Almond and Verba’s 
The Civic Culture (1963). This was the first o f the political culture research genre, which 
flourished in the 1960s, that would examine the coimection between democracy and 
certain cultural variables and try empirically to link them. In a review assessing “The 
Civic Culture at 30,” David Laitin argues that contemporary political culture studies 
should take advantage of new techniques and advances in the field and bring “this
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research tradition into the ‘progressive’ mode” (1995, 168).
Over the last several decades, scholars working in political culture began to do 
just that. The result was that several began to advance the notion that American society 
was undergoing some type of large scale change that while not explicitly political, had 
political implications. Robert Putnam has documented the decline o f social capital 
(1995a, 1995b, 2000). Theda Skocpol has detailed changes in the social organizations to 
which people belong (1999). Ronald Inglehart has theorized about value change (1971, 
1977, 1997).
It is Inglehart’s theory that wiU be utilized as the theoretical framework for 
examining social change. In part, this is both because Inglehart was the first to articulate 
a theory of social change in postindustrial society and because his theory is readily 
quantifiable. More importantly, however, Inglehart’s theory has direct implications for 
critical realignment theory because both theories have certain expectations regarding 
cleavage behavior. In addition, Inglehart feels there is a connection between dealignm ent 
and the advent and growth o f postmaterialist values.
Ronald Inglehart conducts research in the tradition o f  The Civic Culture, doing 
exactly what Laitin would later counsel in his review article. Inglehart takes advantage of 
statistical methods not utilized in the past and survey data not previously available to 
those originally working in the political culture field. Inglehart, a pioneer of looking at 
value change within societies, is truly a scholar in the Almond and Verba tradition. Not 
only has he reexamined and retested the civic culture hypothesis, which argues that 
democracy requires a supportive political culture of which interpersonal trust is an
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important part, and found it valid (1988), but he also pioneered study in the area o f value 
changes in societies (1971, 1977). He has continued studying value change throughout 
his career (1981; 1983; 1985; 1987; 1990; 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; 
Abramson and Inglehart 1995). Inglehart, formulating his theory o f value change in 
western industrialized democracies almost thirty years ago, characterized it as a “silent 
revolution” (1971, 1977). The theory revolves around the concept o f generational value 
change in postindustrial societies. Value change can be defined as changes in “preferred 
goal states” (Namenwhth and Lasswell 1970, 6). That is, priorities change regarding 
which values are most fimdamental, a phenomenon of considerable consequence for 
political scientists because values serve as the source o f opinions and behaviors.
On the face o f things, Inglehart’s theory may not appear to be connected to 
realignment theory. Yet, if  postindustrial society is going through some kind o f large 
scale change then there are certainly political changes that are related, as Inglehart duly 
notes. He feels a cleavage over values has formed that supercedes and is eroding 
traditional cleavages such as class and religion. This is where the connection lies 
between Inglehart’s theory and critical realignments. The political change that he 
explores, however, is a broad, global change in postindustrial society. He does not entail 
what this change might mean in a more specific application. If there is a value change 
occurring in the United States, what might this entail for critical realignment theory?
Inglehart and Value Change 
In the literature on postmaterialism, Ronald Inglehart has largely defined the 
debate. He sees postindustrial societies realigning around a materialist-postmaterialist
31
cleavage, eventually replacing the class cleavage around which industrial societies 
revolved. The value change is conceptualized by Inglehart as a social phenomenon where 
people in postindustrial societies in the aggregate are shifting their primary values from 
being materialist (values that emphasize economic and physical security) to 
postmaterialist (values that emphasize quality of life and self-expression). Supporting 
postmaterialist issues will help them satisfy intellectual, aesthetic and belongingness 
needs (Liglehart 1971,991-992). This concept, as formulated initially by Inglehart, owes 
much to Maslow’s determination that needs are satisfied from bottom to top of a needs 
hierarchy. This hierarchy, beginning at the bottom, starts with physiological, safety, 
social, and esteem needs, and finally ends with self-actualization or self-fiiLfiUment 
(Maslow 1954). Inglehart hypothesizes that there is a change in value priorities taking 
place in postindustrial societies that has made those who were socialized in a more 
aflQuent atmosphere since World War U (the atmosphere o f both the country and of the 
family) less likely to see economic security as their main goal, because their basic 
material needs have been satisfied.* Since these basic needs have already been obtained.
*Inglehart and others who collaborated on the first Eurobarometer survey in 1970 
formulated a question to capture the components of postmaterial versus material values 
(Inglehart 1971, 993). The initial survey question used for capturing the postmaterialist- 
materialist distinction was: “I f  you had to choose among the following things, which are 
the two that seem most desirable to you?
1. Maintaining order in the nation
2. Giving people more say in important political decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom o f speech”
Respondents choosing 1 and 3 were deemed to have materialist values (called at the time 
“acquisitive values”) while those choosing 2 and 4 were deemed to have postmaterialist 
values (called at the time “post-bourgeois values”). AU other combinations were 
classified as mixed (Inglehart 1971, 994-995).
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younger cohorts can then focus on other areas of concern, such as equality, the 
environment, and other nonmaterial desires - what Inglehart will eventually term 
postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1988). In the 1977 book that further develops the 
original thesis, Inglehart expands his value measure in the survey data to include the 
original four choices, plus eight additional ones.’ In addition, he no longer refers to his 
theoretical basis in Maslow’s hierarchy, but now articulates two distinct hypotheses.
1. A Scarcity Hypothesis. An individual’s priorities reflect the 
socioeconomic environment; one places the greatest subjective value on 
those things that are in relatively short supply.
2. A Socialization Hypothesis. The relationship between the 
socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one o f immediate 
adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved, for, to a large extent, one’s 
basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s preadult 
years (1981, 881)
The scarcity hypothesis says that one will value most that which is scarce. According to 
the socialization hypothesis, values are formed in childhood and will reflect the 
conditions prevalent in childhood. Thus, the shift has a generational aspect and grows as 
older cohorts are replaced by younger ones. It is important to note that Inglehart sees the 
scarcity hypothesis and the socialization hypothesis as taking into account period effects 
and cohort effects. “Taken together, the two basic hypotheses imply that the process of
’The additional measures are:
1. For measuring materialist orientations respondents must indicate preferring the 
following: 1) Maintain a high rate o f economic growth; 2) Make sure that this country has 
strong defense forces; 3) Maintain a stable economy; 4) Fight against crime.
2. For measuring postmaterialist orientations respondents must indicate preferring 
the following: 1) Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their 
country; 2) Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful; 3) Move toward a 
friendlier, less impersonal society; 4) Move toward a society where ideas are more 
important than money (Inglehart 1977,44)
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value change is characterized by period effects (reflecting short-term fluctuations in the 
socioeconomic environment) superimposed on long-term cohort effects (reflecting the 
conditions prevailing during a given age group’s formative years)” (1985, 103). In other 
words, the hypotheses imply that times o f scarcity will lead to more materialist values, 
and times o f prosperity will lead to more postmaterialist values, but m the end, 
postmaterialism will grow because it is generational. Inglehart acknowledges the fact that 
postmaterialism has a tendency to rise and fall in the short term, depending upon 
economic circumstances (1981, 883; 1983, 81-82; 1990, 64). Long term, however, 
postmaterialism remains stable, rising as new, more postmaterialist generations replace 
materialist generations (1985).
Originally formulated with western European data (Inglehart 1971, 1977), the 
theory has subsequently been applied globally (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 
1997). Postmaterialism is often taken as a given phenomenon, both generally in western 
industrialized democracies, and more narrowly when the focus is the United States 
(Crepaz 1990; Opp 1990; Rohrschneider 1990, 1993; Lipset 2000; Schier 2000). One 
scholar considers that “the concept of postmaterialist or materialist value orientation has 
become a central variable in social science research” (Opp 1990,212). However, it is not 
without considerable controversy. There is disagreement over whether there is truly a 
value change occurring and whether Inglehart has adequately captured and measured this 
phenomenon in his prolific research on postmaterialism (Van Deth 1983; Flanagan 1987; 
Trump 1991; Duch and Taylor 1993; Warwick 1998; Davis, Dowley, and Silver 1999; 
Davis and Davenport 1999). In addition, there is evidence that the theory’s application to
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the United States is problematic (Brown and Carmines 1995; Layman and Carmines 
1997).
Inglehart’s most recent work. Modernization and Postmodemization: Cultural, 
Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies, updates and expands his earlier works 
(1997). Postmaterialism is set into the larger framework of postmodernism, which 
encompasses change in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Anytime society 
moves to another era (traditional society to modem society to postmodern society) there 
are accompanying political, economic, and cultural changes. Table 2.1, reproduced from 
Inglehart, provides the key changes he sees occurring from era to era.
TABLE 2.1
TRADITIONAL, MODERN, AND POSTMODERN SOCIETY:
SOCIETAL GOALS AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
Traditional Modern Postmodern
Core Societal 
Project
Survival in steady- 
state economy
Maximize Economic 
growth
Maximize subjective well­
being
Individual
Value
Trad. Religious 
and communal norms
Achievement
motivation
Postmaterialist and 
postmodern values
Authority
System
Traditional authority Rational-legal
authority
De-emphasis of both legal 
and religious authority
Source: Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political 
Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) 76, table 3.1.
Postmaterialism is just one aspect o f postmodern society. Where postmaterialism 
is the shift from emphasizing economic and physical security to self-expression and 
quality o f life, postmodernism includes postmaterialism plus the decline of traditional 
authority. Inglehart identifies two areas where the shift to the postmodern era is evident. 
The first is the shift in value systems that has been the focus o f his previous research, 
what he has identified as postmaterialism. Second, institutional structures are changing.
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Hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations are on the way out (1997,28).
Implications for the U.S.
Since people’s preference o f values is changing, different issues are important in 
the postmodern era than issues that were prevalent in the modem era and the pre-modem 
era before it. Inglehart exemplifies, “there are profound differences in the behavior and 
worldviews o f people who feel insecure about their personal survival and people who 
worry about global wanning” (1997, 37). Some new issues that Inglehart believes have 
emerged in response to postmaterialism are environmental issues, women’s issues, and 
gay and lesbian issues. In the modem era, economic issues were o f primary importance. 
“The politics o f advanced industrial societies no longer polarize primarily on the basis of 
working class versus middle class; and the old issues, centering on ownership o f the 
means of production and government control o f the economy, no longer lie at the heart of 
political polarization” (1997,265) The formation of green parties and their increasing 
viability in Westem Europe, for Inglehart, is a  sign o f changing values manifesting itself 
in the political system. In addition, and consistent with the second shift Inglehart 
identifies, “mass loyalties to long-established hierarchical political parties are eroding” 
(43).
The value shift that Inglehart finds does, he thinks, affect political party 
preference, at least in multiparty systems. Those forming postmaterialist values, young 
cohorts with more affluent family backgrounds, who would traditionally favor the more 
conservative parties, are instead favoring parties that are change oriented - the more leftist 
parties such as greens and socialist-progressive parties. At the same time, those with
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materialist values, who traditionally have favored parties o f  the left (social democrats), 
are becoming more conservative and beginning to favor parties o f the right (1971, 992).'° 
Both of the shifts that Inglehart identifies, postmaterialism and decline of 
hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations, may have ramifications for realignment theory in 
the United States. Both could affect the party system and the way it is viewed by an 
electorate with values that have changed. It should be noted that Inglehart’s initial 
research focused on Westem Europe and some o f his discussions, especially about 
political parties, apply more to multiparty systems than the United States’ two-party 
system. The United States’ experience did not explicitly enter Inglehart’s discussion until 
Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (1990), although he had long projected his 
postmaterialist theory to other westem, industrialized nations based on his findings in 
westem Europe. Data on the U.S. was also included in Modernization and 
Postmodernization (1997). Public opinion surveys are vital to Inglehart’s method of 
establishing a postmaterialist shift and he must have a time series to establish change over 
time. His time series on Westem Europe goes back to 1970 but his data on the U.S. is 
limited to two surveys, one in 1981 and the other in 1990." Two potential problems
'“Inglehart does not emphasize the formation o f  the “new right” in later works as 
he does in earlier works. However, he does indicate in later works that there is a 
reactionary function where those with materialist values are fighting for their 
disappearing values. The seeming increase in fundamentalism is one of the 
manifestations o f this. “The rise o f militant religious fundamentalism in the United States, 
and o f xenophobic movements in Westem Europe, represents a reaction against rapid 
cultural changes that seem to be eroding some o f the most basic values and customs o f 
the more traditional and less secure groups in these countries” (1997,251).
"The United States was surveyed in the 1981 and 1990-91 World Values Survey. 
See Inglehart 1997, appendix 1 and 5. The U.S. was also surveyed in the presidential
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emerge: the very limited time series that Inglehart uses, and the wholesale application o f a 
European-rooted theory to the United States. This may make Inglehart’s theory o f value 
change suspect when applied to the United States.
Caveats aside for the moment, it seems that Inglehart has captured a trend with his 
measure o f materialist and postmaterialist values. Figure 2.1 shows the growth in 
postmaterialist values and the decrease in materialist values for the United States from 
1972 to 1992 using NES data.*^ Those who picked one postmaterialist value and one 
materialist value, the majority of those surveyed, are labeled as mixed. Based on 
Inglehart’s theory, we should find postmaterialist values rising since 1972 as younger 
cohorts enter the electorate. Similarly, we should find materialist values decreasing as 
older cohorts exit the electorate. Those with mixed orientations should also be steadily 
declining as postmaterialists expand within the electorate. Those with mixed orientations 
should also be steadily declining as postmaterialists expand within the electorate. It 
should not be the case that those with mixed orientations are simply in transition on their
election years o f 1972-1992 by the NES. However, Inglehart seldom utilizes this data, 
preferring the World Values Survey so he can make multinational comparisons.
‘^ The NES asked a variation o f Inglehart’s original question in presidential 
election years from 1972-1992, at which time it discontinued the question. The NES 
asked: “For a nation, it is not always possible to obtain everything one might wish. On 
this page, several different goals are listed. If  you had to choose among them, which 
would seem the most desirable to you? Which one would be your second choice?” 
Respondents were then given the same four choices as listed in footnote 8. Inglehart 
expanded the values question in 1977 to include a  total o f twelve options as indicated 
above. NES did not expand the original four-choice question to include the eight 
additional choices. However, NES data will be used because it provides a substantial 
time series, being asked every four years from 1972-1992. In addition, Inglehart has 
defended the validity o f the four-item question when compared with the 12-item question 
(Inglehart and Abramson 1999).
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way to postmaterialist values. According to Inglehart, values are formed in one’s
formative years and the change in value orientation is generational. Therefore, an
individual’s values should not be subject to conversion.
FIGURE 2.1 
VALUE PREFERENCES: 1972-1992
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Table 2.2 shows the bivariate regression results o f each value with time, which 
indicate that there is a statistically significant secular trend for all three value 
orientations.^^ However, the trend for mixed orientations moves in the wrong direction; it 
has significantly increased over the time series rather than decreased, as expected. 
Nevertheless, the trends for both materialists and postmaterialists behave according to 
Inglehart’s theory. As the for these two models indicate, time accounts for a 
substantial amount o f the variation in the independent variable. Thus, at least cursorily, 
there is evidence that Inglehart has captured some kind of trend in the United States. One 
task for the next chapter will be to see if  Inglehart’s broad, all-encompassing theory holds 
up when it is applied specifically to the United States given the above caveats and the fact 
that the mixed category does not behave as Inglehart expects.
TABLE 2.2
BIVARIATE REGRESSION OF TIME ON VALUES, 1972-1992
VALUE ORIENTATION
Materialist Mixed Postmaterialist
Intercept 40.5 53.3 6.2
Temporal Counter -4.2** 2.1* 2.1**
(•9) (.5) (-4)
Adj. R2 .81 .76 .84
Durbin-Watson 2.8 3.2 2.3
N 6 6 6
*ps.05
**ps.01 Standard error in parentheses
'^The effect o f time is captured by a  temporal counter, set to 0 in 1972 and 
increasing +1 for each presidential election year.
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In the United States’ two-party system, there is not the choice o f parties that those 
who live in a multiparty system have and the formation of viable third parties is very 
difficult. If  values are shifting in the U.S., it would therefore be imperative that the two 
American political parties adjust their beliefs to accommodate the shifting of values if 
they are to be relevant to the electorate. But, the rational political party in a two party 
system will position itself so it can capture the most voters (Downs 1957). In other 
words, it will move to the center. Is there really much difference between the platforms 
o f the two major parties today? To determine this, looking to the actual party platforms 
win be imperative. Their content wül be analyzed by looking for the way issues are 
prioritized by the parties and how this has changed over time. In addition, the degree of 
polarization on issues will also be important. One possible reason why the decline of 
political parties may have occurred is that they have failed to reflect issues important to 
the electorate and have become less consequential to significant portions o f the electorate. 
If  there has been a change in values taking place but political parties are not reflecting this 
change, select groups may become much less partisan or remove themselves firom the 
electorate. Alternatively, the electorate may be sufficiently fi-agmented and disengaged 
that it is impossible for the party to know where to position themselves to attract the most 
voters.
Inglehart remarks that the cultural changes he has unmasked have “. . .  left 
Western political systems in a  schizophrenic situation” (252). The old issues axis was 
based on social class; the new issues axis, still in transition, will be based on 
‘Tostmodem and fundamentalist worldviews” (265). It seems that even where there is a
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multiparty system in place, the major political parties are still largely focused on the old 
axis. Minor parties have grown up around the new issues and are growing in power.
Inglehart does not believe the spread o f postmaterialist values began until about 
two decades after World War II (210). Children bom and socialized in the much more 
stable and affluent atmosphere of the postwar world, essential for the formation o f 
postmaterialist values, would be o f legal age by that time. Roughly, these values would 
have become evident in the mid-1960s, about the time many believed the U.S. should be 
experiencing a partisan realignment that never materialized, even in decades after. 
Inglehart views the 1972 election in the U.S. as pivotal because “for the first time in 
history, white working class voters were about as likely to vote for the Republican as for 
the Democratic candidate” (1997,244). In fact, it is Inglehart, in a separate vein o f work 
with a  coauthor, who first applies the term “dealignment” to the situation of the United 
States in the late 1960s (Inglehart and Hochstein 1972). Since Inglehart’s value change 
is perceived as cutting across both parties’ traditional bases o f support, dealignment could 
be the result o f  the onset o f a postmaterialist-materialist value distinction. The beginning  
o f dealignment is commonly placed in the mid-1960s, about the same time that Inglehart 
believed postmaterialist voters would begin entering the electorate. This brings us back 
around to a  discussion of cleavages that play such an important role in society and in 
realignment theory.
Critical Realignment Theory in a Societal Context
Two streams of scholarship have been reviewed, realignment theory and value 
change. On the surface, they seemingly do not have much in common. However, a
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fiirther look may show that value change in society may affect the state o f realignment 
theory in the United States. Politics does not exist in a vacuum. It exists within society. 
Society affects politics but politics also affects society. By combining the insights from a 
theory o f political change (realignment theory) with a theory o f societal change (value 
change), we can hopefully add something constructive to our knowledge. Considering 
social and  political change may help explain the poverty of critical realignment theory 
since the New Deal. Thus, ex amining  social change in conjunction with critical 
realignment theory is of paramount importance when seeking to establish the 
contemporary status of that theory.
First, it will be necessary to reexamine critical realignment theory from the basis 
of cleavages since they serve as the foundation o f the theory. If  groups are less partisan, 
then partisan realignment is in jeopardy of being an historical artifact. One alternative 
might be an ideologically based realignment that some believe might be taking place 
(Rabinowitz, Gurian, and MacDonald 1984; Ladd 1995; Levine, Carmines, and Huckfeldt 
1997). An ideological realignment may not correspond exactly with the major political 
party identification and thus would be difficult to see using the traditional methods o f 
identifying partisan realignments. Second, Inglehart’s research suggests that there is a 
new cleavage, one based on a  change in values that crosscuts the old partisan cleavages.
If this is the case, it could serve as a basis for future partisan realignments, but only i f  the 
political parties begin to respond and polarize on the issues important to the new 
cleavage. One requirement for a critical realignment is that there must be polarization on 
a critical issue (Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983). Eventually, the polarization manifests
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itself in the major political parties and the public has a clear choice on the critical issue. 
Examining the behavior of the two major political parties, therefore, is essential in 
assessing the state o f realignment theory. It is possible that the materialist-postmaterialist 
dimension gives us the critical issue, but there has not been any polarization among the 
political parties. By analyzing the platforms o f the two major political parties, one can 
determine if  polarization is present and on which particular issues.
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CHAPTERS 
CHANGING ELECTORAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
This chapter will examine two areas o f  interest to those who study the behavior of 
the American electorate; aggregate electoral behavior and cleavage behavior. This will be 
accomplished using data from the biennial American National Elections Studies (Sapiro, 
et al., 1998; Sapiro, Rosenstone, and NES, 1999). With this data, one can study elections 
from the period 1952-1998.
First, the aggregate behavior o f the electorate is examined. Chapter Two briefly 
presented the foundations from which this discussion will proceed. On the one hand, we 
have the realignment/dealignment framework that conceives of electoral change as a 
cyclical process. Partisan alignments decay over time into a state of dealignment where 
partisan attachments o f the electorate are weakened. After a period of time, a new 
alignment will form and the cycle begins again. The other framework presented was 
apartisanship, a  new terminology and new distinction for something that is usually 
lumped under the rubric o f dealignment. But there is a distinction between dealignment 
(within the realignment framework) and apartisanship (outside the realignment 
framework). Dealignment will progress into a  realignment. Apartisanship involves a 
prolonged period o f fluid and volatile voter behavior; there is no expectation o f a 
forthcoming realignment. Thus, much as time is the key in distinguishing between
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secular and critical realignments, time also helps distinguish between periods o f 
dealignment and periods o f  apartisanship. The evidence in this first section, however, 
leaves a confused picture as to whether either o f these firameworks fit recent electoral 
behavior.
Secondly, I will examine the behavior of cleavages within the electorate.' If 
cleavages are both the bedrock o f realignment theory and the foundation of Inglehart’s 
theory of value change, it makes sense to examine the two in conjunction. We may find 
that the two theories are linked in an important way to what has been occurring in the 
American electorate in the last 35 years. Additional questions arise, however, when 
cleavage behavior is examined in light o f Inglehart’s theory o f value change. Finally, 
Inglehart’s theoretical foundations will be examined because o f questions presented by 
the analysis of cleavages and their voting behavior.
Overall, the evidence suggests that it is time to think anew about sandwiching 
electoral periods between critical realignments. Cleavage behavior has changed over the
‘A cleavage necessarily involves a division within a broad classification such as 
gender, educational attainment, or class to name just a few. Recall the definition of 
cleavages given by Lipset and Rokkan and discussed in Chapter Two. Cleavages are 
divisions in society that stem firom characteristics within the electorate (1967). Also 
recall that Key speaks o f realignments being based in population categories (1959). Take 
gender as an example. Gender is divided into male and female; these two groups make 
up the cleavage o f gender. One can call gender a cleavage whether the groups that make 
up that cleavage are partisanly distinct or not because it encompasses a division within 
society. Realignment theory (whether critical or secular) is concerned with the partisan 
attachment of the groups that make up cleavages. Determining which groups within the 
electorate are aligned with a  political party and which groups are not is cmcial. Groups 
within the cleavage can be termed active or latent in terms of their partisanship, the 
criteria for which is set forth below. Critical realignment theory is concemed with the 
partisan attachment o f these groups in society that make up cleavages.
46
course o f  the time series and the changes suggest that critical realignment theory is no 
longer a theory that fits with the contemporary electorate which has profoundly changed 
in recent decades. Critical realignment should no longer serve as the lens through which 
we view the behavior of the electorate because the contemporary electorate cannot satisfy 
the requirements o f the theory. Yet, these changes in the electorate do not seem to stem 
from Inglehart’s conception o f the way the electorate has been changing.
Changes in the Political Environment 
There are many indicators that suggest we must revise the way in which we think 
about electoral behavior. Political variables that have witnessed change over time include 
voter turnout, incidence of divided government, and the many indicators o f 
“dealignment” to which observers point, such as rising numbers o f  independents, more 
voters splitting tickets, and partisan defectors.
As mentioned in the previous chapter. Key believed that a critical election would 
involve a substantial portion o f the electorate (1955). Many initially hailed the 1994 
congressional elections as an historic, critical realignment, but the “realignment” was not 
sustained in subsequent elections. The fact that the Republicans captured both chambers 
o f Congress was certainly historic, but it was not a  realignment. First o f  all, the emphasis 
that Key put on the electorate’s involvement in the election is seldom discussed as a 
factor in critical realignments. Only 36.6% o f the voting age population turned out to 
vote for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994 (U.S. Census Bureau 1999, 301).
Key did not set exact guidelines for determining if  the electorate’s involvement in an 
election was deep, intense, and high, but it would seem that a little more than one-third of
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the electorate participating does not come close to that mark. Of those voting, 52.4% 
voted for the Republican House candidate in their district (U.S. Census Bureau 1998, 
283). Translate this into the percentage of the voting age population that voted for a  
Republican candidate and it is 19.2%. That does not give the Republican party a credible 
basis for proclaiming a mandate, let alone signal a  critical realignment. Voter turnout in 
the United States has declined to the extent that on this criterion alone, no recent election 
qualifies as any type o f  realignment (Figure 3.1).
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FIGURE 3.1
TURNOUT FOR PRESIDENT AND HOUSE, 1952-1998
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Source: Statistical Abstract 1999, 301.
The much cited divided government also reared its head after the New Deal 
realignment (Table 3.1). Divided government has increasingly become the norm since 
1952. Sundquist (1988) has argued for a new theory of government because divided 
government does not fit the traditional conception o f government, i.e. single party control. 
Divided government has the same effect on realignment theory. It makes our traditional 
conception less useful in explaining today’s behavior. This view is supported by Epstein
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(1986), who states, “Realignment theory rests on that expectation [of unified party 
government] - explicitly on a  restoration o f a close tie between presidential and 
congressional elections that would be both a cause and effect o f greater policymaking 
cohesion of congressional parties” (69). For Brady, divided government alone would 
indicate we can no longer expect realignments because one o f his criteria for a 
realignment is the existence o f  unified government for a m inim um five elections (1985, 
30). Divided government, as Mayhew (1991) documented and Jones (1994) 
substantiated, may not make much difference in terms o f the policy that is being made, 
but it does make a  profound difference when dealing with a theory that seeks to explain 
partisan change in the electorate and the elected ofScials the system produces.
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TABLE 3.1
INCIDENCE OF DIVIDED PARTY GOVERNMENT
Period House Senate White House Divided
1951-52 o o o
1953-54 • • •
1955-56 o o • ✓
1957-58 o o •
1959-60 o o • /
1961-62 o o o
1963-64 o o o
1965-66 o o o
1967-68 o o o
1969-70 o o • ✓
1971-72 o o • y
1973-74 o o • y
1975-76 o o • y
1977-78 o o o
1979-80 o o o
1981-82 o • • y
1983-84 o • • y
1985-86 o • • y
1987-88 o o • y
1989-90 o o • y
1991-92 o o • y
1993-94 o o o
1995-96 • • o y
1997-98 • • o y
1999-2000 • • o y
2001-2002 •
o Democrats control 
•  Republicans control
• y
Source: Stanley and Niemi 1998,35. Updates by author.
^A 50-50 split in the Senate occurred from the 2000 elections. From January 4 to 
20,2001 the Senate was controlled by Democrats due to the fact the Vice President was 
Democrat A1 Gore. Republican Vice President Dick Cheney took office on January 20 
and control reverted to the Republicans. However, control o f the Senate again changed 
hands on June 6, 2001 after Senator James Jeffords left the Republican party to become 
an independent. Democrats held a plurality of seats and again controlled the Senate.
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Evidence for Dealignment, Apartisanship, or Both?
Factors that have spurred talk of dealignment are indicators that show a decline in 
partisan attachment in the electorate. These indicators include the rising numbers o f 
independent voters, rising numbers of split-ticket voters, and increasing party defectors. 
However, one must be careful when making blanket statements about the declining 
partisanship o f the electorate because there are myriad ways to define these measures and 
there is a long-standing debate over whether self-professed partisanship is stable or 
unstable.^ Dealignment, as viewed firom within the realignment firamework, would 
suggest that a period of steadily declining partisanship would precede a realignment. The 
partisan attachments o f the electorate would be in transition during a dealignment. The 
following realignment would see partisanship increase and become stable once again. 
Apartisanship, a view that steps outside the realignment firamework, is consistent with 
dealignment in that there is an absence of partisanship, but the lack of partisanship would 
continue unabated because no realignment would follow. In addition, a period of 
apartisanship would exhibit volatility as partisanship is not in transition, but is merely in a
^The American Voter (Campbell, et al., 1960) found that individual partisan 
identification was stable. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989) seemingly challenged 
this view with their concept o f macropartisanship which found that partisanship in the 
aggregate was unstable, fluctuating with presidential performance and economic 
situation. This view has been challenged, most recently by Green, Palmquist, and 
Schickler (1998), to which MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1998) persuasively 
responded. It should be noted that MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson do not see their view 
o f partisanship in the aggregate as inconsistent with the view that one’s individual 
partisan identity is stable (1998). Regardless, caution should be exercised when 
interpreting aggregate measures o f partisan identification. Presumably, using only 
partisanship (regardless o f  which party) as a measure can alleviate some, but not all o f 
this concern. In later analysis, self-professed partisan identification will not be used 
precisely because o f its murky nature.
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permanent state o f flux.
Figure 3.2 shows strength o f partisanship in the electorate regardless o f party 
preference.** Respondents are asked, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of 
yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” and then prompted to 
classify their partisanship as strong or not very strong if  they identify with Republicans or 
Democrats. Those who answer strong, regardless o f party are represented as strong 
partisans; those who answer not so strong, regardless o f party are classified as weak 
partisans. I f  the respondent claims to be independent, the respondent is then asked if 
he/she is closer to one party or the other. Leaners are those who indicate they lean toward 
one party or the other and also those who respond to the initial question with “no 
preference” but then go on to indicate they feel closer to one major party when probed. 
Therefore, it must be recognized that leaners are both those who initially respond 
“independent” and upon probing indicate a  partisan preference and those who respond 
“no preference” but go on to indicate they “lean” toward one party or the other. As 
Wattenberg (1996) points out, this is an important distinction because there is a 
qualitative difference between the two responses but they are categorized as the same in 
the summary question used in Figure 3.2.^
**The summary question on partisan identification is used. 1952-96 NES 
VCF0305; 1998 recode of NES V980339.
^Wattenberg (1996) established that the no preference category has steadily 
increased since 1968.
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HGURE 3.2 
STRENGTH OF PARTISANSHIP, 1952-1998
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As Figure 3.2 shows, the vast majority of the electorate has remained either 
strongly or weakly partisan, but partisan nonetheless. Strong partisans have rebounded 
from the trough their numbers hit in the late 1970s and have actually begun to expand in 
the electorate. Weak partisans still make up a  plurality o f the electorate although their 
numbers have declined slightly. The major category o f interest is the group classified as 
leaners because here is where the steady growth has taken place, ending the series at
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approximately 25%. Independents are pure independents who maintain their 
independence when probed. The much touted independent, however, makes up a 
relatively small portion o f the electorate. The number o f  pure independents has actually 
declined since peaking in the mid-1970s, and has since remained fairly constant at around 
10%.
Figure 3.2 can be divided into 3 distinct time periods. From 1952-1962, the 
partisanship o f the electorate was remarkably stable. Weak and strong partisans stayed 
constant and together made up the vast majority o f  the electorate, never dipping below 
70% during this period. Leaners and independents were also quite stable and together 
made up about a  quarter o f the electorate. Beginning in 1964, however, the picture begins 
to change. Trend lines for 1964-1978 are consistent with the expectations o f 
dealignment- Strong partisans precipitously decline until 1978. Weak partisans become 
more volatile, showing both marked increases and marked decreases during the fourteen 
year period. Leaners and independents both steadily increase their share o f the electorate. 
The final period can be delineated beginning  after the 1978 election and continuing until 
the present. During this period, the expectations o f  dealignment are not consistently met 
and the picture becomes one o f partisan volatility. The movement o f both strong 
partisans and independents has been relatively smooth and both move in contrary 
directions to what the dealignment framework would predict. Strong partisans began to 
increase from their low point o f 1978. Independents began to steadily decrease. A t the 
same time, the movement o f  both weak partisans and leaners became more volatile from 
year to year.
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Figure 3.3 presents an alternative way o f looking at the movements of 
partisanship. It simply classifies as partisan those who initially indicate they are a 
Republican or a  Democrat, regardless o f strength of that association. Apartisans represent 
those who initially signify a lack o f identification with either party. As noted above, these 
include those who identify as independents and those who profess no preference. While 
there are qualitative differences in these responses, both do represent partisan detachment. 
This lack o f partisanship is o f major concern in assessing the status o f partisan 
realignment theory. Notice that partisanship drops remarkably beginning  in 1964, but 
begins to make a slight comeback in 1980. It is not, however, on the same scale as the 
partisanship o f  the electorate in the earliest time period. Since 1984, partisanship and 
apartisanship in the electorate has showed volatility from year to year. During the final 
period of the time series, apartisans make up about one-third o f the electorate.
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HGURE 3.3
PARTISANSHIP AND APARTISANSHIP, 1952-1998
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Another indicator of declining partisanship, partisan defection, combines self- 
identification and self-professed voting behavior. This measure is one indicator of the 
strength o f one’s partisan attachment. Dealignment and apartisanship, both, would 
predict increases in partisan defectors as party comes to mean less to all voters, even 
partisans. Dealignment would be indicated by steady increases and a leveling off as 
partisan preferences realign. Apartisanship would be indicated by increasing numbers but
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also volatility as the electorate is not in transition to new alignments but entering a period 
of fluidity in partisan attachment. For both fiameworks, party loyalty decreases and in the 
case o f apartisanship, becomes more volatile. Figure 3.4 shows trends in defection. Only 
self-identified partisans who vote for the opposing major party in the particular race are 
included. There is only a very slight increase in defections over time evident in votes for 
Congress. The mean percentage of defections in a given House election is 11.7% and 
12.1% for Senate elections, not a substantial proportion of partisans. Partisans voting for 
the opposing party’s presidential candidate have actually decreased over time.^ If  one 
uses the three time periods delineated above to examine trends in partisan defections, one 
again finds stability from 1952-62. 1964, however, begins a somewhat volatile period. 
From 1978 to the end o f the time period, the volatility o f the earlier period ceases. 
Defections in presidential contests decline to their lowest numbers during the latter time 
period, while house and senate defections stay rather constant. Defections in house and 
senate races in the final time period are slightly higher overall than the previous two 
periods. Yet, defectors do not make up a substantial proportion o f partisans.
®One possible explanation for the decline is that people are simply self-identifying 
with the party whose presidential candidate they supported, providing cursory evidence 
for the macropartisanship thesis of MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989, 1998). 
However, their view o f macropartisanship might be something that developed over time 
since defection was most likely in presidential races at the beginning of the time series, 
but at the end o f  the series was the least likely contest in which one would find defections.
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One final indicator of declining partisanship that is often used is evidence of split- 
ticket voting. Again, both dealignment and apartisanship would predict that as 
partisanship becomes less important, ticket-splitting would become more common. Split- 
ticket voting does not take into account one’s partisan identification but merely measures 
the percentage of voters casting ballots where there is a split partisan vote for two 
particular races. Figure 3.5 shows levels o f split-ticket voting. Again, the middle time
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period is consistent with the expectations o f dealignment and apartisanship; in the early 
1960s, split ticket voting began to notably increase. It reaches its peak from 1972 to 
1980. However, since the peak, it has declined for all combinations of races. In addition, 
split-ticket voting is not as widespread as may be commonly assumed; there is only one 
incidence, the 1978 Senate-House contests, where more than 30% o f the electorate split 
their ticket. Similar to what was found above, from the late 1970s until the present split 
ticket voting has declined, a trend that is contrary to the expectations of dealignment and 
apartisanship.
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On the face of this data, we are left with an inconsistent picture that does not 
easily fit into either framework: dealignment/realigpment or apartisanship. The 
dealignment framework would predict steady decreases in partisanship and increases in 
both rates of defection and split-ticket voting since the mid-1960s in the build-up to a 
realignment. The apartisanship fimnework would predict decline and increasing volatility 
in partisanship and increases in defection (with accompanying volatility) and split-ticket
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voting since the mid-1960s as the electorate becomes unmoored from partisan linkages 
indefinitely. What seems to have happened is that the common indicators o f dealignm ent 
did behave as expected until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since this time there has 
been volatility in some indicators, as would be expected by apartisanship, but there is the 
lack o f volatility in some indicators as well. For example, we see erratic movement in 
weak partisans and leaners but rather constant trends for both strong partisans and 
independents. People who say they are partisans still comprise the vast majority o f the 
electorate and partisan defectors in presidential elections have actually declined over 
time, perhaps hinting at the tendency of voters to simply identify with the party of their 
presidential vote. Partisan defectors from the parties remain fairly constant during the 
later time period. In addition, incidence of ticket splitting has actually declined from its 
peak in the late 1970s. The above data, however, are simplistic and might be masking 
important movements w ithin the electorate in certain groups. Therefore, it is necessary to 
delve deeper into the behavior o f voters to see what has happened over the last half- 
century.
Have Cleavages Changed over Time?
As discussed in Chapter Two, cleavages are the foundation upon which 
realignments are based. At issue will be whether the cleavage structure in the United 
States has changed over the time period being examined, 1952-1998. The traditional way 
o f making sense o f the behavior o f the American electorate has been sandwiching party 
systems between partisan realignments. With the advent o f a prolonged period o f so- 
called dealignment in the mid-1960s, however, political scientists were left contemplating
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whether or not the fifth party system had come to an end and we had entered into a sixth 
(Aldrich and Niemi 1996). This is when the disarray in realignment theory began for 
dealignment did not progress into a new alignment o f voters, which according to 
Burnham’s classification scheme would begin a new party system (1970). At this point, 
political scientists began speculating that realignment or some variant thereof was either 
here or just around the comer after virtually every election. Unfortunately for those 
seeking tidiness in realignment theory, the transitional dealignment period has persisted 
for 35 years, about the same period o f time that Burnham posited was in an entire 
realignment cycle (1970,26). However, firom the data presented above, it would seem 
that dealignment alone does not adequately explain the events o f the last 35 years. It does 
seem to fit firom the mid-Sixties to the late Seventies, but then its expectations are not met 
in the behavior o f the electorate. In addition, apartisanship does not seem to adequately 
describe electoral behavior either, at least based upon the cursory evidence presented 
above. Accordingly, it is necessary to delve deeper into the behavior o f  the electorate by 
examining the way various groups have voted over time
Therefore, my task in the remainder o f this chapter is to shed some light on not 
only how the electorate has changed and its implications for realignment theory, but also 
to explore one possible explanation for why the electorate has been in such a state of flux. 
Realignm ent theory will be discussed in the context o f a specifically posited social 
change, a  change in values as conceptualized by Ronald Inglehart. Realignment theory 
and Inglehart’s conception o f  value change both have expectations regarding cleavages 
within the electorate. The lack of a  critical realignment, which has caused many
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consternation, could be related to the societal change Inglehart sees taking place globally. 
I will first examine the voting behavior of certain cleavages in the United States. The 
evidence suggests marked changes in the way various groups in the contemporary 
electorate voted that would make a cleavage-based critical realignment all but impossible 
under current circumstances. However, some o f these changes are inconsistent with 
Inglehart’s expectations o f cleavage behavior in postindustrial society. Thus, I then turn 
to examining the theoretical basis o f Inglehart’s theory o f  value change. The results call 
into question the applicability o f Inglehart’s theory to the United States for it seems that 
Inglehart’s measure o f postmaterialism is perhaps capturing the increasingly ideological 
nature o f the American electorate.
Cleavages, Critical Realignment, and Value Change
Inglehart’s identified value change has ramifications for the traditional cleavage 
structure in the United States which would necessarily affect realignment theory. He sees 
a new cleavage forming, a  value cleavage, that crosscuts traditional cleavages and 
partisan identity (1997, 330). This value change he believes is occurring does not 
correspond to existing partisan labels because postmaterialist issues do not correspond to 
the traditional issue stances that parties represent (Inglehart 1984, 54-55). . .
[Postmaterialists] have less incentive to identify with any specific political party among 
the available choices. The established political parties were established in an era 
dominated by social class conflict and economic issues and tend to remain polarized 
along these lines” (Inglehart 1997, 311). In addition, Inglehart believes most existing 
demographic cleavages also do not correspond to postmaterialist values. Age and
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education would be the exceptions because postmaterialist values should correspond to 
age (those socialized since WWII) and education (those with higher education levels, as 
this is an indicator o f formative security). Accordingly, this should render traditional 
cleavages such as religion and social class less relevant to vote choice over time as 
postmaterialists grow in the electorate. He remarks that the changes he has unmasked 
have “. . .  left Western political systems in a schizophrenic situation” (1997,252). 
Schizophrenic might be an apt description o f  the state o f realignment theory in recent 
decades and since the onset of dealignment and the emergence o f  postmaterialist values 
coincide, there might be a relationship. Inglehart views the 1972 election in the U.S. as 
pivotal because “for the first time in history, white working class voters were about as 
likely to vote for the Republican as for the Democratic candidate” (1997,244). This 
would indicate a  once active group aligned with a certain party had become latent, evenly 
splitting its vote.
If cleavages are the bedrock upon which realignments are based, examining their 
voting behavior during the time when critical realignment theory has become so 
inadequate should be useful, especially since Inglehart believes traditional cleavages are 
being rendered irrelevant due to the value change he has unmasked. An examination of 
cleavages is the only way to determine who supports the Democratic Party and who 
supports the Republican party. To answer the question o f ‘who supports party x?’, one 
must talk in the languages of cleavages. I f  one carmot say how the cleavages divide and 
which party a group supports, then the answer is o f no interest for there is no way to 
distinguish one supporter from another. As new circumstances arise within society,
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cleavages may change. It could be that cleavages in society are reforming on a non- 
traditional axis. Inglehart believes the axis is the postmaterialist-materialist value 
distinction, but this axis does not correspond with partisan identity because o f a failure o f 
parties to adequately address and polarize on postmaterialist issues. If  there is no 
correspondence o f  this new axis to partisan identity, however, it would be impossible to 
have a partisan realignment.
If Inglehart is correct, we would expect the importance of traditional cleavages to 
be dissipating over time, beginning slowly in the mid 1960s and picking up steam as 
those socialized in the postwar era age. Since Inglehart’s value change is perceived as 
cutting across both parties’ traditional bases o f support, the seeming inapplicability o f 
realignment theory, whether resulting in dealignm ent or partisanship, could be the result 
o f the onset o f a postmaterialist-materialist value distinction. The beginning o f 
dealignm ent is commonly placed in the mid-1960s, about the same time that Inglehart 
believed postmaterialists voters would have been entering the electorate. The first task 
will be to track the vote choice of various groups that are potential cleavages in relation to 
party support for House o f Representative candidates since 1952. Using data j&om the 
biennial National Election Studies (Sapiro, et al., 1998; Sapiro, Rosenstone, and NES, 
1999) for the period 1952-1998, it can be determined if  the cleavage structure in the 
United States has changed over time.
The Importance of Cleavages
Cleavages make realignment meaningful. Saying that most Afiican-Americans 
support the Democratic party is both meaningful and easy to understand. If one
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encounters evidence that particular groups within a cleavage are not overwhelmingly 
supporting one party or the other, then the cleavage would seem to no longer be relevant 
to vote choice. The group’s political view and corresponding vote would not be cohesive. 
Inglehart has argued that traditional demographic cleavages such as class and religion are 
being replaced by a new, all encompassing value cleavage where the electorate is divided 
between those with materialist values that stress economic and physical security, and 
those with postmaterialist values that stress self-expression and quality o f life (1977, 
1997). As Inglehart conceptualizes this change, it cuts across most o f the old 
social/demographic cleavages and their traditional connection to party identity. If this is 
true, we would expect the importance of traditional cleavages to be dissipating over time, 
beginning slowly in the mid 1960s and picking up steam as those socialized in the 
postwar era age. The first task will be to track the vote choice o f various groups that 
make up potential cleavages in relation to party support for candidates for the House of 
Representatives since 1952.
Examining cleavages and their voting behavior can aid in establishing whether or 
not certain group characteristics are important to partisan vote choice. If  group identity 
has become less important to vote choice, this would lend support for Inglehart’s value 
change theory which says the new value cleavage will cut across traditional partisan 
cleavages. If traditional cleavages are dissipating without new ones taking their place 
then critical realignment theory, based on the concept of active cleavages within the 
electorate, cannot be applied to current electoral circumstances. While there are still 
groups that are partisanly aligned, the number of these groups have declined over time.
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These partisanly aligned groups are not a  sufBcient base for either party to win an 
election. To win elections, the parties must appeal to groups of swing voters who no 
longer maintain firm and stable partisan allegiance. Large segments o f  the electorate have 
become increasingly apartisan.
While many researchers o f electoral behavior focus on self professed party 
identification, this study will use the respondent’s self-reported vote for the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Wattenberg has argued voters are largely indifferent toward the two 
parties (1996). Similarly, Bullock notes, “since many voters either profess no party 
affiliation or regularly defect, party identification may not provide the perspective 
necessary to recognize a realigmnent” (1988, 554). I am interested in the electoral 
behavior o f  the respondents, not what they say is their party preference. After all, one 
might still be a registered Democrat and think of himself accordingly, even though he has 
voted predominantly for the Republican party for the last 10 years. Or, one might think of 
herself as independent but always cast her ballot for a Democrat, especially given the 
dearth of independent candidates. In addition, I am focusing on House elections because 
they occur with the most frequency and in aU districts simultaneously.’ Every voter does 
not have the opportunity to cast a ballot for senator or president every two years as they 
do with House elections. The presidential vote is increasingly image driven and not 
suitable for examining long-term partisan preferences in the aggregate. While image is 
certainly going to play a role in House elections, it will conceivably play the least role in
’There is precedent for using house vote with survey data as the basis of 
examining the alignment of cleavages (Kellstadt, et al., 1996b).
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all federal elections because House members attract less media attention on average 
(Jacobson 1997,101).
A word must be said about the role of incumbency. House incumbents are 
considerably more “safe” than their senate counterparts (Mann and Wolfinger 1980, 
Fiorina 1977, Mayhew 1974). However, Mann and Wolfinger (1980) have noted that 
voters base their votes for house candidates on the one they “like” the best, not 
automatically on incumbency or party identification. James Campbell (1993) has also 
pointed out that factors such as incumbency and the partisanship o f the district are 
constant factors and therefore cannot account for change fi-om election to election. The 
incumbency advantage will obviously have an effect on this analysis but it should balance 
out in the aggregate view. As Jacobson notes, “the electoral politics o f Congress may 
center largely on individual candidates and campaigns, but the collective results of 
congressional elections are what shape the course o f national politics” (1997, 124). We 
are, after all, concerned with electoral realignments because o f their impact on national 
politics.
Cleavages that will be considered include gender, age cohorts, race/ethnicity, 
education, place of residence, region o f residence, income, union membership, ideology, 
religion, and Inglehart's value measure.® Figures 3.6 - 3.24 map the way various groups 
are dividing their partisan votes for the House of Representatives since 1952. The lines 
represent the percent^e voting for the Democratic house candidate minus the percentage 
voting for the Republican house candidate, giving what will be called a partisan
®See Appendix 1 for breakdown o f categories.
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attachment score. Thus, a positive number indicates a majority of the group is voting 
Democratic while a negative number indicates a majority o f the group is voting 
Republican.® A group will be considered either active or latent, depending upon the way 
it is distributing votes. Those groups whose percentages indicate an ample majority of its 
members (60% or more) are voting for one party or the other wül be considered partisanly 
active. The group characteristic would seem to be important to partisan vote choice. 
Conversely, if  a group is not overwhelmingly giving support to one party, then the group 
as a whole is dividing its votes fairly evenly between the two parties and wül be 
considered latent.*® Index scores above 20 and below -20 wül signal that a group is active 
whereas points between 20 and -20 will indicate latency. For example, i f  women gave 
60% of their votes to Democratic House candidates and 40% to Republican candidates, 
their score would be 20 and they would be considered actively aligned. If men gave 55% 
of their support to Republican candidates and 45% to Democrats, their score would be - 
10 and they would be considered a  latent group. Trend lines converging around zero 
would indicate a dissipation o f that particular cleavage as groups are dividing their vote 
fairly evenly between the two parties, indicating they do not significantly support one 
party over the other. FinaUy, volatility, or lack of partisan consistency, on the part o f a 
group would lend support both for apartisanship and Inglehart’s theory.
Following Inglehart’s theoretical expectations, one should see fewer and fewer
^Percentages are calculated in terms o f the two-party vote.
'“This threshold is established because a supermajority rather than a bare majority 
would seem to be required to establish a group’s firm partisan aUegiance. If  one is 
seeking to describe a group’s partisan allegiance, a supermajority is required.
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active partisan cleavages as postmaterialists begin to multiply in the electorate beginning 
in the mid 1970s and wreak havoc on the traditional cleavage structure. There are two 
cleavages, however, that Inglehart believes will be of importance for postmaterialists: age 
and education. Those cohorts socialized in the post-World War II era should be the most 
likely to be postmaterialists because their basic needs and necessities would readily have 
been met. In addition, higher education levels should also correspond with 
postmaterialist values because Inglehart reties on education as an indicator o f one’s 
formative security, vital in establishing postmaterialist values. Therefore, these two 
groups should exhibit some cohesiveness in voting behavior, though not necessarily any 
partisan consistency since party ties are thought to be few for postmaterialists because o f 
the inadequate way in which the traditional parties address postmaterialist values.
Beyond these two cleavages, age and education, it can be inferred from Inglehart that he 
believes group identity will steadily become less and less relevant to one’s partisan vote 
choice.
The Cleavages
Gender. In recent U.S. history, gender has become important in terms o f vote 
choice. Gender had traditionally not been seen as a cleavage until the emergence in the 
1980s of the so-called gender gap. Before the 1982 election there was no discernable 
difference between the way men and women cast their votes (Figure 3.6). Men voted 
slightly more Democratic than women but both trend lines followed the same pattern o f 
movement. In the 1982 election, however, women began to move decisively toward 
Democratic house candidates; at the same time men began to move away from them.
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And, the trends no longer followed the same pattern. In the 1994 election, men gave a 
majority o f their vote to Republican house candidates for the first time since the 1952 
election. Women qualify as an active group for the 1982-1992 period, giving an average 
o f 61.3% o f their vote to Democratic house candidates. Since 1992, the gender gap 
between men and women has remained; women still vote more Democratic than men. 
Since 1994, however, women’s cohesiveness has declined; they are no longer an actively 
aligned group, and they have begun to fairly evenly split their vote between Republicans 
and Democrats in the 1990s.
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Age cohorts. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the voting patterns of different age 
cohorts. Those bom in 1926 and later are represented in Figure 3.7 and those bom prior 
to 1926 in Figure 3.8.
Those in cohorts one (bom 1959-80) and two (bom from 1943-58) should be, 
according to Inglehart, the generations most likely to be postmaterialists because they
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were socialized in the post-World War II era. These two groups, along with the highly 
educated, are the only cleavages that Inglehart believes will endure in a postindustrial 
electorate. Thus, they should be a cohesive voting block but not necessarily a consistent 
one in terms of partisan preference. Since postmaterialists are to be less partisan, we 
would expect the partisan preferences o f  these two cohorts to fluctuate. In fact, cohort 
one does exhibit cohesiveness and is very volatile in terms of partisan preference. It 
enters the electorate giving a large majority to Republican House candidates (67% in 
1978), but in the next election cycle almost evenly splits its vote between Democrats and 
Republicans. In the 1982 election, however, the youngest cohort gave its most 
overwhelming support to Republican house candidates in the time series (73%). Just two 
elections later, the youngest cohort gave overwhelming support to Democratic house 
candidates. By 1992, this group had become latent, splitting its two-party vote rather 
evenly but generally favoring Republican candidates. The overall volatility in cohort one 
is exemplified by the standard deviation from the mean partisan attachment score; with a 
mean partisan attachment score for the time series of .78, the standard deviation is 26.44.
The second cohort, those bom from 1943-1958, does not exhibit the erratic voting 
behavior o f the youngest cohort but does exhibit some cohesiveness. For most of the 
period under study, cohort two gave a majority o f their votes to Democratic house 
candidates. From 1970-76, they make up an active group for Democrats. Again briefly, 
in the elections o f 1988-92, they obtain partisan attachment scores above 20, making 
them actively aligned with the Democrats. With the pivotal 1994 election, however, 
cohort two voters bestowed majority allegiance to Republican house candidates, but they
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fall short of being an active group. By the end o f the time series, cohort two is evenly 
divided in its vote preference.
In terms o f Inglehart’s expectations regarding those voters most likely to be 
postmaterialist (cohorts one and two), the results are mixed. Cohort one is often cohesive 
and inconsistent as Inglehart’s theory would lead one to predict. However, cohort two, 
while sometimes cohesive does not show a pattern o f inconsistency in partisan choice as 
cohort one does and as we would expect.
The third cohort in Figure 3.7 consists o f those bom from 1927 to 1942. Cohort 
three briefly attains active status for the Democrats once in every decade but the 1980s. 
This lack of overwhelming Democratic support is surprising since a good portion of 
cohort three consists of voters who would have been socialized during the Great 
Depression and FDR’s New Deal. A  similar pattern o f behavior emerges with this cohort 
as the previous one; the early 1990s begin a period where these voters are evenly splitting 
their votes between Democrats and Republicans.
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Figure 3.8 depicts the oldest cohorts w ithin the electorate. Cohort four is made up 
those bom from 1911 to 1926. From 1958-1966, this cohort makes up an active partisan 
group for the Democrats giving their candidates an average of 61% o f their vote during 
this period. Also, during the elections from 1978 to 1992, cohort four becomes on 
average an active group for Democrats. Again beginning in the 1990s, this group as 
previous cohorts, lessens their support o f Democratic candidates.
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The remaining two cohorts by the end of the time series do not make up sufBcient 
numbers to be reliably included in what appears to be the pivotal decade of the 1990s. 
Cohort 5 briefly attains active status for the Democrats in a few elections (1962-1964, 
1974, and 1986) but is primarily a latent group during the time series. Cohort she is very 
erratic, going from active Democratic status in one election to active Republican status a 
few elections later. Much of this can be attributed to small sample size o f this cohort, 
especially beginning in the 1970s as this cohort begins to fade from the electorate.
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Race/Ethnicity. It is not surprising that the data show African-Americans and 
Hispanics as two o f  the Democratic party’s solid supporters (Figure 3.9). For the entire 
time series, African Americans give a vast majority o f  their vote to Democratic house 
candidates and obtain partisan attachment scores well above 20. Their support peaks in 
1976 when they give 97.2% o f their vote to Democrats. Most notably, however, they 
follow the pattern seen in previous groups; their partisan support has declined in the
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1990s. They end the time series giving their lowest, though still overwhelming, level o f 
support to Democrats (73.1%).
Hispanics are not identifiably sampled by NES until 1978. They, like Afiican- 
Americans, overwhelmingly support Democratic house candidates and their partisan 
attachment scores are well above 20 for the time series, making them an actively aligned 
group. The average partisan attachment score for Hispanics during the time series is 58.2, 
well above the established threshold o f 20. Unlike previous group behavior, however, the 
1990s do not see a decline in partisan support, but an increase in support for Democrats.
White voters attain active status in only two elections, 1964 and 1990 and both 
supporting Democrats. By 1994 they are giving majority support to Republican 
candidates (57.2%). But in subsequent elections in the 1990s, partisan support, while still 
favoring Republicans, becomes more evenly divided.
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Education. Education levels are categorized according to one’s highest level of 
educational attainment. At the beginning o f the time series in 1952, those with the lowest 
education levels do not attain active status, but do give a majority of their vote to 
Democrats (Figure 3.10). In fact, those with the lowest levels o f education do not give 
majority support to Republican candidates at any point in the time series. By the 1958 
election, both those with a grade school education or less and those without a high school
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diploma became actively aligned groups for the Democrats. In the case o f  those with the 
least education, from 1958 to the end of the time series, they maintain this status. High 
school drop outs, however, are a little less supportive o f Democratic house candidates 
than those with the lowest education levels. From 1970 to 1996, those without diplomas 
do maintain partisan attachment scores well above 20. Both groups in the lowest levels 
o f education, despite a spike for the 1996 election, show declining support for Democrats 
in the 1990s when compared to the two previous decades. The lowest education group 
maintains its active status, but high school drop outs not only fall into latency status with 
the 1998 election but split their vote evenly between Democratic house candidates and 
Republican house candidates.
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FIGURE 3.10
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Trends for those with higher levels of education are depicted in Figure 3.11. All 
three categories in 1952 give majority support to Republican candidates; high school 
graduates even obtain a partisan attachment score of -21.4 making them an active 
Republican group. By 1956, however, a majority of graduates support Democrats. For 
the remainder of the time series, high school graduates sporadically make up active 
groups for the Democrats, but rarely for more than one election at a  time. The one
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exception is their voting behavior from 1986 to 1992 where they do sustain active status. 
With the 1994 election, however, they plummet not just into latency, but to an even 
division o f their two-party vote. In subsequent elections, they again begin to favor 
Democratic candidates on the whole but only by slim margins.
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Voters who are high school graduates with some post secondary education are 
only an active group for one election, 1990, when they attain a partisan attachment score
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o f 22.8. This is their peak o f support for any party in the entire time series. In 1994, this 
category gives majority support to Republican candidates. They continue to do so in 
subsequent elections and strengthen their support for Republicans.
Finally, voters with the highest educational attainment give less support to 
Democrats on the whole than the other educational categories. In the 1958 election, they 
briefly achieve active Republican status. In the 1974 election, they momentarily achieve 
active Democratic status. By the election o f  1990, those holding college degrees were 
within .4 o f  a point o f being an actively aligned Democratic group. But, by 1994, they 
had switched majority partisan preference become an active Republican group, which 
they would maintain in 1996. In 1998, however, they substantially pulled back their 
support for Republican candidates.
Inglehart believes that those with the highest educational attainment should be one 
of the groups stül relevant in a postmaterialist electorate. Thus, they should be an 
increasingly cohesive voting block. The data presented here, however, do not meet these 
expectations. Those with college and professional degrees are an active Democratic 
group in 1974 and then become an active Republican group in 1994 and 1996 but do not 
sustain this cohesiveness in the 1998 election. In addition, since Inglehart believes 
political parties are doing an inadequate job representing the issues of primary importance 
to postmaterialist voters, they should not necessarily be consistently voting for one party 
or the other. There is some support in the data for partisan inconsistency. In 1970, those 
o f highest educational attainment had a partisan attachment score of precisely 0. The next 
two elections would find them giving majority support to Democrats, but in 1976 they
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give majority support to Republicans. For the remainder o f the 1970s and all o f the 
1980s, they support Democrats, but never overwhelmingly. By 1994, they have switched 
majority support to Republicans and this support was strong enough for them to be an 
actively aligned Republican group in both 1994 and 1996. Thus, Inglehart’s expectations 
are not wholly met in this data.
To summarize, one finds both similarities and differences in the educational 
category with other groups. Across the board, the election o f  1990 proved to be a peak in 
Democratic support for all education categories. Subsequent elections, however, show 
marked declines overall in Democratic fortunes. Both high school graduates and 
graduates with some post secondary education behave differently after the 1994 election 
than other previously examined groups; they strengthen their partisan support (one 
Democratic, the other Republican) whereas most groups after 1994 retreat from partisan 
support. In addition, the two categories o f lowest education attainment increase their 
Democratic support in 1996 but there is a subsequent decrease o f this support in the 1998 
election, a substantial one in the case o f those without high school diplomas.
Place of residence. Residents of central cities make up a solid Democratic 
constituency for a vast majority o f the time series (Figure 3.12). They never give majority 
support to Republican candidates and are actively aligned with the Democrats from 1956 
to 1992 (after which they drop to a partisan attachment score o f 19.4) and then return to 
active status in both 1996 and 1998. Rural voters have peak Democratic support in 1964, 
giving 68.2% of their support to Democratic house candidates, but Democratic fortunes 
with rural voters wLU not see this level of support for the remainder o f the time series. In
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the 1992 election, rural voters are still giving a majority of their two-party vote to 
Democrats but the 1994 election changes that when rural voters briefly become an active 
Republican group. In the two subsequent elections, rural voters still favor Republicans. 
But, by 1998 they are only giving Republican house candidates a 1.2 percentage point 
edge over Democrats. Suburban voters in 1990 favor Democrats, giving them 58.4% of 
their two-party vote, a  seven election high. Once again the 1994 election proves to be 
monumental; suburban voters switch majority support to Republicans and strengthen that 
support for the remainder o f  the time series. UnHke many o f the other categories, 
suburbanites are becoming more partisan at the end of the time series, not less.
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Region of residence. Figures 3.13 through 3.15 show voting behavior from a 
regional perspective. Figure 3.13 contains voting trends for those in border states and the 
South. The history o f house voting in border states is sporadic but favors the Democratic 
candidate. Only three times in the time series did border states give majority support to 
Republican candidates (1956,1962, 1984). From 1972 to 1992, border states qualify as 
an active Democratic group almost without interruption (interruptions being the elections
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of 1976 and 1984). Declining Democratic fortunes begin with the 1992 election and hit 
bottom with the 1996 election when only 53.8% o f voters in border states give support to 
Democratic candidates. However, in 1998, Democratic candidates see a  resurgence of 
support and again cross the threshold o f  being an actively aligned Democratic group, thus 
making the border states one of the few categories where partisanship increased in the 
final election o f the 1990s after the initial downturn o f that decade.
The South’s movement away firom its “solid” status is evident in Figure 3.13.
This region begins the time series giving overwhelming support to the Democrats. It is 
not until the 1994 election that the region’s majority begins to favor the Republican 
candidate in House level elections, and after a lessening of that support in 1996, 
strengthens it remarkably in 1998 to attain a  partisan attachment score of -35.6. As with 
the border states, the southern states are becoming more partisan in the final election o f 
the 1990s, but support diSerent parties.
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Figure 3.14 portrays trends from both the northcentral and northeastern United 
States. The northcentral United States only attains active status twice (1986 and 1990) 
and that status only endures for one election. Volatility is common; majority support 
switches party nine times from 1952-1998. Similarly, the northeast is quite volatile. The 
elections o f 1962 and 1964 see northeastemers maintaining  active Democratic status, but 
this is the only incidence o f active partisanship that endures for more than one election.
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In the 1990s, Democratic fortunes decline from their 1980s level o f support and the time
series ends with a partisan attachment score o f 3.8, indicating that northeastern votes are
almost evenly divided between the two parties.
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Finally, Figure 3.15 presents the data from the mountain West and the Pacific 
West. Early in the time series, the mountain West gives huge support to Democratic
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candidates; they are an active Democratic group from 1952 to 1960. However, in 1962, 
the mountain West supports Republican candidates at a very high level, only to return to 
the Democratic fold by similar margins. But, from 1968 to 1986, majority support in the 
mountain west is given to Republicans and active status is maintained from 1968-70 and 
from 1980-86. The elections of 1990 and 1992 sees the return o f the mountain West to a 
Democratic group, as with all the other regions, the 1994 election witnesses the shift to 
majority support for Republicans that is strengthened in the 1996 election. While majority 
support returns to the Democrats in 1998, the two party vote is almost evenly split. Thus, 
the mountain West ranks as the most volatile section o f the country (with a standard 
deviation of 30.3 from the mean partisan attachment score), the trend line looking much 
like the peaks and valleys o f this region’s natural landscape.
Despite beginning the time series voting substantially Republican, the Pacific 
West gives a majority o f their two-party vote to the Democratic party in all elections but 
three (1952, 1968, and 1986). Even in 1994, a decidedly Republican year, the electorate 
for this region votes a 50-50 split. By 1998, partisanship in favor o f Democratic 
candidates was increasing.
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Thus, regional trend depictions give us three patterns. For the six regions 
examined, two would seem to be becoming more partisan by the 1998 election, the border 
states and the South. Each end the time series as active groups; the border region for the 
Democrats and the South for the Republicans. One region, the Pacific West does not 
attain active status but with a partisan attachment score o f 12.8, ends the time series
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giving moderate majority support to Democrats. The remaining three regions end the 
series with small partisan attachment scores indicating the two party vote is closely 
divided. The mountain West, northcentral and northeastern United States have partisan 
attachment scores o f 5.8, 6.4, and 3.8 respectively at the end o f the time series.
Income. Income level voting trends are depicted in Figure 3.16. Those 
occupying the lowest 1/3 o f the income scale make up the low income category. 
Throughout the time series, they never give a majority o f their two-party vote to 
Republican candidates. In 1952, low income voters are at their lowest level o f 
Democratic support. Throughout the time series, the overall level o f support for 
Democrats rises until it reaches its peak in the 1990 election when 76.6% o f low income 
voters favor the Democratic house candidate. Even with this solidly Democratic 
constituency, the Democrats’ level o f support drops precipitously after the 1990 election 
and low income voters end the time series dropping from being actively aligned with the 
Democrats for the first time since 1968.
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Middle income voters, like their low income counterparts, have their peak 
Democratic support in the election of 1990 when 71% of them cast ballots for the 
Democratic house candidate. However, in the 1994 election, they switch majority party 
support to Republicans, the first time in the time series when a majority of the middle 
income voters cast ballots for the GOP. In the subsequent elections, partisan attachment 
scores are very small, all with absolute values less than 5, indicating an increased
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propensity for evenly splitting the two-party vote.
Finally, the high income voters comprise the upper 1/3 o f  the income scale. These 
voters do not attain active status for the entire time series until the 1994 and 1996 
elections when they overwhelmingly support Republican candidates. However, by 1998, 
while still giving a majority o f their support to the GOP, high income voters were not 
giving this support sufficiently to maintain their active status. Thus, at the end of the time 
series, all income categories had become much less partisan than they were just two 
elections earlier.
Union membership. Union households are an active Democratic group from 
1952 to 1994, with the exception o f the 1968 election when their partisan attachment 
score drops to 15.8 (Figure 3.17). With the 1996 and 1998 elections, a  majority of union 
households still support the Democrats but they fall into latent status with scores of 19.2 
and 14.2 respectively. As with many o f the previous trend lines, beginning in the 1990s, 
the partisan support o f union households declines. Nonunion households are only a 
partisanly active group in one election, 1990, when they obtain a  partisan attachment 
score o f 24.2. The very next election, however, nonunion households give a majority o f 
their vote to Republican house candidates but they do not become an actively aligned 
partisan group. Their support o f Republican house candidates after 1994 is not as strong.
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Ideology. While liberals throughout the time series are always actively aligned 
with the Democrats, the same cannot be said o f conservatives and their support for the 
Republican party (Figure 3.18). Mean liberal support for Democratic candidates for the
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time series is 77.1% with a standard deviation o f 3.8. Conservative voters during the time 
series gave an average o f 62.2% support for Republican candidates and the standard 
deviation o f 7.4 indicates comparatively more volatility. Conservatives qualify as an 
active Republican group in 1976, 1980-84, 1988, and 1992-1998, only 9 o f the 14 
elections, whereas liberals are an active Democratic group in all o f  the 14 elections. 
Conservatives are at their most partisan during the late 1990s than at any other time 
period and their partisan support peaks in 1996. Liberals are less partisan from 1992 to 
the end o f the time series; their partisan support peaks in 1988. Still, liberals are more 
partisan by the end o f the time series because their partisan attachment score in 1998 is 49 
whereas the partisan attachment score for conservatives is -41.
The vast majority o f the electorate inhabits the moderate and “don’t know” 
categories. The moderates were a consistently active Democratic group from 1982 to 
1990. However, after the 1990 election their support in every subsequent election drops 
off and they end the time series with a partisan attachment score o f 4.2, indicating they 
have become not only a latent group but one that is almost evenly dividing its vote 
between the two parties. Voters who respond to queries about their ideology with a 
“don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about it” strongly favor Democratic house 
candidates. While they miss the threshold for active status in 1972,1984, and 1998, they 
are not far from scores o f 20 in those years. The overall mean partisan attachment score 
for 1972 to 1998, the only years the ideology question was asked by NES, is 31. Those 
with ambivalent attitudes toward party ideology supported the Democratic house 
candidate with an average two-party vote o f  65.7%.
97
While liberals, moderates, and those ambivalent about ideology saw their support 
for Democratic candidates decline after the early 1990s, conservatives strengthened their 
support for Republican candidates. In 1990, conservatives only gave 56.5% o f their vote 
to Republicans but by 1996 were giving an all-time high o f 76.9% to them. The 
ideological bent of all categories decreased from 1996 to 1998. It is important, however, 
to recognize that liberals and conservatives retained their active status and the “don’t 
knows” only missed the partisan attachment score necessary to sustain their active status 
by .6 of a point. Therefore, even though the connection between ideology and vote choice 
was loosened, it remained strong.
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Religion. Religion has always played a unique role in American society and this 
role is an evolving one. This evolution makes the analysis of religion challenging. This 
difficulty is compounded when using NES data because of the lack o f continuity in both 
religious questions and coding o f religious denominations. Initially, the NES only asked 
respondents their preference o f religion by prompting them to choose from being
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Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. Only in 1970 was the question altered to include 
“something else” as one o f  the responses in the actual question itself. In 1960, the NES 
began asking Protestants to distinguish their denomination and allowed for approximately 
50 different codes." In 1990, when it became apparent to scholars who study religion and 
politics that the breakdown o f various denominations as being used by NES since 1960 
was incapable o f capturing the changing religious picture in the United States, the NES 
updated and expanded its denominational codes. This lack o f  continuity in both question 
format and in religious coding is extremely problematic when trying to get a picture of 
voting trends by religious groups. Consequently, religion in this study is examined in 
three ways in an attempt to get the most comprehensive picture o f  the voting behavior o f 
different religious traditions.
First, religion is presented in its simplest form using the basic categorization of 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish because this is the one question for which the NES 
provides continuous data for the entire 1952-98 time series (Figures 3.19). Because we 
know there are substantial voting behavioral differences that follow racial lines (Kellstedt, 
et al., 1996a), trends for only white Protestants are shown in Figure 3.19. This 
distinction, however, still does not alleviate the problem o f  putting all Protestants within 
one classification. As evangelicalism and fimdamentalism within Protestantism grew and 
mainline denominations declined during the mid to late twentieth century, the conflating 
of two often very different religious views under one categorization has masked important
"However, the question was not asked in 1962 but was resumed the following 
election year.
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dififerences in political behavior. Nevertheless, Figures 3.19 gives us a broad religious 
overview o f  the American electorate since 1952. While this overview is not perfect, it is 
still useful.
As can be seen, Jews are by far the most faithful supporters o f Democratic house 
candidates. In every election, they register as an active Democratic group. Democratic 
fortunes with Catholics have steadily fallen off since their peak support in 1960 when 
John F. Kennedy had remarkable coattails within the Catholic community. In 1994, 
Catholics gave majority support to Republican house candidates for the first (and only) 
time. The remainder o f the 1990s do see them return to giving majority support to 
Democratic house candidates but by shm margins. White Protestants rarely give majority 
support to Democratic house candidates during the time series. The 1998 election finds 
white Protestants giving their strongest support ever to Republican house candidates; they 
register a partisan attachment score of -31.8.
It is notable that what we do not see in the religion category is the across-the- 
board falling off o f  cleavage strength in the 1990s as has been evident in many o f  the 
other categories examined, indicating that at least for some, religious affiliation remains 
firmly linked to partisan vote choice. Jews are m aintaining  their active status as a 
Democratic group. White Protestants have strengthed their Republican support. Finally, 
Catholics do behave in the same manner as previous groups; their partisan attachment 
scores since 1994 hover around 0.
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A more nuanced view o f religion can be gleaned from NES data. However, this 
approach is not without its difficulties as well. The comparability of the 1960-1988 
coding and the 1990-98 coding o f  denominations is problematic. While possible to 
roughly translate denominational codes to make them comparable, the codebook warns o f 
this comparability as being “extremely dubious” (Sapiro, et. al, 1998). Kellstedt, et al., 
(1996a) provide guidance in categorizing the now more than 100 denominational codings 
that NES has used since 1990. They recommend 5 denominational distinctions within 
Protestantism: Evangelical, Mainline, Black, conservative nontraditional, and liberal 
nontraditional (188-189). These denominational assignments, the translation o f religious 
codes provided by NES, and the limitations o f  the NES data itself has led to Figures 3.20 
and 3.21, which offer a more nuanced categorization than the original religion question 
provides, but the data still must be viewed with the noted caveats.
From Figures 3.20 and 3.21, it is possible to more accurately gauge the partisan 
leanings of religious groups.*^ Figure 3.20 portrays voting trends for Catholic and Eastern 
Orthodox, Jewish, and secular respondents. Catholics and Eastern Orthodox are an active 
Democratic group in all but five elections, 1970, 1980, and 1994-1998. Most notably. 
Catholics and Eastern Orthodox began giving majority support to Republican candidates
'^Ideally, we would have ten categorizations: secular. Evangelical Protestants, 
Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, conservative nontraditional Protestants, liberal 
nontradtitional Protestants, Catholics, Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, and other nonchristian 
(Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt 1996). However, there are not sufficient respondents 
in several of these categories for the analysis to be reliable. Therefore, five categories 
will be utilized here: Secular, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Catholic and 
Eastern Orthodox, and Jewish. See Appendix Two for the breakdown of religious 
coding. The reference line at 1990 marks the change in NES denominational coding 
where comparability is in doubt.
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in both 1994 and 1996. Even though this majority support is slight, it is a remarkable 
change in a very short amount o f  time; the partisan attachment score for Catholics was 
24.4 in 1992 and plummeted to -2.2 in 1994. The 1998 election saw Catholics and 
Eastern Orthodox again giving majority support to Democrats, but the partisan 
attachment score is under 10 so the support is not overwhelming. The cohesiveness of 
the Jewish vote and its loyalty to Democratic house candidates is reflected m the fact that 
partisan attachment scores never fall below 20, the threshold for active status. Secular 
voters begin the time series in 1960 heavily favoring Republican candidates.*^ By the 
next election for which data is available (1964), the secular are heavily favoring 
Democratic candidates and do not return to Republican majority support.
'^Data for the 1996 and 1998 election is treated as missing for seculars because 
there were fewer than five respondents.
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Figure 3.21 breaks the Protestant faith into two different categories, mainline 
Protestants and white evangelicals.''* Mainline Protestants are those who belong to
'“It should be reiterated that the trends for Protestants before 1990 should be 
treated with caution due to the inadequacies of the NES categories within Protestantism. 
B eginning in 1990, the codes were adapted to better fit changing religious circumstances 
and, thus, are more reliable. In addition, there is a difference in political views between 
black evangelicals and white evangelicals as Kellstedt, et al., (1996a) point out. Black 
evangelicals are not sampled in large enough numbers by the NES to be included here.
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Methodist, Episcopalian, Congregationalists, Presbyterian and similar old-line 
denominations. Historically, mainline Protestants have always been perceived as a very 
Republican constituency, at least at the presidential level. The data for congressional 
elections show a group that gives majority support to Republican candidates in 75% of 
the elections captured in the time series but ojften not at active status levels. This is 
surprising because the strength o f that Republican support is not as strong as might have 
been assumed given presidential data and conventional wisdom. Mainline Protestants are 
sporadically an active Republican group, in 1960, 1968, and 1994-98. However, in 1990, 
mainline Protestants give a majority o f their vote to Democratic house candidates but are 
certainly not an actively aligned group. From that peak of Democratic support in one 
election, m ainline  Protestants immediately return to the fold o f the Republican party and 
the rest o f the 1990s see them strengthen that support so that they end the time series as 
an active Republican group and, if  the current trend continues, one that is deepening.
White evangelical Protestants are a much more Democratic constituency at the 
congressional election level during the bulk o f  the time series than are mainline 
Protestants. From 1960 until 1980, white evangelicals are a solidly Democratic group, 
reflecting the fact that evangelicals were disproportionately from the South and of lower 
income (Fowler and Hertzke 1995,97-98). During the early part of the time series, these 
two characteristics were likely to predispose them to the Democratic party even though 
they tended to be conservative in social outlook. Although much has been written about 
the move o f  white evangelicals to the GOP, the trend is not as pronounced when 
examining data on congressional elections. Ofren the local Democratic party was at odds
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with the national party’s outlook, especially in the South. In this region, there was also a 
dearth of Republican candidates during much o f the time period under examination.
Thus, there is a significant time lag involved in the move o f white evangelicals to the 
GOP from presidential election data to congressional election data.'^ The conservative, 
white evangelicals began moving to Republican presidential candidates in the mid-1960s. 
However, the retreat from Democrats happens after the 1978 election when one examines 
data for congressional elections. In 1980, white evangelicals give a majority o f their 
congressional vote to Republican house candidates for the first time. From 1984-1992, 
they evenly split on congressional candidates. In 1994, however, they support Republican 
House candidates by a whopping margin; their partisan attachment score in 1994 is -39.8.
‘^ For more on the dififerences between presidential and other elections in the 
South, see Glaser 1996.
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Attendance at religious services is also a characteristic that should be tracked as 
there is considerable evidence o f increasing bifurcation within religious traditions (Green 
et al., 1996, Layman and Carmines 1997, Layman 1999). Accordingly, Figure 3.22 
presents a final way to look at religion in the United States. It tracks House vote by 
whether one attends religious services firequently (weekly or more) and those who attend 
infrequently (few times a year, never). After 1984, frequent attendees begin voting for 
Democrats less and less. By 1992, they are giving solid majorities to Republicans. Those 
who never or infrequently attend services are much more predisposed to Democratic 
House candidates. Although their support drops after 1992 it rebounds at the end o f  the 
time series.
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Thus, the picture presented here is a mixed bag. By the last decade of the time 
series some religious traditions, Jews and mainline Protestants, maintain their historic 
support of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. On the other hand. 
Catholics and Eastern Orthodox, as weU as evangelical Protestants but especially white 
evangelicals have retreated from their historic overwhelming support o f one party, the 
Democrats. By the 1990s, vfrite evangelicals are decidedly favoring Republican 
candidates. Catholics and Eastern Orthodox indicate some ambivalence towards the two 
parties by the end o f the time series as they are almost evenly splitting their vote between 
the two. If the overall trend that is evident in the time series for Catholics and Eastern 
Orthodox since 1960 continues, then this partisan ambivalence will fade as Catholics 
strengthen their Republican support. Only time, however, wül reveal whether or not this 
trend will continue.
Overall, the voting trends o f religious groups in the United States do not conform 
to Inglehart’s expectations of declining importance; religion is stiU a salient characteristic 
for many voters. First, Jews traditional strong support o f  the Democratic party has 
continued. In the 1980s, Democratic support was at its lowest level but Jews still 
remained a very active group. Democratic support among Jews has since rebounded; the 
average partisan attachment score for the decade o f the Nineties was 49.5 making Jews 
one of the strongest Democratic constituencies. In addition, mainline Protestants are 
strengthening their support for the Republican party in the latter part o f the time series, 
being an actively aligned Republican group in the last half o f  the 1990s. House 
candidates can also count on solid white evangelical support in the 1990s.
I l l
More in accordance with Inglehart’s expectations, are the trend lines for Catholics 
and Eastern Orthodox. At the end o f  the time series, they are rather evenly divided on 
their support o f the two parties. Catholics and Eastern Orthodox are no longer in the 
active Democratic camp. It could be that they will continue to move decisively toward 
Republican support but future elections are necessary to see if  this trend continues.
Postmaterialist-materialist values. Finally, the last category examined is value 
orientation, those whom Inglehart identifies as having materialist, postmaterialist, or 
mixed values, and the relationship to vote choice.'® Inglehart is adamant that 
postmaterialist values will not correspond to partisan vote choice because parties have 
done an inadequate job of addressing issues important to postmaterialists. Since 
postmaterialist values are supposed to crosscut partisan lines. Figure 3.23 is surprising.
In fact, postmaterialists are a consistently active and strong group for the Democrats; the 
partisan attachment score for the time series is 27. This does not fit with Inglehart’s 
theoretical expectations as postmaterialists overwhelmingly favor Democrats. If 
postmaterialism were truly crosscutting partisan ties, one would expect latency and 
volatility, but not active partisan status.
Given Inglehart’s theory, one might expect materialists to be an active partisan 
group since it is their values that Inglehart believes the two parties have been addressing. 
However, materialists faü to attain active partisan status. Those with mixed value 
orientations also can be classified as a  latent group.
'®See Chapter 2 for the explanation o f how value orientation is determined with 
NES data. NES discontinued the Inglehart question after the 1992 survey.
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Cleavage Summary
If Inglehart is correct in his theoretical assumptions, cleavages should have begun 
to dissipate in the mid 1970s as postmaterialists voters make their presence felt in the 
electorate. However, an overview of the cleavage trends shows that the 1970s was not 
the pivotal decade. The 1990s were the decade where the dissipation o f cleavages 
materialized, several decades after Inglehart believed the change would become evident.
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If  one compares partisan attachment scores across the 1990$, there are many once active 
groups that fade into latency during this decade. Many have partisan attachment scores 
that hover around 0 indicating an even division o f the partisan vote. For these groups, the 
group characteristic is not important as a whole to partisan vote choice. In addition, most 
o f the groups, whether latent or active, show declining strength during the 1990s as well. 
Thus, there is a dissipation o f many cleavages found, as Inglehart would predict, but the 
time frame is different than what Inglehart predicted. There are, however, some notable 
instances where cleavages are not behaving as Inglehart thought, as in the cases of 
ideology, religion, region o f residence, race, age cohorts, and Inglehart’s own value 
orientation. There is evidence that some groups within these cleavages are attaining 
higher and higher partisan attachment scores as time progresses becoming more partisan, 
contrary to how Inglehart believed a postmaterialist electorate would behave.
Active groups. Table 3.2 shows the active groups in the 1990-1998 period.
There are still a number o f active partisan groups within the electorate, but a majority are 
showing signs o f waning. Nine o f  the 18 active groups in this period are decreasing, 
sometimes to the point o f latency by 1998. O f the active groups, there are notable ones 
that remain strong and are not showing signs of decreasing strength. These groups are 
Hispanics, conservatives, white Protestants, Jews, mainline Protestants, white 
evangelicals, frequent attendees at religious services, and postmaterialists. These groups 
behave contrary to Inglehart’s expectations o f the postmaterialist electorate because they 
are active and because they are not becoming less cohesive in their vote.
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TABLE 3.2
ACTIVE GROUPS 1990-1998
CLEAVAGE
group
Race/Ethnicity
African-Americans
Hispanics
Education
Grade School or less 
High School, no diploma
Place o f Residence 
Central City
Region o f Residence 
Border 
South
DECREASING COHESIVENESS
✓
✓
Income
Low Income
Union Household 
Union
Ideology
Liberals 
Conservatives 
Don’t know
✓
✓
Religion
White Protestants 
Jewish
Mainline Protestants 
White Evangelicals 
Frequent attendees
Value Orientation
Postmaterialists
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Inglehart is silent on expectations for racial and ethnic cleavages. Since issues of 
equality are identified by Inglehart as o f concern to postmaterialist, it should not be 
surprising that Afiican-Americans and Hispanics remain two o f the most cohesive voting 
blocks in the American electorate. Given Inglehart’s expectations o f  the postindustrial 
electorate, however, it is surprising that these two cohesive groups are also highly 
partisan. Afiican-Americans have seen their strength as a voting block decrease in the 
1990s and register the lowest percentage of Democratic support in 1998, but race remains 
the most enduring active cleavage within the American electorate. Hispanics, on the 
other hand are one o f the few groups that seems to be strengthening their cohesiveness in 
the 1990s.
Inglehart believes that with the growth o f postmaterialist values ideology will 
decrease in importance because o f  its link with the old cleavage structure and its lack of a 
link with value change, but this does not seem to be the case in the United States. 
Ideology is a strong cleavage in the 1990s. Conservatives in the 1990s have strengthened 
their cohesiveness while liberals show declining strength in the Nineties, but it is slight 
and they remain a highly partisan group. The non-ideological, the “don’t knows”, also 
qualify as an active Democratic group but they have voted less cohesively as the 1990s 
progressed.
According to Inglehart, postmaterialist society will be a secularized society. As 
postmaterialist values grow, religion as a cleavage should decline in importance. 
However, religion has always played a unique role in American society. Rather than 
fading firom the political scene, religion shows interesting movements that indicate more
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cohesiveness. The active religious groups do not show signs o f weakening as many o f  the 
other cleavages. White Protestants in the broad view became an actively aligned 
Republican group with the election o f 1994 and its support o f  Republican house 
candidates remains strong. Jews remain a very active Democratic group, and one that has 
not abated in the Nineties. Mainline Protestants in the 1990s go from being an active 
Democratic group to an active Republican group and show signs of growing strength. 
Also, white evangelicals and those who attend religious services frequently have also 
become solidly Republican constituencies.
The last o f  the groups that are not showing decreasing strength in the 1990s, the 
postmaterialist group, is the most surprising given Inglehart’s theory. Postmaterialist 
values are supposed to crosscut partisan lines. In fact, however, postmaterialists are an 
active Democratic group, and one that was becoming a stronger group in 1992 when the 
time series ended.
Latent groups. Latent groups are identified in Table 3.3. There are 25 latent 
groups in the 1990s. Even though these groups are latent rather than active, a similar 
pattern is evident; 19 o f the latent groups are exhibiting decreasing strength as they move 
closer toward evenly splitting their vote between the two parties. There are six groups 
whose strength has been increasing in the Nineties; the youngest age cohort, suburbanites, 
high income earners, the secular, those with mixed value orientation, and those who 
infrequently or never attend religious services.
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TABLE 33
LATENT GROUPS 1990-1998
CLEAVAGE
group
Gender
Female
Male
DECREASING COHESIVENESS
✓
✓
Age Cohorts
Bom 1959-80 
Bom 1943-58 
Bom 1927-42 
Bom 1911-26
✓
✓
✓
Education
HS grads 
Some post HS ed 
College degree and +
Race/Ethnicity
Whites
Place o f Residence 
Rural 
Suburbs
✓
✓
✓
Region of Residence
Mountain West 
Pacific West 
North Central 
Northeastem
✓
✓
✓
✓
Income
Middle
High
Union household 
nonunion
Ideology
Moderates
✓
✓
Religion
Catholic & Eastern Orthodox 
Secular
Infi’equent attendees
Value Orientation 
Mixed 
Materialist
1 1 8
The youngest cohort, bom from 1959-1980, goes from being an active Democratic 
group in the late 1980s to exhibiting signs o f moving toward becoming an active 
Republican group by the 1998 election. This is especially contrary to Inglehart’s theory 
because those socialized since World War U are the most likely to be postmaterialists and 
to have lessened partisan allegiances.
Suburbanites also show signs o f strengthening cohesiveness and if their Nineties 
trend continues will soon become an active Republican constituency. Of the three place- 
of- residence categories examined, one would expect suburbanites to be the most likely 
postmaterialists because o f the security in which they are likely to have grown up.‘^  Yet, 
they are increasingly partisan just as the youngest cohorts are.
High income earners also are becoming increasingly partisan in the Nineties as are 
the secular and those with values that are neither materialist or postmaterialist. Like 
suburbanites, one might expect high income earners to tend toward postmaterialist values 
as they are likely to have material needs satisfied.'® Yet, those with the highest levels o f 
income are becoming more partisan, not less as one might think. O f those in the religious
‘^ It should be noted that Inglehart measures the security of one’s formative years 
by educational attainment only, not place o f residence, but it would seem to intuitively 
make sense that suburbanites are more likely to be postmaterialists than those in the 
central city and rural areas.
'®Again, it should be noted that Inglehart does not use one’s current income level 
as an indicator o f security because he is concerned with security of one’s formative years 
which he believes is best captured by educational attainment. As is the case with 
suburbanites, it makes intuitive sense that high income earners would be more likely to be 
postmaterialists than those with lower incomes.
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grouping, the secular would be the most likely to be postmaterialist given that Inglehart 
believes postindustrial society is increasingly secularized and religion means less and 
less. However, his expectations are again confounded as the secular are close to moving 
into active status, becoming more, not less partisan. Similarly, those who are infrequently 
at religious services and those who never attend are also becoming more partisan, not 
less, as would be expected if  Inglehart's theory was true.
Where do the Cleavages Leave Us?
Thus, an examination o f group voting behavior within the American electorate 
shows marked changes occurring in the 1990s. While there are still actively aligned 
partisan groups within the electorate, many o f these are showing signs o f decreasing 
cohesiveness in terms of partisan house vote. O f the active groups, nine have increased 
their voting strength in the 1990s; five o f  these are within the religious cleavage (white 
Protestants, mainline Protestants, white evangelical Protestants, Jews, and frequent 
religious service attendees), one is racial (Hispanics), one is ideological (Conservatives), 
one is regional (the South), and one is value based (postmaterialists). Latent groups are 
more numerous than active groups; o f the 43 groups, 25 are latent. A vast majority (76%) 
o f  the latent groups are also showing signs o f  decreasing cohesiveness. All but six are 
dissipating in the last decade o f the time series. As cleavages dissipate, the possibility for 
critical realignment becomes remote. However, this dissipation did not occur until the 
1990s. Combining the thinking o f both Inglehart and conceptions o f dealignment, 
increasing dissolution should have begun in the Sixties and Seventies, but this is not the 
case. It could be that the value change Inglehart has identified simply does not begin to
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show up in the cleavage data until the vast majority o f the electorate consists o f those 
most likely to have postmaterialist values (those socialized after WWII).
Much o f the above data would seem to confirm Inglehart’s expectations that 
cleavages in postindustrial society are of decreasing importance. Is this due to value 
change? The great majority o f groups, whether active or latent, have shown declining 
partisan strength in the 1990s. There are, however, some groups that do not seem to fit 
Inglehart’s expectations regarding the declining importance o f cleavages; Hispanics, 
conservatives, Jews, white Protestants, mainline Protestants, white Evangelicals, the 
youngest cohorts; suburbanites, those with the highest incomes, the secular and infirequent 
religious service goers, those with mixed values, and most importantly Inglehart’s own 
postmaterialists. In addition, the youngest cohort should be the most likely 
postmaterialists according to Inglehart’s theory. As shown above, postmaterialists are an 
active Democratic constituency. Yet, the youngest cohort shows signs of moving into the 
Republican camp if  the current trend continues. This is true for suburbanites and high 
income earners also.
The cleavage data indicate the existence o f few active cleavages of growing 
strength within the electorate, thus calling into question the applicability of critical 
realignment theory to current electoral circumstances. In addition, the cleavage data leave 
questions about Inglehart’s theory. Many cleavages have dissipated, but the time finme 
does not meet Inglehart’s expectations. Those with postmaterialist values are an active 
partisan group which would call into question the crosscutting nature of the value 
cleavage on which Inglehart insists. Ideology, religion, and race/ethnicity also seem to
121
play large roles in partisan vote choice but Inglehart believes as postmaterial values gain 
ascendency, these characteristics will play a lesser role due to its lack o f correspondence 
with the value distinctions he delineates. Clearly, the electorate has change over the 
course of the time series, but is that change due to a value change? A detailed look into 
Inglehart’s theoretical assumptions is in order given the questions that the cleavage data 
have presented.
Changes in the Social Environment
The previous section established that the political environment has indeed 
changed. Recent decades have seen the political environment become increasingly fluid 
and less predictable in terms o f partisanship. Many cleavages in society have dissipated, 
leaving few that are still active and on which a realignment could be based. The question 
to be addressed now is whether or not the observed changes in cleavages can be attributed 
to a change in values, specifically Inglehart’s conception of materialist and postmaterialist 
values. Already, some o f Inglehart’s expectations in regards to cleavage behavior have 
not been met, leaving important questions about his theory.
Who are Postmaterialists?
Inglehart outlines certain characteristics that wiU distinguish postmaterialists fi’om 
materialists and those with mixed orientations. These expectations can be tested using 
logit analysis and data firom the 1972-1992 NES surveys.’® The dependent variable is the 
measure o f one’s values, coded 1 for those with postmaterial values and 0 for all others 
(materialists and mixed). The independent variables are age, education, attendance at
’®See Appendix Three for coding.
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religious services, ideology and partisanship. These variables were chosen because they 
are theoretically important to one’s value orientation according to Inglehart.
Age
As noted previously, Inglehart does not believe that postmaterialist values began
to have a political impact until about two decades after World War II when children bom
and socialized in the much more stable and affluent atmosphere o f the postwar world
begin to come o f age.
During the period since World War II, advanced industrial societies have 
attained much higher real income levels than ever before in history.
Coupled with the emergence o f  the welfare state, this has brought about a 
historically unprecedented situation: most o f their population does not live 
under conditions o f hunger and economic insecurity (Inglehart 1997, 132).
The aggregate affluence o f postindustrial society should thus foster the formation o f
postmaterialist values because according to the scarcity hypothesis, one does not pursue
needs that have already been satisfied. Materialist values, which emphasize economic
and physical security, can be forsaken by this younger generation to pursue the higher
level needs of equality, self-expression and quality of life, or postmaterialist values. The
socialization hypothesis accords that values formed in childhood will endure.
Postmaterialists should, according to Inglehart’s theory, be concentrated in the ranks o f
those bom after World War II. As the electorate grows, we can expect postmaterialist
values steadily to increase over time as generational replacement occurs. For this
analysis, two categories will be used: those socialized after World War II (bom 1943 and
later) and those socialized before World War II (bom before 1943).
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Education
The formative years are crucial to Inglehart because o f the importance he places 
on the socialization hypothesis. The more security in one’s formative years, the more 
likely one is to form postmaterialist values. Because security in one’s formative years 
does not have a direct measure, Inglehart uses a proxy - education. . .  [OJne’s 
educational level is a considerably better indicator o f security during one’s formative 
years than is one’s current income or occupation. Education gets closer to the key causal 
factor, which is form ative security” (1997, 152). Thus, the better educated are more 
likely to have postmaterialist values than those with lower levels o f  education. The 
education variable contains four categories: those with no high school diploma or 
equivalent, high school graduates, those with some post high school training and/or some 
college, and finally, those with a bachelor’s degree and higher. Those with the lowest 
level o f education are compared with each o f  the other three categories of successively 
higher education.
Religion
The secularization o f  society is also associated with the move to postmaterialist 
values. As people become more secure physically and economically, organized religion 
and the reassurance it provides are less important (1997, 281). The religious, therefore, 
are more likely to be materialists than postmaterialists. “The publics of most advanced 
industrial societies show both declining confidence in churches and falling rates o f church 
attendance and are placing less emphasis on organized religion” (1997,45). Religiosity, 
in the context o f Inglehart’s theory, can be measured by one’s church attendance. Those
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who attend services once or twice a month, almost every week and every week are 
contrasted with those who have no religious preference, never attend services or attend 
only a few times a year.
Ideology
One key way in which value change is said to be reshaping the political landscape
is by crosscutting the traditional left-right distinction. Because Inglehart conceptualizes
the materialist-postmaterialist dimension as replacing the class cleavage, the traditional
left-right dimension should become less significant as postmaterialism grows.
PostmateriaHsts do not automatically adopt whatever happens to be the 
conventional Left position. On many issues, they do gravitate toward the 
Left. But the rise o f Postmaterialism has brought a new perspective into 
play, one that sometimes runs against established political orthodoxy; it is 
reshaping the meaning o f Left and Right (1997, 319)
Thus, liberalism and postmaterialism should not necessarily go hand in hand. As
postmaterial values grow, the traditional labels o f conservative and liberal should become
less significant to values. In fact, we might expect those who respond to the ideology
question with a  “don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about it” as likely candidates for
postmaterialist values as neither o f the traditional dimensions perfectly fit their values.^®
Ideology contains four categories: conservatives, moderates, liberals, and those who
indicate no preference. Conservatives are utilized as the reference category.
Partisanship
Finally, postmaterialists should be more nonpartisan than those who are not
“^This category of respondents is the largest from 1972-84 and is second only to 
conservatives in 1988-92. The percentages in this category are: 1972 - 22.4%; 1976 - 
32.5%; 1980 - 34.8%; 1984 - 29.9%; 1992,26.6%.
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postmaterialists.
Although their higher levels o f education and politicization predispose 
them to identify with some political party, the younger relatively 
Postmaterialist cohorts have less incentive to identify with any specific 
political party among the available choices. The established political 
parties were established in an era dominated by social class conflict and 
economic issues and tend to remain polarized along these lines (1997,
311).
Partisanship is categorized by strength of partisanship, not nominal affiliation. 
The three categories are made up o f strong partisans, weak partisans, and nonpartisans 
(all others). Strong partisans are used as the reference category. Nonpartisans should be 
much more likely to be postmaterialists than partisans, weak or strong.
The Results
The results of the logit analyses for each year, 1972-1992 are contained in Table 
3.4. Overall, the characteristics o f those holding postmaterialist values do not conform to 
Inglehart’s theoretical expectations.
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TABLE 3.4
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR POSTMATERIALIST VALUES
to
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
\m 1976 1980 1984 1988 m i
socialized after WWII .2 -.02 .42* -.4* .39* .19
(.25) (.16) (.21) (.2) (.14) (.13)
Education (reference = less than hs diploma)
hs graduates .14 .42 -.73* -.13 -.1 -.41*
(.42) (.24) (.35) (.31) (.2) (.17)
Post hs training/some college 1.07* .4 -.33 .02 -.26 -.24
(.34) (.22) (.27) (.26) (.22) (.19)
College degree and above 1.62* .95* -.32 .23 .21 .19
(.38) (.24) (.31) (.31) (.21) (.19)
regular church attendance .77* .35* -.19 .5* -.09 .34*
(.24) (.15) (2) (.19) (.13) (.12)
ideology (reference = conservative)
Moderate -.36 .14 -.24 .02 .17 .57*
(.36) (.2) (.3) (.26) (.18) (.17)
to
00
Liberal .83* .55* .63* .49* .7* 1.03*
(.31) (.2) (.26) (.25) (.18) (.16)
Don’t know .21 -.14 -.45 -.2 -.17 .36*
(.37) (.23) (.28) (.26) (.19) (.18)
strength of partisanship (reference = strong partisan
weak partisanship -.11 -.09 .45 -.05 -.1 -.001
(3) (.2) (.27) (.23) (.17) (.15)
Apol, ind, lean indep .06 .22 .45 .18 -.06 -.04
(.29) (.2) (.27) (.23) (.16) (.14)
Constant -2.83 -2.39 -2.47 -1.72 -1.73 -1.76
(.21) (.12) (.18) (.17) (.13) (.12)
Log-likelihood 561.2 1398.8 774.3 787.01 1498.1 1946.8
Null prediction 90.4 90.11 90.85 83.95 82.85 81.45
Pseudo .18 .07 .05 .04 .05 .08
N 1011 1793 1311 916 1679 2120
*ps .05 standard errors in parentheses No VIFs above 1.5
The two defining characteristics o f postmaterialists should be age and education 
level. However, these two theoretically important variables do not behave as expected. 
Those socialized since World War H should be significantly more likely to hold 
postmaterialist values than others. This variable is significant in the years 1980-1988. 
But, in 1984 the coefficient is o f the wrong sign, indicating those socialized pre-World 
War n  are significantly more likely to have postmaterialist values in that year. Later 
years produce insignificant coefficients. Education, a proxy for security in one’s 
formative years, does behave as expected in 1972 and to a lesser extent 1976, with the 
higher levels o f education attaining significance compared with the lowest level of 
education. In subsequent years, however, education does not meet expectations. First, in 
1980 and 1992, those with high school diplomas are significantly less likely than those 
without high school diplomas to be postmaterialists, contrary to the theoretical 
assumptions that those with the lowest levels o f education should be the least likely to be 
postmaterialists. In addition, those with the highest levels of education are not more 
likely after 1976 to have postmaterialist values than those with the lowest level o f 
education, a significant departure firom Inglehart’s assumptions. Thus, the two most 
theoretically important variables do not meet Inglehart’s expectations.
According to Inglehart, the secularization o f society accompanies the rise in 
postmaterialist values. As people become more secure, they rely less on traditional belief 
systems such as that which religion provides. Church attendance does prove to behave as 
Inglehart hypothesized in relation to postmaterialist values. It attains significance, and in 
the correct direction, in four o f the six years. Thus, there would seem to be a religious
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component to those who indicate postmaterialist values; they do tend to be more secular 
in that they seldom attend religious services.
One’s ideology, which should not be a defining characteristic o f postmaterialism, 
proves to be the most consistently significant independent variable. Liberals are 
significantly more likely to be postmaterialists than conservatives in every year. In 
addition, the suspected relationship between postmaterialists and those who indicate no 
preference in terms o f ideology does not prove to be significant. Those with no 
ideological preference, when compared with conservatives, are not more fikely to be 
postmaterialists, except in 1992, when every category is significantly more likely to be 
postmaterialist than conservatives.
Partisanship is the worst performing variable in the model as it does not attain 
significance in any year. Weak partisans and nonpartisans are not more likely to be 
postmaterialists than strong partisans.
Thus, Inglehart’s theoretical expectations do not hold up very well against his 
measure o f  postmaterialism in the United States. What the measure o f postmaterialism 
seems to capture most consistently is liberal ideology, not something Inglehart believes to 
be a defining characteristic o f postmaterial values. The only variable that consistently 
behaves as Inglehart theorizes is church attendance, attaining significance in four of the 
six years. Age and education, which should be two o f the defining characteristics of 
postmaterialism, do not live up to expectations. Inglehart’s measure o f values would 
seem to be capturing the increasingly ideological nature o f American politics as noted by 
others (Rabinowitz, Gurian, MacDonald 1985; Ladd 1995) rather than his conception of
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postmaterialîst values. However, we cannot say this definitively because it could be that 
the left-right dimension, which Inglehart believes should be crosscut by the new value 
dimension, has simply adjusted to reflect the bifurcation o f materialist and postmaterialist 
values. Still, his two definitive characteristics o f  postmaterialists, age and education, do 
not conform to his theoretical expectations. It could also be that the measure o f  values is 
flawed or that the U.S. has once again proved to be exceptional as Inglehart’s theory has 
its roots in western Europe. Regardless, before we take the applicability o f 
postmaterialist values to the U.S. as an article o f  faith, further study is needed regarding 
the nature o f value change in the United States. It is evident that this further study should 
not rely on Inglehart’s simplistic measure of materialist and postmaterialist values but 
should examine other possible indicators o f postmaterial-material values.
Summary
The question o f  whether the political environment has changed has been answered 
affirmatively. Turnout is at its lowest level in the last decade of the time series. Divided 
government is increasingly common. Apartisans have increased and among partisans 
there has been a slightly increased tendency to defect in congressional elections. Voters 
who split their ticket, while less than one-third o f  the electorate, are more common in the 
1990s than in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, and more importantly for addressing the 
relevance o f critical realignment theory, many cleavages have disintegrated. This 
evidence calls into question the applicability o f  critical realignment theory to a 
fundamentally changed electorate.
Change in the social environment was addressed by examining the basis o f
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postmaterialist values. Because several cleavages did not behave as Inglehart predicted, a 
test o f his theoretical assumptions was conducted. This test indicated that Inglehart’s 
conception of postmaterialist values and the characteristics o f those who have those 
values is flawed. The results call into question many o f  Inglehart’s core assumptions 
about who postmaterialists are and leave political scientists interested in political 
behavior and social change with many lingering questions about why group voting 
behavior changed in the 1990s. It could be that Inglehart’s core theoretical assumptions 
are correct but the instrument for capturing values is flawed. Therefore, the next chapter 
will take a different approach in trying to answer the question of why cleavages began to 
behave the way they did in the 1990s, rendering critical realignment theory less relevant 
to the contemporary electorate. Party platforms are analyzed as an indicator of social 
change. By using party platfiDrms, one can investigate further whether or not large scale 
social change might be connected to cleavage behavior.
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CHAPTER 4
IS THERE A ‘DIME’S WORTH OF DIFFERENCE’? THE EBB AND FLOW OF
PARTY PLATFORMS
Often, complaints are heard in an election year that ‘there’s not a dime’s worth o f 
difference’ between the two parties. If this is indeed true, it could go a long way in 
explaining why the United States has not seen a national, critical realignment in seventy 
years. More specifically, the behavior o f the two major political parties may aid in the 
investigation o f cleavage dissipation that began in the 1990s, making critical realignment 
an inappropriate concept for the contemporary electorate. Inglehart’s theory o f  value 
change was entertained as a possible reason for cleavage dissipation in Chapter Three, but 
the theoretical expectations were not congruent with the survey instrument. This, 
however, does not mean that one should begin digging the grave on the concept o f value 
change in society. Therefore, another avenue o f gauging social change needs to be 
explored. In this chapter, the platforms of the two major political parties are investigated 
over time as an indicator o f social change. In addition, by using platform analysis one can 
explore whether there is a possible connection between party platforms and not only the 
partisan disaffection found in many cleavages in the 1990s but also the enduring strength 
o f other cleavages during the same time period.
Part o f Sundquist’s criteria for a realignment is the polarization of political groups 
(1983). An absence o f polarization, therefore, would preclude a realignment. When no
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polarization occurs, portions o f the electorate may be more likely to remove themselves 
from politics because they do not feel there are partisan differences. Accordingly, one 
feels that whether a  Democrat or a Republican is chosen on election day, policies will 
remain essentially the same. Gerald Pomper’s model o f the meddling voter applies to this 
situation (1968). He states “ [Voters] are prepared to meddle selectively in the political 
system by granting their vote to the party which seems best able to deal with their 
personal concerns” (95). If  neither party deals with the voter’s personal concerns, it is 
rational to abstain from voting. Those who choose to vote may feel less partisan 
attachment because o f the lack o f  difference they see between the two parties. In the past 
when partisan identification was stable, one’s party affiliation was enough to compel one 
to vote with his or her historical affiliation in the absence o f what Carmines and Stimson 
call “easy issues.” (1989). This is no longer the case today when it often makes little 
sense to talk o f individual partisan attachment. Thus, less polarization by parties could be 
a reason why, 1) voter turnout has declined, and 2) why cleavages have dissipated and 
partisanship within groups has become increasingly fluid. Thus, the beliefs and behavior 
o f the parties themselves could be a contributing factor to the era o f apartisanship. The 
existence and nature o f party polarization over time needs to be determined if  an 
investigation of the root causes o f apartisanship are to be explored.
The State of Cleavages in the Electorate 
The electorate is in a messy state. Dealignment, as defined earlier, does not seem 
to explain adequately current electoral circumstances. We seem to have entered a period 
o f apartisanship where many cleavages’ behavior is ambivalent in terms o f partisan
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preference. This behavior directly impacts the state o f realignment theory which requires 
partisan stability on the part o f a substantial number o f groups within the electorate.
While some groups have maintained high partisan allegiance, the cohesiveness o f  many 
has disintegrated over time. The culmination of this dissipation seems to have occurred 
in the 1990s where it was found that many groups are splitting their vote almost evenly 
between Democrats and Republicans.
Without active cleavages, realignments are moot. Since the 1960s, debate has 
raged over the lack o f a critical realignment and its probable causes. Few, however, have 
attempted to examine the very behavior o f the parties for clues. Shea (1999) did conclude 
the parties are to blame for lack of realignment, but he focused on the party organization 
rather than the parties’ beliefs and policy ideas. Voters’ partisan disaffection is not in 
doubt but the root causes o f it are. While the rise o f the service oriented party, which 
Shea believes is the culprit, is certainly contributory, it is not the whole story. Again, a 
student of realignment fails to consider more socially rooted explanations. The policy 
beliefs, what one might call the core values o f the party, are contained in party platforms, 
which Shea’s investigation neglects. It is possible to examine party platforms over time 
for changes not only in the way issues are addressed, but also for changes in which issues 
are addressed. This examination may also further illuminate the status o f value change 
within the American electorate.
Any one single cause o f partisan disaffection in the electorate does not exist. It is 
certainly a combination o f things. However, party platforms have been an overlooked 
potential piece o f the puzzle. An examination o f party platforms can add another clue in
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solving the riddle o f apartisanship among some voters and enduring loyalty in others.
This chapter’s analysis o f party platforms finds that it is very likely that parties have 
influenced and responded to the partisan disaflection o f certain groups because the parties 
no longer polarize on political issues as they once did.' Both parties’ platforms 
underwent a significant change in 1992 that carried over to 1996, the very time frame 
when the dissipation o f many groups was observed in the previous chapter. At the same 
time, the parties’ most significant polarization was on cultural issues that hold special 
appeal to the very groups in the electorate that do remain partisanly attached.
Investigating Cleavage Patterns 
This chapter examines party platforms for evidence o f  changes that might be 
linked to cleavage dissipation. Is the dissolution o f many partisan cleavages affected by 
political party behavior as manifested in political party platforms? Further, is the 
endurance of some partisanly aligned groups linked to what the parties have to say? To 
shed more light on the increaing apartisanship of large segments o f the electorate and the 
enduring loyalty o f others, we should consider the policies and beliefs of the two major 
political parties.
Why Platforms?
What a party stands for can be judged by using the party’s platform. Gerald 
Pomper in his classic study o f  political party platforms found that platforms do matter.
'It should be noted that this analysis does not provide the evidence for establishing 
whether the parties’ treatment o f certain issues in the platforms caused cleavage behavior 
to become less partisan, or whether the parties were merely responding to cleavage 
behavior and reflecting its ambivalence on certain issues within their platforms, or both.
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both for the voter and for policy that will subsequently be made. Three-fourths of the 
pledges made in a  platform are kept by the party that wins the presidency (1968, 187). In 
addition, platforms are important for the voter, even if  they do not read the document. 
“The statements made in the platform reach the voter less directly, through interest 
groups, mass media, candidates’ speeches, party controversy, and incomplete popular 
perceptions” (177-78). This analysis o f  party platforms will look at how statements of 
policy ebb and flow over time. It is important to look at party behavior in conjunction 
with cleavages’ partisanship to see if  something occurred in party platforms in the 1990s 
that might pertain to the behavior o f cleavages.
Method
Using content analysis, I examine the two major parties’ platforms for dominant 
themes from 1952 to 1996.  ^ The ebb and flow o f the issues addressed by the two parties 
will be mapped and degree o f polarization will be determined. By looking at platforms 
over time, it can be determined if  there were changes in the way issues were addressed. 
Changes in these indicators may give a clue as to the peculiar cleavage behavior observed 
in the 1990s.
This analysis examines the platforms using a two pronged approach. First, the 
platforms are quantitatively analyzed using a prioritization index. Second, the platforms 
are qualitatively analyzed for polarization on certain issues. For the quantitative analysis.
^Every other platform beginning with 1952 and ending with 1992 is analyzed. In 
addition, the platforms for 1996 are also analyzed since the cleavage time series ends in 
1998. Every other platform is analyzed because Pomper contends that there is continuity 
within the parties’ platforms from election to election (1968, 155).
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paragraphs are utilized as the unit o f analysis. Pomper’s analysis o f party platforms found 
that there were three types o f statements in platforms (1968, 156-158). The first category 
consists of statements o f  rhetoric and fact. For the purposes o f this analysis, these 
statements are not coded. The second category consists o f evaluations o f parties’ records 
and past performances. These statements include both approvals and criticisms. 
Statements o f fixture policies, which includes rhetorical pledges, make up the third 
category. The paragraphs that satisfy both the second and third criteria are coded.
Because I am interested in the issues that parties discuss over time, I do not distinguish 
between statements that address fixture policies and statements that criticize or approve o f 
past policies and performance. Therefore, any paragraph that addresses a policy area is 
counted as eqxxal to every other paragraph that addresses a policy area regardless o f 
whether it refers to the past or the fixture. Preambles and introductions to platforms are 
not coded for two reasons. First, they are usually fixll o f rhetorical statements, such as 
“America is the greatest coimtry on earth,” that take no stand on policy. Second, 
preambles and introductions usually lump many policy areas into single paragraphs while 
paragraphs within the body of the docixment do not.
Paragraphs are classified as one of nine different policy areas. These policy areas 
are the ones that Pomper used in his analysis o f platforms (1968). The nine broad issue 
areas are foreign policy, defense policy, economic policy, labor policy, agriculture policy, 
resoixrce policy, social welfare policy, governmental affairs policy and civil rights/civil
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liberties/ The form used to code the platforms is found in Appendix Four and indicates 
the specific policy areas that fall into the broader categories. Paragraphs devoted to 
policy areas are counted and the percentage of the space given to that policy in the total 
platform is computed to standardize comparisons between platforms. A prioritization 
index is formed consisting o f the percentage of the platform devoted to a policy area 
divided by the placement (1-9) o f  the policy area in the platform.'^ For example, the 1952 
GOP platform devoted 9.9% o f  the total platform to economic policy (fourteen of 142 
total paragraphs). Economic policy was discussed after foreign policy, defense policy and 
governmental affairs, giving it a  prioritization of four. The priority index for economic 
policy is 2.5 (9.9 / 4). For each year the Republican and Democratic party prioritization 
scores are graphed to suggest whether the priority each party is giving to policy areas is 
similar.
The analysis for polarization is qualitative in nature. Once paragraphs have been 
coded for the type of policy, the policy areas are then compared between the two parties 
for degree o f polarization. Polarization is defined as the parties taking opposing stances. 
For example, the Republican party in 1984 pledges to “eliminate the incentive-destroying 
effects of graduated tax rates.” (Congressional Quarterly 1995, 150). In that same year.
^Some additions and slight changes were made to Pomper’s policy areas. These 
changes are noted in Appendix Four.
'‘Carmines and Stimson (1989) established that the space devoted to policy within 
the platform and the position o f  that policy within the platform are good indicators of the 
importance of an issue to the party (1989, 56-57). However, it should be noted that their 
priority index and the one utilized here are different due to the fact that Carmines and 
Stimson only look at racial policy within platforms.
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the Democratic party calls for increasing progressivity in the tax code (145). The parties 
are polarized on the issue o f taxation. Polarization is distinguished firom issues on which 
parties merely differ. For example, in 1992, the Democrats support a National Missile 
Defense program and the Republicans support a  long-range missile defense programs. 
There are differences between the two programs. The Democrats would work within the 
bounds o f ABM treaty while the Republicans call the treaty outdated and would not be 
bound by it. There is certainly a difference between the two parties in this area but they 
are not polarized. Both parties support a missile defense system; there is differentiation 
but not polarization.
Platform Analysis
The following sections detail the platforms for the years analyzed. The 
prioritization index is graphed for each year and evidence for polarization is discussed.
1952: The Specter o f  Communism 
Figure 4.1 graphs the priority index scores for the two platforms for 1952. The 
Republicans give a  much higher priority to both foreign policy and governmental affairs 
than do the Democrats. Both differences can be attributed to the role that communism 
played in the 1952 election. The foreign policy differences are largely due to the fact that 
the Republicans are the party out o f power and they devote substantial portions of the 
foreign policy plank to criticisms of previous Democratic administrations and their 
foreign policy since 1933. The differences between the two parties in the area o f 
governmental affairs stem from the strong stand the Republicans take against communism 
and rooting communism out o f domestic government institutions. The Democrats devote
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more attention to the economy and social welfare than the Republicans. In these two 
areas, the Democrats have had considerable successes while in office and devote more 
space detailing the good they have done in these areas. Other policy areas are similar in 
terms o f prioritization.
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The Republican, platform’s tone is very polarizing. One o f  the opening salvos in
the Republican preamble states, “We charge that [Democrats] work unceasingly to
achieve their goal of national socialism” (Johnson and Porter 1973,497). The tone of the
Democratic platform is more measured as they are not defensively criticizing a current
administration but trumpeting the successes they have had. Unlike the Republican
preamble, the Democratic preamble is positive.
Under Democratic Party leadership, America has accepted each new 
challenge of history and has found practical solutions to meet and 
overcome them. This we have done without departing from the principles 
of our basic philosophy, that is, the destiny of man to achieve his earthly 
ends in the spirit o f brotherhood (475).
Both parties in 1952 give pride o f place in their platforms to foreign policy. With 
the nomination of Eisenhower at the GOP convention, the internationalist wing of the 
Republican party beat back the isolationist wing represented by Senator Robert Taft, 
whom Dee defeated for the nomination. In terms of foreign policy, the platforms are 
remarkably similar in substance, but not in tone. The Republicans, being the party out of 
power, stress the Democratic party’s failings in the area o f foreign policy, especially the 
abandonment of numerous countries to communism and the war in Korea which they 
believe was preventable (Johnson and Porter 1973,497). They are very critical of the 
Democratic policy o f containment, calling it a “negative, futile and immoral policy. . .  
which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism” (499). 
Meanwhile, the Democrats “look forward to the day” when Soviet satellite states of 
central and Eastem Europe are once again free (476). Interestingly enough, both parties 
propose the use of the Voice o f America program to penetrate the Iron Curtain (476, 499).
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So, although the rhetoric is sharp, the foreign policy proposals are not vastly different in 
terms o f real substance. The Democrats state “peace with honor is the greatest o f our 
goals” (475) while the Republicans declare “the supreme goal o f our foreign policy will 
be an honorable and just peace” (498).
Domestically, communism was also a large issue. The first domestic issue 
discussed in the Republican platform is simply labeled “Communism” (500) but does not 
address the international kind, only the kind they see ru n n in g  rampant at home. The 
Republicans’ views, therefore, on governmental reform are ranked high on the 
prioritization index. In 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy began his crusade against 
communists in government. And, the 1952 election came on the heels of the Rosenberg’s 
1951 conviction on charges that they were Soviet spies. Not coincidentally, the 
Republican platform declares, “There are no communists in the Republican party” (500). 
It goes on to detail the governmental reforms the Republicans would enact to ensure that 
government would include only the loyal (i.e., not communists). McCarthy’s methods o f 
ferreting out communists in government are not directly sanctioned in the GOP platform. 
Nevertheless, it does declare “by the Administration’s appeasement o f C o m m unism  at 
home and abroad it has permitted Communists and their fellow travelers to serve in many 
key agencies and to infiltrate our American life” (500). The Democrats counter by 
stating, “We deplore and condemn smear attacks upon the character and reputations of 
our federal workers” (486). Their discussion o f governmental affairs is the next to the 
last platform section thus they give the section much less weight than do the Repubhcans.
While the Republicans begin their discussion o f domestic policy with a discussion
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of government reform, the Democrats give more weight to economic policy. Here, the 
two platforms give perhaps the best glimpse o f  the overall philosophies o f  the two parties 
in 1952. “Here a little, there a little, year by year, [the Democratic party] has sought to 
curb, regulate, harass, restrain and punish. There is scarcely a phase o f our economic and 
social life today in which Government does not attempt to interfere” (500). This is the 
Republican refrain. The Democrats, however, champion government involvement in the 
economy by advocating price controls, rent controls and other means o f keeping prices 
down (478). Thus, in terms of the role o f  government in the economy, there are 
significant differences; polarization occurs because the Democrats favor government 
involvement and the Republicans do not. No polarization is displayed over taxation.
Both parties favor qualified tax cuts. The Democrats would first ensure defense needs 
before cutting taxes while the Republicans would cut spending to enable a cut in taxes.
In other domestic policy issues, the Democrats and Republicans also diverge and 
are quite polarized even thought the prioritization is roughly the same. In the area of 
agricultural policy, the GOP is against direct subsidies that “make the farmer dependent 
upon government” (501). Conversely, the Democrats “will continue to protect the 
producers o f basic agricultural commodities under the terms of a mandatory price support 
program at not less that ninety percent o f parity” (479). Labor policy planks also differ as 
the Republicans pledge to uphold and strengthen Taft-Hartley, the act which limits some 
labor union practices. The Democrats advocate its repeal.
The platforms o f 1952 indicate that there are considerable differences between the 
two parties in both substance and emphasis. The Republicans focus on the issue of
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communism both abroad and at home. While the Democrats are also focused on 
communism abroad, they focus more attention on the economy domestically.
1960: Gap Politics
The differences in issue prioritization for 1960 are displayed in Figure 4.2. The
largest o f these differences are found in defense, foreign policy, and civil rights/civil
liberties. The Republican platform places heavy emphasis once again on foreign policy.
Foreign policy is also what the Democrats emphasize the most, but they discuss defense
and civil liberties much more than Republicans. There is also significant polarization that
occurs in the planks on defense, economy, labor, agriculture, resources, and civil rights.
In 1960 the Democrats can take the offensive with their platform and challenge
the record o f the Eisenhower Administration just as the Republicans had attacked the
Truman Administration in their 1952 platform. The 1957 launch o f the Soviets’ Sputnik
left the Eisenhower Administration open to attack from many segments o f society that the
Soviets were “winning.” Accordingly, the Democrats hit hard on what they claimed was
America’s lack of preparedness. The Democratic platform charges the Soviets were
outpacing the United States, leaving a “missile gap, space gap, limited-war gap” (575).
The charge of a loss of preeminence, the Democratic platform claims
. . .  has been persistently made by high officials o f the Republican 
Administration itself. Before Congressional committees they have 
testified that the Communists will have a dangerous lead in the 
intercontinental missiles through 1963 — and that the Republican 
Administration has no plans to catch up (575).
O f course, the Republicans do not acknowledge a missile gap. In the platform, they state,
“Under the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration, our military might has been forged into a
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power second to none" (608). The Republicans, however, seem sensitive to the missile 
gap charge, whether real or perceived, for in their platform they pledge “unremitting 
modernization” and the acceleration and “intensified development” o f various defense 
programs (608). All this is pledged even while their man Eisenhower is still in the White 
House.
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The approach that each party takes on defense is different. The Republican’s 
defense section o f  the platform concludes by stating, “There is no price ceiling on 
America’s security” (608). The Democrats, however, would close the missile gap 
partially through disarmament. They devote nine full paragraphs to their disarmament 
planks as compared with the single paragraph o f  the Republicans. The Democrats do not 
specifically call for more defense spending. They believe pursuing arms agreements will 
enable them to provide for “an orderly shift o f our expenditures” thus enabling them to 
provide for tax reductions and the “backlog o f public needs” (576).
Defense ranks higher on the prioritization scale for both Democrats and 
Republicans than in any other year examined. Even so, the prioritization index on 
defense indicates a difference in emphasis. This gap in the prioritization index on defense 
is due to the Democrats’ criticisms o f the Eisenhower Administration’s defense policy, a 
laundry list o f  policy proposals to close the defense gap, and plans for pursuing 
disarmament agreements. Thus, the Democrats place much more emphasis on defense 
policy than do the Republicans.
Foreign policy is another area where the two parties’ prioritization differs. Here, 
however, the Republicans give higher priority to foreign policy than do Democrats. The 
Democrats actually devote more overall space to foreign policy but they place it after 
defense in their platform. This is reflected in the prioritization index.
The Republican platform, when compared with the 1952 platform’s statements on 
foreign policy, is remarkable in its statements on communism. The attacks on and the 
rhetoric directed against c o m m u n ism  are very limited. In regard to the Soviet satellite
148
States, the Republican platform simply says they do not “condone” their subjugation and 
that “we are not shaken in our hope and belief that once again they will rule themselves” 
(607). There is none o f the sharp rhetoric present in 1952 and little space devoted to 
communism. Even though the Democratic platform devotes twenty-four paragraphs to 
detailing their stances on relations with communist nations, a change in tone is apparent. 
The acceptance on the part of both parties of a bipolar foreign policy environment is 
evident as it was not in 1952.
The final area where the prioritization index indicates large differences is in the 
area of civil rights and liberties. The Democratic platform gives a higher priority o f this 
policy area than does the Republican platform. However, civil rights and liberties rank 
high on the scale for the Democrats due to the priority they give immigration policy in 
their platform, not because of attitudes to civil rights, per se. Both parties favor 
increasing immigration but the degree differs. The Democratic platform states “The 
national-origins quota system o f limiting immigration contradicts the founding principles 
of this nation” and they pledge a liberalization of immigration laws (577). Republicans, 
on the other hand, include immigration pohcy as the very last plank in their platform and 
would require “the annual number o f immigrants that we accept be at least doubled” 
(620).
Beyond immigration policy, there are other significant differences that pertain 
specifically to civil rights. In their civil rights planks, the Democratic platform never 
refers specifically to Afiican-Americans and states that they are “the party of Jefferson” 
(599). The Republican platform declares they are “the party o f Lincoln” (618). While
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Democrats dance around the issue of civil rights to keep both northern and southern 
wings o f the party appeased, the Republicans are much more direct and specific in dealing 
with civil rights than are the Democrats. Yet, the Democrats were able to include a 
significant civil rights platform despite the call firom nine southern delegations at the 
convention to delete it (Congressional Quarterly 1995, 104). The most direct differences 
occur over the implementation o f desegregation. The Democratic platform states, “We 
believe that every school district affected by the Supreme Court’s school desegregation 
decision should submit a plan providing for at least first-step compliance by 1963, the 
100* anniversary o f the Emancipation Proclamation” (Johnson and Porter 1973, 599).
The Republicans directly counter by stating, “We oppose the pretense of fixing a target 
date three years firom now for the mere submission of plans for school desegregation. . .  
We believe that each o f the pending court actions should proceed as the Supreme Court 
has directed and that in no district should there be such delay” (619). In addition, the 
Republicans include a plank that addresses the use o f literacy tests on which the 
Democrats are silent. The Republicans pledge “Legislation to provide that the 
completion o f six primary grades in a state accredited school is conclusive evidence of 
literacy for voting purposes” (619).
Even though in the other policy areas the prioritization index indicates remarkable 
similarity between the two parties’ platforms, this does not preclude polarization. In 
terms of the economy, the Democrats blame the Republicans and their “high-interest, 
tight-money policy” for the two recessions during Eisenhower’s tenure (582). They 
recommend full employment and government aid to depressed areas. The Republicans
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“reject the concept of artificial growth forced by massive new federal spending and loose 
money policies” (609).
In terms of labor, the two parties repeat the stances made on Taft-Hartley in the 
1952 platforms. The Landrum-Griffin Act, passed in 1959, is similarly opposed by 
Democrats and favored by Republicans. In addition, their stances on agriculture remain 
essentially the same as in 1952.
In the area of resources, the Democrats indicate the beginning of environmental 
consciousness. “America” they say “can no longer take pure water and air for granted . . .  
Federal action is needed in planning, coordinating and helping to finance pollution 
control. The states and local c o m m u n itie s  cannot go it alone” (591). The Republican 
platform is silent on pollution control.
Social welfare also shows a degree o f difference between the two parties. The 
Democrats advocate a medical program for the elderly that would not be means tested 
(588). The Republicans also advocate developing a health care plan for the “aged 
needing it” (616). But, they prefer encouraging private insurance to “develop sound 
coverage plans for the senior population” (616) rather than a government-instituted plan.
Thus, the differences between the two parties’ platforms are significant for 1960. 
The tone of the platforms is not as polarizing as it was in 1952 but there are still large 
differences between what the parties are advocating. The major differences revolve 
around activist and limited government (especially in the economy) and approaches to 
defense.
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1968: Vietnam and the Triumph o f Domestic Policy 
Figure 4.3 indicates only three policy areas in which there are prioritization 
differences for 1968. These differences, however, are large and occur in relation to the 
economy, social welfare policy, and governmental affairs. The starkest differences in 
terms o f substance occur over economic policy, social welfare policy, crime control, 
defense and civil rights. In addition the two platforms are notable for the treatment o f 
Vietnam and its priority (or lack o f it) in the platforms.
The Democrats’ platform leads with the economic plank. In this section they 
stress the three recessions under past Republican administrations and the success o f the 
economy under Kennedy and Johnson citing “a 90-month period o f recession-free 
prosperity, the longest and strongest period of sustained economic growth in American 
history” (719). Democrats commit themselves to “full employment and price stability.” 
While their preferred method o f obtaining frdl employment is the private sector, they 
would commit the federal government to be the “employer o f last resort” for those who 
cannot otherwise find employment (735). In terms o f containing inflation, the Democrats 
point out that they have made the tough decisions in fiscal policy. They raised taxes in 
1966 and 1968 and stated this in their platform (728). In addition, they stress the 
progressivity of the tax code “which [is] based on the democratic principle of ability to 
pay” (728). They propose a m in im um  income tax for the wealthy and no income taxes 
for those below the poverty line (728).
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The Republicans, most interestingly, do not capitalize or even mention the 
Democratic tax increases that the Democrats themselves acknowledge in their own 
platform. In terms o f taxation the Republicans are very brief and offer no specific 
proposals. They do state “the imperative need for tax reform and simplification will have 
our priority attention” (756). They pledge fimds saved as a result o f the end o f the war 
toward “critical domestic needs and to reduce the heavy tax bmden” (756). This is the 
extent of the mention of taxation.
The Republicans repeatedly stress the virtues of the free enterprise system and 
individualism. “The nation must look to an expanding free enterprise system to provide 
jobs” (752). In addition, a Republican administration would “avoid such economic 
dislocations as wage and price controls” (756).
The Democrats biggest priority in the platform is social welfare policy. Much o f 
the platform stresses the success o f the war on poverty: Head Start, Job Corps, 
Neighborhood Youth Corps, Upward Bound, the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act o f 1965, the Higher Education Act o f 1965, Medicare, and the Civil Rights Acts o f 
1964 and 1968. For the future, they pledge a federalization o f the amalgam of state 
welfare programs. “Every American family whose income is not sufBcient to enable its 
members to live in decency should receive assistance free o f  the indignities and 
uncertainties that still too often mar our present programs” (736).
Pledging to “create a new mix o f private responsibility and public participation in 
the solution of social problems” is what the Republicans include in their planks on social 
welfare (749). To aid them in this task they would “favor maximum reliance on
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community leaders utilizing the regular channels of government to provide needed public 
services” (753). They stress the failures o f the war on poverty, especially the duplication 
o f services. In addition they advocate federal revenue sharing to buttress state and local 
efforts to combat poverty.
The Democrats offer several specific health care proposals including uniform 
standards among states for Medicaid, equalizing Medicare benefits to the disabled, and 
containing costs “through a partnership o f government and private group practice 
arrangements, increased availability o f neighborhood health centers and the greater use of 
sub-professional aides” (737). The Republican counter to this laundry list o f proposals is 
their “pledge to encourage the broadening o f private health insurance plans” (753).
The Republicans’ highest priority is their plank on crime and the administration of 
justice. Conversely, the Democrats’ section on “justice and law” is the very last section 
in their platform. Although not the case in their other planks, the Republican platform is 
much more specific than the Democratic platform. The Republicans stress personal 
responsibility; “We must re-establish the principle that men are accountable for what they 
do, that criminals are responsible for their crimes, that while the youth’s environment 
may help to explain the man’s crime, it does not excuse the crime” (750). In addition, the 
Republicans call for “decisive action to quell civil disorder” (750). For their part, the 
Democrats stress combating crime by attacking “the root causes o f crime and disorder” 
and stress their concern for equal justice and safeguards for civil liberties (742).
Finally, there is also a significant difference in the way the two parties discuss 
civil rights. While the prioritiisation index indicates there is little difference in the space
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and emphasis the two parties give to this area, it should be underscored that civil liberties 
are also included in this category along with civil rights. The Republicans offer no 
separate section on civil liberties or civil rights. They only devote seven paragraphs 
(3.9%) of the platform to both and these paragraphs are scattered throughout. O f the 
seven paragraphs, three deal with discrimination o f racial minorities, one with 
immigration, and the remainder with civil liberties. The two paragraphs that most 
directly deal with discrimination occur in the platform’s introduction to domestic policy 
and pledge:
Energetic, positive leadership to enforce statutory and constitutional 
protection to eliminate discrimination;
Concern for the unique problems of citizens of long disadvantaged in our 
total society by race, color, national origin, creed, or sex (749)
The third and final paragraph that deals with discrimination states that racial minorities
are more likely to be living in poverty and that “this nation must not blink the harsh fact”
that this occurs(753).
The Democratic platform, while not giving huge amounts of space over to civil
rights and liberties does accord it a relatively high priority in the platform. They
accentuate the Johnson Administration’s record, especially the Civil Rights Acts o f 1964
and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In addition, they include an entire section
on their future policy proposals in this field.
Gone are the days when foreign policy and defense planks were placed at the
beginning of the parties’ platforms. Even though the Vietnam War is raging, the priority
given it in the platform is low. Both the Democrats and Republicans have virtually
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identical prioritization scores for both, defense and foreign policy. Both parties de- 
emphasize the war and this is especially true for the Democrats as they are the incumbent 
party. Democrats do not even mention the war in Vietnam until paragraph sixty-one.
The section of the platform that discusses Vietnam policy appears one quarter o f the way 
into the platform. The Democrats offer more concrete policy proposals but devote less 
space within the foreign policy plank to Vietnam. O f the fifty-seven paragraphs devoted 
to foreign policy, only 23% deal with Vietnam. The Republicans mention Vietnam in 
their opening paragraphs but do not refer to it again until they are more than one-third o f 
the way into the platform where they are discussing veterans’ benefits, not foreign policy. 
Eighty-three percent o f the platform precedes the statements on Vietnam policy.
However, the Republicans devote 46% of their foreign policy plank to Vietnam policy 
with the bulk of this criticism dedicated to the conduct of the war. The Republicans 
emphasize the mistakes o f the Johnson Administration in Vietnam and seem to be 
running on the “not Johnson and the Democrats” plank in terms o f foreign policy even 
though their policy prescriptions do not differ substantially.
In terms of actual policy proposals, the two parties differ very little. The 
Democrats advocate Vietnamization. This entails negotiating for the “withdrawal firom 
South Vietnam o f all foreign forces — both United States and allied forces, and forces 
infiltrated firom North Vietnam” (725). The platform goes on to say, “We reject as 
unacceptable a unilateral withdrawal o f our forces [firom Vietnam] which would a l low. . .  
aggression and subversion [firom North Vietnam] to succeed. We have never demanded, 
and do not now demand, unconditional surrender by the communists” (725). The
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Republican platform advocates “de-Americanization” (762) saying.
We pledge a program for peace in Vietnam — neither peace at any price nor 
a camouflaged surrender o f legitimate United States or allied interests — 
but a positive program that will open a fair and equitable settlement to all, 
based on the principle of self-determination, our national interests and the 
cause o f  long-range world peace (762).
The Republicans and Democrats do significantly differ in their stances on defense 
even though they accord roughly the same priority to defense. For the Democrats, arms 
control is foremost in their defense plank. Their platform pledges, “We support 
concurrent efforts to freeze the present level o f strategic weapons and delivery systems, 
and to achieve a balanced and verified reduction of all nuclear and conventional arms” 
(725). The Republicans “encourage international limitations o f armaments, provided all 
major powers are proportionately restrained and trustworthy guarantees are provided 
against violations” (761). However, they go on to say, “not retention o f American 
superiority but parity with the Soviet Union has been made the controlling doctrine in 
many critical areas [by the Johnson Administration]” (762).
The Republican platform o f 1968 is quite vague and haphazard; its overall theme 
is one that calls for “new leadership.” The Democratic platform’s policy prescriptions are 
quite specific in comparison thus making the platform quite lengthy and often verbose. 
There are several significant differences in terms of prioritization, the starkest of these 
being in the area o f law and order (governmental affairs). Polarization also occurs in 
many areas o f domestic policy such as the economy, social welfare and defense.
1976: The Rise o f Civil Liberties 
Overall, the two platforms for 1976 are very different even though the
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prioritization for most issues does not vary much (Figure 4.4). The Republican platform 
stresses limited government involvement in the economy, several constitutional 
amendments in the area o f civil liberties, local and state control, and the use of block 
grants. The Democrats on the other hand, call for more involved, activist federal 
government in the economy and protection of civil liberties.
Both the Democratic and Republican platforms lead with their economic planks 
but the priority index shows that the Democrats give a higher priority to the economy. 
This is because the Democrats devote more space to economic policy. The Democrats 
and Republicans both urge job creation, but their method o f creation differs. The 
Democratic platform pledges to reduce unemployment to 3% during the next presidential 
term. In part, this would be possible because the Democrats believe “The federal 
government has the responsibility to ensure that all Americans able, willing and seeking 
work are provided opportunities for useful jobs” (Congressional Quarterly 1977, 856). 
The Republicans, however, state that “sound job creation can only be accomplished in the 
private sector of the economy. Americans must not be fooled into accepting government 
as the employer o f last resort” (904).
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Similarly, the platforms take opposite stances on price controls. The Republican 
party bluntly states, “Wage and price controls are not the solution to inflation . . .  the 
Republican party strongly opposes any reimposition o f such controls, on a standby basis 
or otherwise” (904). Conversely, the Democrats argue that “A comprehensive anti­
inflation policy must be established to assure relative price stability . . .  At times, direct 
government involvement in wage and price decisions may be required to ensure price 
stability” (857).
In terms o f  taxation the Democratic platform disparages the “massive tax welfare’
going to the wealthiest in society (857). To combat. Democrats pledge “a complete
overhaul o f the present tax system, which will review all special tax provisions to ensure
that they are justified and distributed equitably among our citizens” (857). The
Republican proposals are geared toward the wealthy in that they promise
hastening capital recovery through new systems o f accelerated 
depreciation, removing the tax burden on equity financing to encourage 
more capital investment, ending the unfair double taxation of dividends, 
and supporting proposals to enhance the ability o f our working and other 
citizens to own a ‘piece of the action’ through stock ownership (904).
The Democrats, as would be expected, put much more emphasis on labor than
Republicans do. In direct opposition to each other, the Democrats pledge to support “the
full right o f construction workers to picket a job site peacefully” (858) while the
Republicans “oppose . . .  the legalization o f common-situs picketing” (909). And the
perennial issue o f Taft-Hartley arises with the Democrats stating support for a repeal of
the section o f the act that allows states to pass right-to-work legislation and the
Republicans reasserting their support o f this section and the right o f states to legislate in
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this area.
In terms of agricultural policy the two parties’ planks do not differ significantly. 
Both call for estate tax reform, expanding markets, and support for family farms. The 
difference in the priority index stems from the Republican placement of agriculture 
toward the platform’s beginning.
Stark differences occur in the discussion o f resources. Democrats sharply attack 
the oil industry. They begin by stating, “RepubUcan energy policy has failed because it is 
based on illusions; the illusion o f a free market in energy that does not exist, the illusion 
that ever-increasing energy prices will not harm the economy, and the illusion o f  an 
energy program based on unobtainable independence” (864). The Republicans would 
eliminate price controls on oil and natural gas to let the free market function. “Fair and 
realistic market prices” they say “will encourage sensible conservation efforts and 
establish priorities in the use o f our resources, which over the long run will provide a 
secure supply at reasonable prices for all” (912). They also stand up for the oil industry 
by adding to their platform the following statement: “The petroleum industry is an 
important segment of our economy and is entitled to reasonable profits to permit further 
exploration and development” (912). The Republicans fully support nuclear energy (912) 
while the Democrats want to keep nuclear power to the absolute m in im um  necessary to 
meet needs (865).
Within the social welfare planks there are also many differences between the two 
parties. The Democrats call for a national health system that would have universal 
coverage. The Republicans reject this notion and call for better utilization of the private
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health insurance system (859,908).
The Democrats again call for a replacement o f the shared welfare system with a 
federal system (866). Republicans “oppose federalizing the welfare system; local levels 
of government are most aware of the needs o f their communities” (910).
The two parties also square off in the area o f civil liberties and civil rights. The 
Republicans support no less than three constitutional amendments (right to life, anti­
busing, and school prayer) plus the ratification o f the Equal Rights Amendment. The 
Republicans call for a constitutional amendment “to restore protection o f  the right to life 
for imbom children” (909). The Democrats are much less dogmatic saying, “We fully 
recognized the religious and ethical nature o f the concerns which many Americans have 
on the subject o f abortion” but go on to oppose a constitutional amendment overturning 
court decisions on abortion (860). The Republicans also call for a constitutional 
amendment to allow non-sectarian prayer in public schools.
Similarly, on civil rights issues, there is polarization over afiSrmative action. The 
Democrats pledge ‘Vigorous federal programs and policies of compensating opportunity 
to remedy for many Americans the generations o f injustice and deprivation; and ftill 
fundmg o f programs to secure the implementation and enforcement o f civil rights” (860). 
The Republicans, however, state their pledge to enforce vigorously equal treatment laws 
but go on to say “The way to end discrimination, however, is not by resurrecting the 
much discredited quota system and attempting to cloak it in an aura o f new respectability” 
(908).
Busing is another polarizing issue. The Democrats call it “a judicial tool of last
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resort” but nonetheless support its use (861). Segregated schools are “morally wrong” 
say the Republicans but they advocate neighborhood schools and oppose busing (907). 
They add, “The racial composition of many schools results from decisions by people 
about where they choose to live” (907). In fact, they call for a constitutional amendment 
that would forbid “the assignment of children to schools on the basis o f race” if  Congress 
continues to fail to protect neighborhood schools (907).
There is no polarization found in several policy planks dealing with the workings 
o f government unlike previous years. For example, both parties advocate revenue 
sharing. There is disagreement when both parties address campaign financing although 
each party supports some variation of reform. The Democrats call for partial public 
financing o f congressional campaigns (859) while the Republicans stress improving the 
disclosure of the funds public ofiBcials receive from lobbyists (906).
Even though both parties talk about foreign policy and defense matters in the last 
section of their platforms, they devote more paragraphs to foreign policy than any other 
policy area. The Democrats stress opeimess, candor, and the core American values of 
freedom and justice. They criticize the secretiveness o f the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations in the area o f  foreign policy. Strangely enough, the Republican platform 
also indirectly criticizes the past two Republican administrations due to the fact that a 
segment o f the foreign policy plank was the work o f  the Reagan camp at the 1976 
convention.^ The Reagan forces did not subscribe to the realist machinations of Secretary
^The Reagan sponsored section was offered as a minority report from the floor. 
The Ford forces declined to fight the Reaganites on the foreign policy plank even though 
they opposed it. It was then added to the platform before the whole platform was
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of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and successfully inserted a 
section into the platform entitled “Morality in Foreign Policy” that registered their 
disapproval of the Nixon and Ford Administrations’ “secret agreements”  ^and support of 
the Helsinki Accords.
A portion o f the Reagan-sponsored section states, “ours will be a foreign policy 
which recognizes that in international negotiations we must make no undue concessions” 
(914) directly countering the cooperation between the US and USSR that had made 
detente possible. This set the stage for the disagreements the two parties had in relations 
to arms control. The Democrats stress their objective as deterrence and advocate seeking 
“those disarmament and arms control agreements which will contribute to mutual 
reduction in both nuclear and conventional forces” (868). Whereas the Democrats 
emphasize only enough defense for effective deterrence, the Republicans state “a sound 
foreign policy must be rooted in a superior defense capability” (914). Therefore, they call 
for “a period o f sustained growth in our defense efforts” (914).
The Republicans and Democrats emphasize the same areas o f policy in 1976. 
Their prescriptions within these policy areas, however, are quite different. Economic 
policy is given more weight by the Democrats and they stress a high level of government 
involvement. The Republicans, conversely, favor letting the free market function with 
little intervention. In addition, the polarization within civil rights and civil liberties
accepted by the convention (Congressional Quarterly 1995, 129).
®The secret agreements presumably refer to Kissinger’s secret trip to Peking in 
1971, and secret negotiations he undertook to negotiate an end to the Vietnam war.
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becomes more developed than in previous platforms.
1984: A Clear Choice 
The prioritization index again shows differences o f emphasis in only two o f the 
policy areas: economic policy and social welfare policy (Figure 4.5). The Democrats give 
more weight to these two areas than the Republicans. There are many other areas of 
policy polarization. The preambles to both platforms give a good indication o f the 
parties’ overall philosophy. The Democrats say, “We have a proud legacy to build upon: 
the Democratic tradition o f caring, and the Democratic commitment to an activist 
government that understands and accepts its responsibilities” (Congressional Quarterly 
1985, 73B). In contradistinction, the Republicans state, “ . . .  the divine command to help 
our neighbor is directed to each individual and not to a bureaucratic machine. Not every 
problem cries out for a federal solution.”  ^ The Democratic platform is scathing in its 
indictment of the Reagan Administration but many o f  the very things the Democrats 
criticize, the Republicans gladly accept credit for in their platform. The 1984 platforms 
offer voters a clearer choice on policy proposals than any of the previous platforms 
reviewed.
^The references to the 1984 Republican platform will not contain page numbers 
since the document is available on the World Wide Web @
http://europe.cnn.com/aUpolitics/1996/conventions/san.diego/facts/past.platforms/gop84/.
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Both Democrats and Republicans begin tbeir platforms with economic issues. 
With budget deficits drastically increasing after the 1981 tax cut and increases in defense 
spending, the issue o f  taxation came to the fore in the election. The priority index shows 
that both Democrats and Republicans give more weight to the economy than any other 
policy area. The Democrats also give it more weight than the Republicans. In addition, 
the content o f the two economic planks could not be more distinct.
The Republicans pledged to “oppose any attempts to increase taxes.” They attack 
the Democrats, whose candidate Walter Mondale had said in his speech accepting the 
Democratic nomination “Mr. Reagan will raise taxes, and so will I. He won’t tell you. 1 
just did” (Congressional (Quarterly 1995, 144). The Republicans inserted into their 
platform the following: “Democrats claim deficits are caused by Americans' paying too 
little in taxes. Nonsense. We categorically reject proposals to increase taxes in a 
misguided effort to balance the budget.” The Republican platform also pledges further 
tax reductions on interest income and dividends. They indicate their support for a 
modified fiat tax, not “ . . .  the incentive-destroying effects of graduated tax rates.” The 
Democrats counter with indictments of the “Reagan tax cuts for wealthy Americans” and 
pledge to increase tax progressivity (Congressional Quarterly 1985, 78-B). In addition, 
the Democrats propose a minimum 15% corporate tax. Everyone paying a fair share is 
the dominant theme. “Our tax code must produce sufficient revenue to finance our 
defense and allow for investment in our future, and we will ask every American to pay his 
or her fair share.. . .  Wealthier taxpayers will have to shoulder a greater share o f the new 
tax burdens” (78-B).
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The prioritization index also indicates a gap in the attention the two parties give to 
social welfare issues. The polarization in this area is also quite marked. The Democrats 
call attention to rising health care costs and the effect these costs have had on the federal 
budget (78-B). In addition, they repeat their call o f years past to move toward 
comprehensive national health insurance (95-B). To control escalating health care costs, 
the Democrats advocate more preventive health care and the fostering o f innovation in 
delivery systems (HMDs and PPOs). The Republicans repudiate the Democrats call for 
nationalized health care by stating, “We reaffirm . . .  our opposition to any proposals for 
compulsory national health insurance.” Again, the Republican platform draws heavily 
upon laissez-faire doctrines and emphasizes personal responsibility. In their discussion of 
health care failures, the Republicans blamed a “lack o f free-market incentives to respond 
to consumer wishes. Instead, government’s heavy hand was everywhere.” They also 
advocate personal responsibility. “A supportive environment linking family, home, 
neighborhood, and workplace is essential to sound health policy. The other essential step 
is to encourage the individual responsibility and group assistance that are uniquely 
American.”
Both parties acknowledge the federal role in education is limited. The Democrats 
stress educational leadership at the federal level while acknowledging the responsibility 
o f local government. “While education is the responsibility o f local government, local 
governments already strapped for funds by this Administration carmot be expected to bear 
alone the burden of undertaking the efforts we need for quality education. . .  without 
leadership at the federal level” (80-B). The Democrats decry the cuts in education
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funding instituted by the Reagan Administration and pledge to restore them (80-B). The 
Republicans acknowledge a much more limited federal role. “We believe that education 
is a local function, a State responsibility, and a federal concern.” They go on to define 
further what “a federal concern” entails. “It includes helping parents and local authorities 
ensure high standards, protecting civil rights, and ensuring family rights.” Later in the 
document they qualify the federal government’s civil rights role. “Discrimination cannot 
be condoned, nor may public policies encourage its practice. Civil rights enforcement 
must not be twisted into excessive interference in the education process.” In terms of 
federal funding for education, the Republicans pledge to “complete the block-grant 
process begun in 1981. We will return revenue sources to State and local governments to 
make them independent o f federal fionds and of the control that inevitably follows.” The 
Republicans also advocate school choice through the use o f vouchers.
Governmental affairs
The Republican platform places more emphasis on governmental affairs than the 
Democratic platform and there is also significant disagreement on policies. The budget 
process is addressed by the Republicans who call for a constitutional convention to 
amend the constitution with a balanced budget amendment. They blame the problems on 
the congressional budget process. “The congressional budget process is bankrupt. . .  The 
President is denied proper control over the federal budget.” The Democrats specifically 
repudiate a constitutional convention and say, “We oppose the artificial and rigid 
Constitutional restraint o f  a balanced budget amendment” (78-B). They specifically 
blame Reagan for the budget deficits which they state were caused by tax cuts and
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defense spending. “The Democratic Party is pledged to reducing these intolerable
deficits. We will reassess defense expenditures; create a tax system that is both adequate
and fair. . . ” (78-B).
The defense budget is also debated. The Democrats propose “rational defense
spending” (78-B). Democrats do not propose a  cut in overall defense but do advocate a
reduction in “the rate o f increase in defense spending” (78-B). Reagan’s Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) is never mentioned by name in the Democratic platform but is
addressed and labeled a waste. “We will stop throwing away money on unworkable or
unnecessary [defense] systems”(78-B). The Republicans are firmly behind SDI. “We
enthusiastically support the development o f non-nuclear, space-based defensive systems
to protect the United States by destroying incoming missiles.”
Also included in the area of governmental relations are basic principles o f
federalism over which the two parties fundamentally disagree. State and local control is
something that is not restricted to one area o f the Republican platform but is a common
thread that runs throughout it.
For more responsible government, nonessential federal functions should be 
returned to the States and localities wherever prudent. They have the 
capability, knowledge, and sensitivity to local needs required to better 
administer and deliver public services. Their diverse problems require 
local understanding. The transfer o f rights, responsibilities, and revenues 
to the "home fi-ont" will recognize the abilities o f local government and the 
limitations o f a distant federal government.
Similarly, the common thread running throughout the Democratic platform is the idea of
federal government involvement and assistance to states and localities. The Democrats
often support local and state control in areas such as education and the administration of
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justice but temper this control with statements about federal oversight. For example, the 
education plank in the Democratic platform states, “We will create a partnership for 
excellence among federal, state and local governments” (80-B). The platform continues 
with proposals for federal funding for science, math, computer education, and 
supplementation for community-based programs.
Finally, in the area o f civil liberties and civil rights there remain gulfs in what the 
two parties believe. The Republicans continue to include a plank on abortion and their 
opposition to it as they had since the 1976 platform. They call for a constitutional 
amendment to make the 14* Amendment apply to unborn children. In addition, they 
oppose public funds going to any organizations who advocate and/or support abortion. 
The Democratic party takes the opposite position on both matters but they go on to 
include a statement that acknowledges differences o f opinion on this issue within the 
party. “We fully recognize the religious and ethical concerns which many Americans 
have about abortion. But we also recognize the belief o f many Americans that a woman 
has a right to choose whether and when to have a child” (93-B).
The Republican platform no longer supports the ratification o f the Equal Rights 
Amendment as they did in the 1976 platform. They do stress they support equality and 
state, “President Reagan believes, as do we, that all members o f our party are firee to work 
individually for women's progress. As a party, we demand that there be no detriment to 
that progress or inhibition o f women's rights to full opportunity and advancement within 
this society.” This falls short o f advocating the position o f the Equal Rights Amendment. 
The Democrats indicate “A top priority of a Democratic Administration will be
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ratification of the unamended Equal Rights Amendment” (92-B).
The Republicans also no longer call for a  constitutional amendment for school
prayer as they did in the 1976 platform. They still support the concept but do not indicate
they would amend the Constitution to allow it. “Mindful of our religious diversity, we
reaftirm our commitment to the freedoms o f religion and speech guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States and firmly support the rights o f students to openly
practice the same, including the right to engage in voluntary prayer in schools.” The
Democrats do not directly address school prayer, per se, but state “The Democratic
Platform affirms its support o f the principles o f religious liberty, religious tolerance and
church/state separation and o f the Supreme Court decisions forbidding violation o f those
principles” (92-B).
Similarly there is a strong differentiation in what the two parties proclaim
regarding afhrmative action. The Democrat party “reafitirms its longstanding
commitment to the eradication o f discrimination in all aspects o f American life through
the use o f afSrmative action, goals, timetables, and other verifiable measurements to
overturn historic burdens of discrimination in hiring, training, promotions, contract
procurement, education, and the administration of all Federal programs” (92-B). The
Republicans never mention afSrmative action by name but do proclaim:
Just as we must guarantee opportunity, we oppose attempts to dictate 
results. We will resist efforts to replace equal rights with discriminatory 
quota systems and preferential treatment. Quotas are the most insidious 
form o f discrimination: reverse discrimination against the innocent. We 
must always remember that, in a free society, different individual goals 
will yield different results.
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In terms o f foreign policy, the main debate in the 1984 election is over American
involvement in Central America. The Democrats included within their foreign policy
plank a checklist of sorts that indicate when unilateral military involvement should not be
used by the United States that would apply to the Reagan Administration’s activities in
Central America. In addition, the platform includes a detailed section on Central
American foreign policy that states, among other things, “We must terminate our support
for the contras and other paramilitary groups fighting in Nicaragua” (104-B).
Conversely, the Republican platform states, “We support continued assistance to the
democratic fi-eedom fighters in Nicaragua.”
The Democratic platform’s rhetoric toward the Soviet Union is not as sharp as the
Republican platform. The Democrats believe, “We must see the Soviet Union as it is -
neither minimizing the threats that Soviet power and policies pose to U.S. interests, nor
exaggerating the strength of a Soviet regime beset by economic stagnation and saddled
with a bankrupt and sterile ideology” (102-B). The Republicans state.
We hold a sober view of the Soviet Union. Its globalist ideology and its 
leadership obsessed with military power make it a threat to fireedom and 
peace on every continent.. . .  Republicans reaffirm our belief that Soviet 
behavior at the negotiating table cannot be divorced firom Soviet behavior 
elsewhere.
The approach the two parties take to defense policy is also different as shown in 
the discussion o f defense budgeting above. Their approach to arms control, similarly, 
also demonstrates the differences between the two parties. The Republicans are proud of 
their accomplishments in the area of building defense and pledge continued 
modernization. “Our military strength exists for the high moral purpose o f deterring
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conflict, not initiating war.” They state President Reagan’s willingness to negotiate with
the Soviets even though the Soviets have been unwilling. As the Democratic platform is
quick to remind, “Ronald Reagan is the first American president in over twenty years who
has not reached any significant arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, and he is
the first in over fifty years who has not met face to face with Soviet leaders” (100-B).
The Republican platform points out the Soviets’ refusal to engage in talks stems firom the
US deployment o f Pershing H and Cruise missiles in Europe.
Soviet intransigence is designed to force concessions firom the Untied 
States even before negotiations begin. The Soviet Union wül return to the 
bargaining table only when it recognizes that the United States will not 
make unilateral concessions or allow the Soviet Union to achieve nuclear 
superiority.
The Republicans stress the verification of any future arms control agreement reached with
the Soviets due to their “sustained pattern of violations.” Republicans, to deter this
behavior stress that
the United States m us t . . .  display a willingness to respond to Soviet 
violations which have military significance, and adopt a policy whereby 
the defense o f the United States is not constrained by arms control 
agreements violated by the Soviet Union.
The Democrats state, “True national security requires urgent measures to fireeze and
reverse the arms race, not the pursuit of the phantom o f  nuclear superiority or futile Star
Wars schemes.” (100-B). Democratic proposals are much more specific in the area o f
arms control.
. . .  [A] Democratic President will initiate temporary, verifiable, and 
mutual moratoria, to be maintained for a fixed period during negotiations 
so long as the Soviets do the same, on the testing o f  underground nuclear 
weapons and anti-satellite weapons; on the testing and deployment of all
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weapons in space; on the testing and deployment o f new strategic ballistic 
missiles now under development; and on the deployment o f  nuclear­
armed, sea-launched cruise missiles. (100-B).
Whereas the Republicans confine their section on arms control to seven paragraphs, the
Democrats are much more detailed in their proposals. They devote 40% of their
discussion o f defense policy to arms control proposals. The Republicans devote 13% of
their total defense plank to arms control.
Overall, the two platforms o f 1984 are quite distinct. They offer voters a clear
choice in terms o f policy in most areas. Previous platforms analyzed above did not so
clearly delineate the differences in policy proposals. The increasing polarization of the
two parties, evident in the 1976 platforms, reaches its peak in 1984.
1992: Breaking the Mold 
There are many ways in which both parties’ platforms in 1992 do not conform to 
previous years. This is evident not only in the prioritization index but also in terms of the 
traditional expectations o f what both platforms look like and address. Figure 4.5 shows 
the prioritization index for 1992 and the differences in the scores for social welfare issues 
is pronounced. In addition, the prioritization scores differ on governmental affairs. Even 
though the Democratic platform moves to the right in some areas, the Republican 
platform moves farther right. Therefore, there are still significant differences evident in 
the Republican and Democratic platforms.
First, the Democratic party platform is the shortest ever for the period examined.
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It ran to only eighty-three paragraphs.® This is highly unusual since the challenging 
party’s platform usually has a substantial number o f paragraphs denouncing the policy of 
the incumbent administration. The Democrats do attack the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations, but the platform devotes relatively little space to these attacks and the 
overall tone is optimistic. In addition, the influence o f  “New Democrats” is very evident. 
The Democratic platform states, “We reject both the do-nothing government of the last 
twelve years and the big government theory that says we can hamstring business and tax 
and spend our way to prosperity. Instead we offer a  third way.”’ Indeed the title o f  the 
platform is “A New Covenant with the American People.” On this new covenant, they 
state, “ To make this revolution, we seek a New Covenant to repair the damaged bond 
between the American people and their government, that will expand opportunity, insist 
upon greater individual responsibility in return, restore community, and ensure national 
security in a profoundly new era.” The platform’s overall theme is responsibility; it uses 
the term sixteen times. Three times the phrase is “personal responsibility,” a traditionally 
Republican phrase. References to “values” also appear as they have not previously. 
Within the relatively short platform, there are ten references to some type of “values.”
*83 paragraphs refer to the number of coded paragraphs. By comparison, the 1984 
Democratic platform was 597 coded paragraphs. Due to the succinct nature of the 1992 
Democratic platform, the standard of using four paragraphs to indicate the prioritization 
placement had to be altered. Several topics were covered in one paragraph. In addition, 
paragraphs tended to be somewhat longer than in previous years. Therefore, the standard 
used for 1992 was first substantial mention o f a policy area that was not covered 
subsequently in the platform.
’The 1992 Democratic platform is available on the World Wide Web at 
http://europe.cnn.eom/ALLPOLlTlCS/1996/conventions/san.diego/facts/past.platforms/ 
dem92/index.shtml.orig. Therefore, page references are not indicated.
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However, none of these references are to “traditional family values” or “lamily values,’
phrases the Republicans will repeat, but refer instead to basic American values.
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The Republican platform is also different from preceding ones. In 1984, there 
were three references to God, none o f  which were in a specifically religious c o n t e x t . I n  
the 1992 platform, this changes. While there are only four references to God, three of 
them are specifically used in a religious context. There are two references to “faith in 
God,” one to a nation “under God,” and a thanks to God for peace. In addition, the 
platform takes a quotation from the book o f Proverbs and there are two references to the 
United States’ “Judeo-Christian heritage.” The religious overtones in the Republican 
platform are exemplified in a statement from the preamble. “We believe in traditional 
family values and in the Judeo-Christian heritage that informs our culture.” In addition, 
the language of values is also present in the 1992 Republican platform and is the focus o f 
much o f the platform. There are eighteen references to “values.” Seven are references to 
family values or traditional family values. The remainders are to moral, religious, 
cultural and general values. By comparison, the 1984 platform contained only eight 
references to values and two o f  these were specifically economic, referring to land and 
asset values.
The Democrats primarily emphasize the economy and deficit reduction. While 
the platform is much more moderate than in past years, there are still some traditional 
Democratic stances. In contrast, the Republicans place their primary emphasis on social 
welfare policy and specifically focus on a discussion o f family values. The thread 
running through past Republican platforms was local control, but the thread running
‘“The 1984 Republican platform made use o f the phrases “God-given natural 
resources,” “God-given and inalienable rights,” and “God-given rights.”
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through the 1992 Republican platform is an emphasis on the family.
Prescriptions for the economy are the first item of business the Democrats say
they will attend to if  elected. There is criticism o f President Bush’s lack o f attention to
domestic matters and he is blamed for slow economic growth. The Democratic platform
states, “We believe in free enterprise and the power of market forces.” The platform
indicates the Democrats would facilitate economic growth through public investment by
channeling money saved from defense into research, education and training. In addition,
they would encourage private investment through tax credits for those who invest in new
technologies and businesses. The differences between Democrats and Republicans in this
particular area are not as stark as in years past but there are still differences.
We reject the Democrats’ politics o f division, envy and conflict. They 
believe that America is split into classes and can be healed only through 
the redistribution of wealth. We believe in the economics of 
multiplication: free markets expand opportunity and wealth for all.”
And, in traditional Democratic fashion, the Democrats repeat pledges o f  past years to
“make the rich pay their fair share in taxes.” They call for middle class tax relief that will
be made possible by “forcing the rich to pay their fair share.” The Republican platform
must put the tax increase that President Bush signed in 1990 into perspective. They do so
by saying, “We will oppose any attempt to increase taxes. Furthermore, Republicans
believe that the taxes insisted on by the Democrats in the 1990 budget agreement were
recessionary.. . .  We believe the tax increases o f 1990 should ultimately be repealed.”
“The 1992 Republican platform is available on the World Wide Web at 
http://europe.cnn.eom/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/san.diego/facts/past.platforms/g 
op92/. Because the platform is available in electronic format, page references are not 
used.
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The deficit is another area o f concern for the Democrats. “In place o f  the 
Republican supply-side disaster, the Democratic investment, economic conversion and 
growth strategy will generate more revenues firom a growing economy.” This, in 
conjunction with a réévaluation o f spending, will reduce the deficit over time. The 
Republicans stress in several areas that the Democratic Congress was responsible for both 
the tax increase in 1990, the lack o f subsequent tax cuts that were proposed by Bush but 
not passed by Congress, and a  failure to control spending. Had President Bush been able 
to hold spending down (say, with a line item veto and a balanced budget amendment - 
both o f which the platform champions) then the deficit would have been controlled. The 
Republican platform contains no other prescriptions for controlling the deficit but does 
state, “As the deficit comes under control, we aspire to fiuther tax rate cuts.” The lack of 
attention to the deficit is striking, especially when one considers that 1992 is the year 
Ross Perot challenged both Bush and Clinton with his primary emphasis on deficit 
reduction and attention to the national debt.
Other policy planks in governmental affairs reveal the rightward shift o f  the 
Democratic Party platform. In a statement that in years past could have been in the 
Republican platform, the Democrats state, “To foster greater responsibility in government 
at every level, we support giving greater flexibility to our cities, counties and states in 
achieving Federal mandates and carrying out existing programs.” However, in the 1992 
platform, the Republicans favor doing away with the mandates altogether. “We oppose 
costly federal mandates that stifle iimovation and force tax hikes upon states and 
localities.” So, while the Democratic party moved to the right, the Republican party
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moved further in that direction.
The area of social welfare holds the largest differences for the two platforms. 
Whereas the Democrats lead with planks on the economy, the Republicans lead with 
planks on the family that encompass social welfare policy.'" The Republican platform 
states, “This is the ultimate agenda o f contemporary socialism under aU its masks: to 
liberate youth from traditional family values by replacing family functions with 
bureaucratic social services. That is why today’s liberal Democrats are hostile toward any 
institution government cannot control, like private child care or religious schools.” The 
platform goes on to encourage “state legislators to explore ways to promote marital 
stability,” and states “. . .  we put the highest priority upon enforcement of family rights 
and responsibilities.” The Democratic platform also contains a statement on 
“strengthening the family” but it is one paragraph unlike the Republican platform which 
contains references to family in virtually every section. The Democrats opening 
statement, however, sounds as if  it could have come from the Republicans.
“Governments don’t raise children, people do. People who bring children into this world 
have a responsibility to care for them and give them values, motivation and discipline.” 
But, the Democrats go on to advocate strengthening the family through pay equity and 
family and medical leave, two things that are not mentioned in the 1992 Republican
'"The discussion o f family values in the Republican platform is often pure rhetoric 
and/or fact. Paragraphs of rhetoric and fact were not coded for inclusion in the 
prioritization index. However, when there were specific policy proposals couched in the 
language o f family values, they most often, but not always, dealt with social welfare 
issues. Thus lumping the entire discussion o f family values under the social welfare 
category is an uneasy fit since the Republican discussion o f  civil rights, civil liberties, and 
the economy also included proposals that linked these policy areas to family values.
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platform.
The education planks for the two parties are in direct opposition on the subject o f 
vouchers. The Democrats oppose school vouchers that could be used at private schools 
as an “effort to bankrupt the public school system.” The Republicans support vouchers, 
although they do not label them as such. “The president has shown unprecedented 
leadership for the most important education goal of all: helping middle- and low income 
families enjoy the same choice o f schools - public, private or religious - that families with 
more resources already have. The president's proposed "GI Bill for Children" will provide 
$1,000 scholarships to middle- and low-income families, enabling their children to attend 
the school o f their choice.”
The Democrats address the disparities in funding of public schools. We “. . .  
believe every child deserves an equal chance to a world class education. Reallocating 
resources toward this goal must be a priority.” The Republicans call for the continuation 
of the “education revolution” begun by President Bush which has resulted in “a new 
generation o f break-the-mold” schools. The Republicans, however, do not address 
funding disparities. They do encourage innovation and choice. “We have an 
uncompromising commitment to improve public education - which means assuring that 
our schools produce well educated, responsible citizens - not the maintenance o f a 
government monopoly over the means o f  educating. American families must be given 
choice in education.” Finally, the Republicans support abstinence education in public 
schools o f which the Democrats make no mention.
Past Democratic platforms called for a national health care system. The 1992
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platform modifies this to call for “universal access to quality, affordable health care.”
The details o f how they would accomplish this are quite sketchy in the platform. The 
Republicans portray this as a fundamental difference between the two parties, stating 
“Republicans believe government control of health care is irresponsible and ineffective. 
We believe health-care choices should remain in the hands o f the people, not government 
bureaucrats.”
One area where the Democratic shift to the right is very evident is in the area o f
welfare. Rather than calling for the federalization o f welfare programs as in previous
platforms, the Democrats chart a new course. The Democrats include a substantial section
on the restoration of community in their platform and this is where they include their
prescriptions for welfare reform.
Democrats will pursue a new course that stresses work, family and 
individual responsibility, and that empowers Americans to liberate 
themselves firom poverty and dependence. We pledge to bolster the 
institutions of civil society and place a new emphasis on civic enterprises 
that seek solutions to our nation’s problems.
The Republicans, however, go further to the right and advocate the surrender o f 
the federal role in welfare. “It cannot be merely tinkered with by Congress; it must be 
recreated by states and localities.”
There remain significant gulfs between the beliefs o f the Democrats and 
Republicans over civil rights and liberties. While the Democratic platform is short on 
specifics, they repeat their support for certain items that appeal to traditional Democratic 
constituencies. They state support for the ratification o f  the ERA, affirmative action, civil 
rights protection for homosexuals, prosecution o f hate crimes, and stronger protection for
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voting rights o f racial and ethnic minorities. Even though the Democrats lump all these 
pledges o f support into one sentence, they do include a separate section on reproductive 
rights and the Democrats’ support o f choice. The Republicans repeat their opposition to 
abortion and call for “a human life amendment to the Constitution.” In addition, the 
Republicans do not support the enlistment o f homosexuals in the military. In their 
statement on AIDS, Republicans oppose the discrimination o f AIDS victims and pledge 
to slow the spread o f AIDS, but they link prevention to a very controversial statement. 
“The administration has thus placed great emphasis on a variety o f prevention efforts to 
do so. We must recognize, also, that prevention is linked ultimately to personal 
responsibility and moral behavior.” In their section on promoting cultural values, the 
Republican platform counters the position o f the Democratic platform. “We oppose 
efforts by the Democratic Party to include sexual preference as a protected minority 
receiving preferential status under civil rights statutes at the federal, state and local level.” 
The platforms also take opposite stands on federal support o f  the arts. The 
Republicans believe “Government has a responsibility. . .  to ensure that it promotes the 
common moral values that bind us together as a nation. We therefore condemn the use o f 
public funds to subsidize obscenity and blasphemy masquerading as art.” The Democrats 
respond to this controversy by stating “We believe in public support for the Arts, 
including a National Endowment for the Arts that is free from political manipulation and 
firmly rooted in the First Amendment's freedom o f expression guarantee.”
The Democrats make no mention o f either their support for or opposition to 
school prayer. However, the Republicans include a statement that falls short o f calling
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for a constitutional amendment, as they have in the past, but do unequivocally state their 
position. “Mindful o f our country's Judeo-Christian heritage and rich religious pluralism, 
we support the right o f students to engage in voluntary prayer in schools and the right o f 
the community to do so at commencements or other occasions.”
In the area o f defense policy, the Democrats condemn the Republicans for still 
thinking in the Cold War mode. They advocate a  restructuring o f forces that will save 
expenditures while better meeting the needs o f a new international landscape.
Specifically this would mean a reduction of forces in Europe and increasing use o f 
technology and intelligence. The Republican platform lauds President Bush’s victory in 
the Gulf War and emphasizes his leadership ability. They recognize the end o f the Cold 
War means fewer defense expenditures but call for “a controlled defense drawdown, not a 
free fall.” Republicans also do not give up on Ronald Reagan’s dream of SDI. “We will 
cooperate with our former adversaries both to curtail proliferation and to move beyond 
the ABM Treaty toward effective ballistic missile defenses.”
In the area of foreign policy, the Democrats discuss the global environment, 
something that was not discussed in previous platforms. The Democratic platform states, 
“The United States must become a leader, not an impediment, in the fight against global 
warming. We should join our European allies in agreeing to limit carbon dioxide 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.” The Republicans do not talk about the 
environment in terms o f foreign policy. They do, however, obliquely refer to global 
warming in their discussion o f domestic resources. “[Liberal Democrats] use junk 
science to foster hysteria instead of reason, demanding rigid controls, more taxes and less
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resource production.”
Both platforms briefly address the Balkans. The differences in the way the two 
parties approach this area o f the world are subtle, but they are differences, nonetheless. 
The Democrats believe, “. . .  we must act decisively with our European allies to support 
freedom, diminish ethnic tensions, and oppose aggression in the former communist 
countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are struggling to make the transition from 
communism to democracy.” The Republican platform’s statements on the Balkans do not 
involve action on the part o f the United States, only support. “The violence in what used 
to be Yugoslavia is an affront to humanity. We condemn those responsible for the carnage 
there and call for an immediate international investigation o f  atrocities. We support the 
United Nations peacekeeping effort and urge an immediate cease-fire by all parties. The 
United States should continue to demand respect for international law and fundamental 
human rights in this agonizing conflict.”
The 1992 platforms are fundamentally different from what each party produced in 
past years. The Democrats, moving to the right, moderate their traditional stances in 
many areas. By using references to values and personal responsibility, they adopt the 
language that traditionally has been used by the Republican party. Yet, even as they do 
this, their solutions for restoring values and responsibility are different from Republican 
prescriptions. Democrats do, in addition, still include some traditionally liberal stances 
such as support for abortion rights and progressive taxation. The policy area of civil 
rights and liberties hold the largest differences between the two parties. The Democratic 
platform does not include any references to God; it does inclusively speak of religious
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faiths on two occasions.
The Republican platform is more conservative than the very conservative 
Republican statement o f 1984. However, the fundamental difference between the 1992 
Republican platform and past Republican platforms is the overtly religious nature o f the 
document. In addition, the Republicans increase the references to family and values in 
their 1992 platform. While the Democrats, by moderating many of their traditional 
positions, move right, the Republican party moves further right by incorporating religion 
in the 1992 platform. Voters were offered a clear choice in 1984 between a liberal 
Democratic statement o f beliefs and a very conservative Republican statement. The 1992 
platforms offer voters a clear choice between a moderate, secular Democratic platform 
and a conservative, religious Republican platform.
1996: A new paradigm?
The prioritization index for 1996 (Figure 4.7) looks a lot like the prioritization 
index for 1992 with one important exception; the Democratic index resembles the 
Republican index o f 1992 and the Republican index of 1996 looks like that o f the 
Democrats in 1992. In 1992, Republicans overwhelmingly emphasized social welfare 
issues due to the platform’s focus on the role o f family values. In 1996, Democrats 
overwhelmingly emphasize social welfare issues and they place a huge emphasis on 
values. Republicans in 1996 shift their main emphasis to governmental affairs focusing 
especially on reform, crime and judicial selection. The Democratic platform o f 1992 gave 
a high priority to governmental affairs. There are also important changes in terms o f the 
substance of the two platforms as well.
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The Democrats’ platform in 1996 does not return to normal length; it is still
abnormally brief but does manage to be almost twice as long as the 1992 document.
Contributing to the document’s length is the fact that the Clinton administration has a
record it can champion in 1996 as it did not in 1992. There is a sense in which the
Democratic platform tries to out-republican the Republicans. Recall that the 1992
Republican platform was heavily religious and referred extensively to values. The 1992
Democratic platform contained no references to God; the 1996 Democratic platform
contains five (one more than the Republican platform in both 1992 and 1996). In
addition, both the 1992 and 1996 Republican platforms refer to some type of “values”
eighteen times. The 1996 Democratic platform uses “values” twenty-nine times while
being a much shorter document than the Repubhcan platform. There is also a peculiar
paragraph in the Democratic platform o f 1996 that lauds the fact that the Democrats are
doing all the things the Republicans have promised in the past but never accomplished.
For years. Republicans talked about making government smaller while 
letting it grow —  Democrats are doing it. For years. Republicans talked 
about cutting the deficit while letting it climb —  Democrats are doing it  
For years. Republicans talked about shifting power back to states and 
communities —  Democrats are doing it. For years. Republicans talked 
about making government more businesslike and efficient —Democrats are 
doing it. Democrats are bringing responsibility back to Washington.’^
The Democrats are saying they are more successful Republicans than the Republicans!
’■’The 1996 Democratic platform is available on the World Wide Web at 
http://www.perkel.com/congress/platform.htm. Due to its availability electronically, page 
numbers are not referenced.
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The 1996 Republican platform returns to the pattern found before 1992, once 
again focusing on issues of federalism. The 1996 platform is not overtly religious as the 
1992 document was. One might characterize it, however, as covertly religious as there 
are many planks that appeal to religious conservatives such as support for home 
schooling, phonics education, school vouchers, abstinence education, appeals to 
traditional family values, denunciation o f homosexuality as a category for civil rights 
purposes, strong pro-life statements, calls for stopping moral decay, and strong anti- 
pomography statements. The Republicans also return to the traditional theme in their 
platform - local control over federal control - instead of the theme o f family values that 
dominated the 1992 platform. There are still plenty of appeals to family values in 1996 
but it is not the pivot point around which the rest of the platform revolves; local control 
is.
The Democrats put a very high emphasis on social welfare issues while the 
Republicans do not. In education. Democrats stress the cuts the Republican 104^ 
Congress tried to implement. “The Republican budget tried to take Big Bird away from 
5-year-olds, school lunches away from 10-year-olds, summer jobs away from 15-year- 
olds, and college loans away from 20-year-olds.” In other areas, however, the Democrats 
drift toward some Republican stances. For example, the Democrats support expanding 
public school choice, but do not support vouchers that could be used at private 
institutions. “We should expand public school choice, but we should not take American
*'‘The 1996 Republican platform is available on the World Wide Web at 
http://cgi.crm.eom/ALLPOLlTlCS/1996/conventions/san.diego/facts/gop.platform/index.s 
html. Due to its availability electronically, page numbers are not referenced.
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tax dollars from public schools and give them to private schools.” The Democrats also
voice support for innovative charter schools. The Republicans say, “We support and
vigorously work for mechanisms, such as opportunity scholarships, block grants, school
rebates, charter schools, and vouchers, to make parental choice in education a reality for
all parents.” The Democrats also include a plank entitled “teaching values in schools”
that has a decidedly Republican feel. “We applaud the efforts o f the Clinton-Gore
Administration to promote character education in our schools.” However, a very
important gulf still exists between Republican and Democratic education policy. The
Republicans want to do away with the federal government’s role in education.
Our formula is as simple as it is sweeping: the federal government has no 
constitutional authority to be involved in school curricula or to control 
jobs in the work place. That is why we will abolish the Department of 
Education, end federal meddling in our schools, and promote family 
choice at all levels o f learning.
Even though the Democrats do support some traditionally Republican ideas (choice,
charter schools) they do not advocate abolishing the Education Department or
relinquishing the federal role in education.
Today's Democratic Party will stand firmly against the Republican assault 
on education. Cutting education as we move into the 21st century would 
be like cutting defense spending at the height o f the Cold War. We must 
do more to expand educational opportunity — not less.
Even though the Democrats moderate their traditional stance on education, there is still
differentiation between the two parties.
The rightward turn o f  the Democrats is evident in the area of welfare reform more
than any other area. In past platforms. Democrats often called for the federalization of
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welfare. In the 1996 platform, the Democrats changed their tune. “Today's Democratic 
Party knows there is no greater gap between mainstream American values and modem 
American government than our failed welfare system.” When the Democratic platform 
was presented, the reform bill that shifted responsibility for welfare to the states was a 
recent development. The Democratic platform is careful to point out that Republicans 
were forced to compromise on key issues. “We are proud the President forced 
Congressional Republicans to abandon their wrong-headed and mean-spirited efforts to 
punish the poor.” The platform also states that the welfare reform measure is flawed but 
Democrats will work to fix its problems. The Republicans are proud o f  their welfare 
reform package. “The key to welfare reform is restoring personal responsibility and 
encouraging two-parent households. The path to that goal lies outside o f  official 
Washington. In the hands o f State and local officials, and under the eye o f  local taxpayers, 
welfare can again become a hand up instead o f  a handout.” Thus, 1996 finds the 
Democratic and Republican platforms closer than ever before in the area o f  welfare 
policy. And, it is the Democrats who repositioned themselves.
In the area o f health care, the Democrats have to finesse the failure o f Clinton’s 
attempt at reform in his first term. They do this by ignoring it and stressing the 
incremental reforms accomplished in the time since the Clinton plan went up in smoke, 
such as the Kennedy-Kassebaum Act. They also pledge to “preserve and strengthen 
Medicare and Medicaid” which they feel are under attack fi*om Republicans. The 
Republicans disparage “Clintoncare” and are firmly committed to protecting individual 
choice. They also favor the establishment o f  medical savings accounts to help make
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health care more afiFordable. The Republicans directly counter the Democrats’ position
on Medicare. “We reaffirm our determination to protect Medicare. We will ensure a
significant annual expansion in Medicare.” Medicaid is a different story. “Medicaid” say
the Republicans, “should be turned over to State management with leeway for
restructuring and reform.”
While the Democrats are concerned primarily with social welfare. Republicans
emphasize governmental affairs. They especially stress reform o f the bureaucracy and
Congress. In addition, substantial portions are dedicated to crime control and the
administration of justice.
The Republicans continue to champion a balanced budget amendment to the
constitution and legislation requiring a supermajority vote in Congress before taxes could
be raised. They include a long list o f  congressional reforms, one of which calls for a
constitutional amendment to impose term limits on members o f congress. The
bureaucracy is similarly held up as grossly in need of reform.
As a first step in reforming government, we support elimination of the 
Departments o f Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Education, 
and Energy, and the elimination, defunding or privatization o f agencies 
which are obsolete, redundant, o f limited value, or too regional in focus.
Examples o f agencies we seek to defund or to privatize are the National 
Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the Legal Services Corporation.
Not only do the Republicans favor the devolution of most federal responsibilities to states
and localities, they also call for privatization. “Republicans believe we can streamline
government and make it more effective through competition and privatization.” The
Democrats pledge to continue “reinventing government” but they are not as inventive as
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the Republicans. Democrats do acknowledge “the era o f big government is over" and 
that “we need a smaller government.” They even feel the need to state, “We know that 
government workers are good people trapped in bad systems, and we are committed to 
reinventing government to reform those systems.” Nevertheless, the reforms they 
propose are not nearly so far reaching as Republican proposals. The Democrats would 
reinvent government by cutting waste, improving customer service, and demanding 
accountability.
In the area o f  electoral reform, differences are quite apparent. The Democrats 
hold up the Motor Voter Act as an achievement which “make[s] it easier for people to 
participate in our democracy and exercise their civic responsibility in the voting booth.” 
The Republicans are happy to give credit to the Democrats for passing the Motor Voter 
Act, which they see as an unfiinded mandate, call “ill-conceived,” and “the Democrats' 
costly invitation to ballot fraud.” The Democrats also call for the Republicans to allow 
McCain-Feingold, the campaign finance reform bill, a  vote in Congress. The 
Republicans do not mention the bill by name but do state, “We will eliminate made-in- 
Washington schemes to rig the election process under the guise o f campaign reform. True 
reform is indeed needed: ending taxpayer subsidies for campaigns, strengthening party 
structures to guard against rogue operations, requiring full and immediate disclosure o f all 
contributions, and cracking down on the indirect support, or "soft money," by which 
special interest groups underwrite their favored candidates.”
Crime is discussed extensively by both parties. Both parties agree on a 
constitutional amendment to protect victims’ rights. Both agree that crime is a problem.
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The Democrats believe they have made substantial headway in combating crime; they 
especially tout the 1994 Crime Bill. The Republicans do not believe inroads have been 
made in combating crime. They state “Making America safe again will be a tremendous 
undertaking, in its own way as heroic as was the liberation o f Europe from a different 
kind o f criminal half a century ago.” The Republican proposals largely seek to correct 
inadequacies in the administration o f justice. “We will reform the Supreme Court’s 
fanciful exclusionary rule, which has allowed a generation o f criminals to get off on 
technicalities.” In addition, they pledge “Bob Dole, the next Republican president w ill. .
. make our courts once again an instrument of justice.” The Democrats approach crime in 
a different manner. “The Democratic party under President Clinton is putting more police 
on the streets and tougher penalties on the books; we are taking guns off the streets and 
working to steer young people away from crime and gangs and drugs in the first place.”
The Republicans call for judicial reform and their criticisms are sharp. “The 
federal judiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court, has overstepped its authority under 
the Constitution. It has usurped the right of citizen legislators and popularly elected 
executives to make law by declaring duly enacted laws to be ‘unconstitutional’ through 
the misapplication o f judicial review.” The reform for these failings, state the 
Republicans, is the wise application o f the president’s appointment power. The 
Democratic platform does not address the judiciary.
Again, the movement o f  Democrats toward the center is discernable. They call for 
less government. Republicans, however, demand even less government. Republicans 
advocate the cutting of whole agencies, advocating the demise o f  more bureaucracies than
196
in past platforms. Despite the movement of Democrats toward the center, the parties do
not get any closer in the area o f governmental reform because the Republicans also
become more conservative and strident.
Civil rights and civil liberties have been the areas where the Democrats and
Republicans are farthest apart since the 1976 platforms. This tradition remains intact in
the 1996 platforms. The Republicans do include a statement o f tolerance at the beginning
of their civil rights plank, the likes of which has not appeared in previous platforms.
We are the party o f the open door. As we approach the start of a new 
century, the Republican Party is more dedicated than ever to strengthening 
the social, cultural, and political ties that bind us together as a free people, 
the greatest force for good the world has ever seen. While our party 
remains steadfast in its commitment to advancing its historic principles 
and ideals, we also recognize that members o f our party have deeply held 
and sometimes differing views. We view this diversity o f views as a 
source of strength, not as a sign of weakness, and we welcome into our 
ranks all Americans who may hold differing positions. We are committed 
to resolving our differences in a spirit o f civility, hope, and mutual respect.
However, the pro-life plank of the platform is taken almost verbatim from the 1992
platform. Similarly there is no support for homosexual rights. “We reject the distortion
of [equal opportunity laws] to cover sexual preference, and we endorse the Defense o f
Marriage Act to prevent states from being forced to recognize same-sex unions.” New to
the Republican platform is the call for “a constitutional amendment or constitutionally-
valid legislation declaring that children bom in the United States of parents who are not
legally present in the United States or who are not long-term residents are not
automatically citizens.” There is also a call for English to be designated the ofBcial
language. Republicans repeat from past platforms their desire to amend the Constitution
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to protect against flag burning. Support for voluntary school prayer is reiterated but no 
constitutional amendment is advocated.
The Democratic platform counters most o f these stances. Democrats repeat from 
previous platforms their support o f a woman’s right to choose in the area o f abortion. In 
addition. Democrats “believe everyone in America should leam English so they can fully 
share in our daily life, but we strongly oppose divisive efforts like English-only 
legislation, designed to erect barriers between us and force people away from the culture 
and heritage o f which they are rightly proud.” Democrats do call for the inclusion of 
sexual orientation to those afforded civil rights protection. Finally, Democrats include a 
cryptic statement on school prayer which distinguishes between public and private 
religious expression. “Americans have a  right to express their love o f God in public, and 
we applaud the President's work to ensure that children are not denied private religious 
expression in school.”
Defense policy is another area where the Democrats move in the direction of the 
Republicans, specifically concerning missile defense. The Republicans advocate a long- 
range missile defense system. “The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) o f  the last two 
Republican administrations has been dismantled by Bill Clinton, who - contrary to the 
national security interests of the United States - clings to the obsolete Cold War ABM 
Treaty.” The Democrats, in a change from previous years, state that they are “committed 
to a strong and balanced National Missile Defense (NMD) program.” This program is 
different, however from the old SDI.
The Democratic Party opposes the Republican NMD plan —  spending up
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to $60 billion on a  revival o f  the Star Wars program that would force us to 
choose a costly system today that could be obsolete tomorrow. The 
Republican plan would waste money, weaken America’s defenses and 
violate existing arms control agreements that make us more secure. It is 
the wrong way to defend America.
The Democratic plan, according to their platform, is cheaper, more realistic, and would
not violate the ABM treaty.
In the area o f foreign policy, the Democrats and Republicans disagree over the
deployment of troops in Bosnia Republicans “did not support the ill-conceived and
inconsistent policies that led to [troop] deployment.” Republicans believe that if  the
Bosnians had not been placed under an arms embargo, the U.S. would not now be
involved. The Democrats see their intervention in Bosnia as a positive. “Four years ago,
America stood aloof as war and genocide spread through the former Yugoslavia Today,
thanks to NATO airstrikes, American diplomacy and the deployment of troops from the
U.S. and other nations, the war has stopped and Bosnia has its first real chance for a
lasting peace.”
The parties’ core beliefs, as presented in their platforms, still present voters with a 
choice but in some policy areas the traditionally Democratic stances are forsaken as they 
were in 1992. Even as the Democrats reposition themselves to the right of previous 
platforms and try to co-opt many traditionally Republican stances, the Republican party 
relies more on cultural appeals to the traditionally religious. The Democratic platform is, 
in part, a reaction to the Republican platform o f 1992. The Democrats include more 
references to God and values than does the Republican platform. Yet, the Democrats’ 
stance, especially in relation to civil rights and liberties does not move right. For those
199
who care about issues other than civil liberties and civil rights, there is not the 
polarization between the two parties as in the past. However, when the platforms are 
taken as a whole, there remain significant differences.
Platform change over time 
Changes have occurred in the way issues are addressed over time both in terms of 
prioritization and substance. In terms o f prioritization, three areas have instructive trends: 
foreign policy, economic policy, and governmental affairs. In terms o f polarization, there 
have been important shifts in the way the parties think about the scope o f government.
The seven platforms analyzed from 1952-1996 show significant changes in the way 
certain issues are addressed by the two parties. Economic policy, social welfare policy, 
and governmental affairs are addressed one way by the Democrats in 1952, another way 
in 1996 and the change is quite large. While there is still differentiation in social welfare 
policy and the approach to governmental affairs at the end o f the time period, there is no 
polarization - if polarization is taken to mean direct opposition. More subtle changes are 
evident over time in the parties stances on civil rights and civil liberties. Polarization in 
the area of civil liberties, begun in 1976, is especially distinct by 1996.
Priority
Figure 4.8 maps the falling fortunes o f  foreign policy’s priority in the platforms. 
The two trends are almost identical. When the time series began in 1952, both parties led 
with their foreign policy planks. Beginning in 1968, foreign policy loses its preeminent 
position and is relegated to the end o f the platforms by both parties. The effect of 
Viemam on this re-prioritization caimot be overstated. Both parties de-emphasize
2 0 0
Vietnam in their 1968 platforms even though it is arguably the largest issue in the 
election. It is also the most divisive. In subsequent years, foreign policy does not regain 
its opening position, largely because the country is still suffering from a Vietnam 
hangover and attention is focused on domestic matters. Even though the Cold War is 
raging for much o f this period, domestic issues take precedence over foreign policy. This 
does not mean that foreign policy is not extensively discussed in platforms; it simply 
means that domestic issues are deemed to be more important to the public. Foreign 
policy still continues to have many, often the most, paragraphs dedicated to its discussion 
but its placement in the platform itself moderates its prioritization.
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Economie policy is emphasized more by the two parties at the end o f the time 
series than when it began (Figure 4.9). The void left after 1968, when foreign policy was 
relegated to the end o f the platforms, is largely filled by economic policy. Even though 
the Democratic catchphrase for the 1992 election was “It’s the economy, stupid,” 1992 
wimesses a large drop in the priority the Democrats give to economic policy. The 
Republican emphasis on economic policy steadily rises over the course o f the time series. 
These two trends are explained by a shift that occurs within economic policy around 
1976. When the series begins in 1952, there is polarization between Democrats and 
Republicans over government intervention in the economy. However, the 1976 platforms 
begin a change in the area o f emphasis within economic policy. In 1976, the Democrats 
continue to advocate a government that is active in the economy but they also begin to 
emphasize tax progressivity, thus more space is devoted to economic policy. At the same 
time, the Republicans begin to address taxation more than any other economic plank in 
addition to praising the virtues o f the free market, thus the steady growth in their 
prioritization trend. The large drop in prioritization for the Democrats in 1992 was due to 
the Democrats’ de-emphasis on government intervention in the economy while 
maintaining their emphasis on taxation.
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The prioritization index for governmental affairs also indicates growth over time 
for both parties (Figure 4.10). The Republican trend makes a  huge spike in 1968 and 
1996. Both o f these spikes are due to the Republican platform’s emphasis on law and 
order. A steady growth in the discussion o f governmental affairs is evident for 
Democrats. Governmental policy encompasses several policy areas that all are of 
increasing concern as time progresses. Crime and the administration o f justice, issues of 
federalism, and the growth o f bureaucracy are all given more space in the platforms as 
time passes.
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Polarization and Differentiation 
There is significant polarization in economic policy between the two parties but 
the issues on which the parties are polarized has changed over time. From 1952 to 1968, 
this polarization was over the federal government’s role in the economy; fi-om 1976 to 
1996 the polarization was over tax policy. The Democrats advocated an active role for 
government in the early period, championing price controls, aid to depressed areas, the 
government as the employer o f last resort and government involvement in the setting o f 
interest rates and control o f the money supply. The Republicans felt government 
involvement in these areas was ruinous. In 1976, the focus within economic policy shifts. 
While the Democrats still advocate significant involvement in economic matters and the 
Republicans disdain it, the two parties turn their focus to taxation. Before 1976, the two 
parties did not heavily emphasize taxation and when they talked about it, there were not 
huge disagreements. For example, the Democrats state in their 1968 platform that they 
raised taxes twice during the last presidential term. The Republicans do not refer to this 
at all in their 1968 platform. Often tax policy was spoken of in vague generalities before 
1976; calls for tax reform and tax simplification. The polarization over taxation becomes 
prominent in the 1976 election with the Republicans stressing tax relief and the 
Democrats emphasizing making the tax code more progressive. This would mean tax 
increases for the wealthy, the group to which the Republican tax relief was most often 
targeted. After 1976, the Republicans’ economic policy was dominated by taxation and 
their insistence on tax reductions. In 1992, the Democrats drop all calls for an 
economically activist government and actually trumpet the free market in their platform
207
quite extensively. They would spur the economy indirectly (rather than directly as they 
advocated in years past) by public investments in education and training and encouraging 
private investment by offering tax credits. The debate over taxation, however, is an 
enduring area o f polarization between the two parties from 1976 to 1996. The Democrats 
stress progressivity and making everyone pay their fair share. The Republicans advocate 
tax cuts and especially tax cuts that would benefit those with investments and business.
There is a large gulf between the way the two parties address issues o f social 
welfare in 1952 and this polarization continues until 1984. As in economic policy, the 
debate is over the extent of federal government involvement The Democrats favor an 
activist federal government that provides many things for its citizens such as health care, 
retirement income, unemployment assistance and welfare programs. The Republicans 
stress that the federal government should not be active in most o f these areas and that the 
private sector and/or state and local levels of government are better able to fill these needs 
for citizens. In 1992, however, there is an important change in the way the two parties 
approach social welfare issues. The Democrat move significantly rightward and the 
Republicans move even further rightward. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area 
o f welfare. In past platforms, the Democrats had consistently called for the federalization 
of welfare rather than the hodgepodge o f shared programs that delivered basic needs to 
the poor. They do not make this call in 1992 and begin to talk about personal 
responsibility and reforming the welfare system. Republicans favor a total abdication of 
the federal role in welfere and propose states, localities, and institutions o f civil society 
can take care o f  the needs of the poor much better. They move farther right in that they
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stress the responsibilities o f  families and private community organizations to care for the 
poor as the ideal, and propose steps in that direction. Also in 1992, the Democrats do not 
call for a national health care system. Instead, the platform advocates “universal access to 
quality, affordable health care” which fells short o f their former goal o f a federalized 
system. In education, they also list rightward by favoring educational choice (though not 
vouchers) and innovation. Unlike economic policy, where there was a change in 
emphasis but still significant polarization between the two parties over taxation in the 
1990s, the polarization on social welfere policy disappears in the 1990s. There was still 
significant differentiation between the two parties, but they were not polar opposites in 
these policy areas as in previous decades.
In governmental affairs there is also a shift on the part o f the Democrats that 
moves them closer to the traditional Republican stance. The Republicans step further 
rightward. This occurs mainly in the area o f  federalism and bureaucratic reform. Again, 
the move occurs in the 1992 Democratic platform. The Democrats in 1992 call for 
“greater flexibility” to lower levels of government The Republicans, in this area move 
further rightward in advocating not “greater flexibility” but total devolution. The growth 
of bureaucracy after the 1960s is something both parties address, albeit not always at the 
same time. Republicans begin their assault o f the bureaucracy in the 1970s; the 
Democrats do not address its growth until 1992 when they call for smaller government. 
The Republican platform always emphasizes using local and state governments over the 
federal government. The Democrats actually begin to moderate their belief in federal 
centralization in the 1976 platform’s support for revenue sharing. By 1992, the
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Democrats are advocating giving more responsibilities to states and localities and they 
continue this theme in 1996. There is still a signiGcant difference about what to do about 
the deficit at the end o f the time period. The Democrats would spur the economy and “re­
evaluate spending.” Tax increases are not specifically ruled out but are not advocated in 
the platform. The Republicans specifically rule out raising taxes, advocate cutting taxes, 
and would balance the budget by cutting spending. In addition, there is a difference in the 
1990s in the way the two parties approach crime and the administration o f justice. The 
Republicans would focus on what they identify as the mal administration o f justice by 
using the appointment power and legislation to reform the way the courts work. The 
Democratic platforms focus on prevention of crime and more law enforcement efforts.
Thus, there occurs a  sea change in Democratic philosophy in the 1990s that affects 
the relative polarization between the two parties. The 1984 platforms were the piimacle 
o f  polarization for the examined time period. Democrats advocated extensive 
government involvement in the economy and social welfare programs that both cost a lot 
o f  money and needed a  lot o f  civil servants to administer. Republicans in 1984 advocated 
a modified fiat tax, block grants to public education to make them independent o f  federal 
involvement, and devolution o f social programs. However, in 1992, the Democratic 
platform is moderated and this trend continues in 1996. In economic policy, social 
welfare policy and governmental afi&irs, there are areas where the Democratic platforms 
o f  the 1990s are more like Republican platforms of the past than Democratic platforms of 
the past. It should be reiterated, however that there is still polarization between the two 
parties on taxation, a very important issue. In addition, the Republicans move farther
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right at the same time the Democrats move right, so even as polarization disappears the 
degree o f separation remains rather constant. The parties are no longer polarized in key 
policy areas but there is still differentiation.
More significant changes are evident in the area of civil liberties and civil rights. 
In these two areas, the degree o f polarization actually increases between the two parties 
over time. First, by 1968 the two parties have polarized on issues o f civil rights. 
Secondly, the polarization on civil liberties begins in earnest in 1976 and grows. Finally, 
the religious appeal of one platform far outstrips the other beginning  in 1992.
The 1968 platform indicates the Democrats are fully in support o f  expanding civil 
rights, a stance they actually solidified in the 1964 platform that was not used for this 
analysis. In the 1970s, the two parties take opposite stands on busing. As time 
progresses, the Democrats expand the groups they believe should be afforded protection 
from discrimination. In 1996, they include the standard race, ethnicity, national origin, 
religion, age, and gender, but they would also protect against discrimination on the basis 
o f disability and sexual orientation. In 1996, the Republican platform states, “. . .  we 
oppose discrimination based on sex, race, age, creed, or national origin and will 
vigorously enforce anti-discrimination statutes.” They do not expand protection based on 
sexual orientation.*^ In addition, the Democrats continue to support afGrmative action. 
The 1996 platform states, “When it comes to afGrmative action, we should mend it, not
'^Although not included in this statement from the Republican platform, there is 
an earlier pledge that states “We believe in the equality o f all people before the law and 
that individuals should be judged by their ability rather than their race, creed, or 
disability.”
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end it.” The Republicans consider it a form o f discrimination and pledge in 1996 to “end 
discrimination by the federal government.”
Greater differences exist in the area of civil liberties. In 1976 there is a change in 
the combativeness on civil liberties that grows over time. The Republicans’ abortion 
statement also debuts in 1976. “The Republican Party favors a continuance of the public 
dialog on abortion and supports the efforts of those who seek enactment o f a 
constitutional amendment to restore protection o f the right to life for unborn children” 
(Congressional Quarterly 1977, 906). The Republicans, in later years, will strengthen this 
statement o f opposition and it will appear in every platform. On abortion, the Democratic 
platform o f 1976 states “We hilly recognize the religious and ethical nature of the 
concerns which many Americans have on the subject o f abortion. We feel, however, that 
it is undesirable to attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution to overturn the Supreme Court 
decision in this area” (860). The Democrats will also strengthen their support for a 
woman’s right to choose in later platforms.
By 1984, the separation o f church and state issue has entered the platforms. The 
Democrats include a strong statement o f support for this principle. “The Democratic 
Platform afBrms its support o f the principles o f religious liberty, religious tolerance and 
church/state separation and o f  the Supreme Court decisions forbidding violation of those 
principles” (Congressional Quarterly 1985,92-B). The Republican statement of that year 
supports the right o f students to “practice . . .  [freedom o f speech and religion], including 
the right to engage in voluntary prayer in schools.” In 1996, the Republicans call for a 
constitutional amendment for flag protection. “[The flag’s] deliberate desecration is not
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‘free speech,’ but an assault against our history and our hopes. We support a 
constitutional amendment that will restore to the people, through their elected 
representatives, their right to safeguard Old Glory.”
Judicial reform is also strongly advocated in the 1996 Republican platform. This 
is partially due to the fact the battle over civil rights and civil liberties is most often 
played out in the courts. The Republicans begin their section on the courts by stating, 
“The American people have lost faith in their courts, and for good reason. Some members 
o f the federal judiciary threaten the safety, the values, and the freedom o f law-abiding 
citizens.” The mention o f  values is instmctive in this statement as it indicates the extent 
to which the Republican platform stresses the courts as being out of the mainstream o f 
American life.
Just as the 1992 Democratic platform was very different from their previous 
platforms, 1992 also marks a change in the Republican platform.*® As mentioned 
previously, the 1992 platform is overtly religious and the 1996 platform is covertly 
religious. The appeal the Republican platforms hold for religious conservatives is 
apparent. Both parties in the 1990s increasingly use the term “values” in their platforms 
as detailed above. The Republican platform in 1992 is focused around the theme o f 
family values and makes many references to religion. In 1996, the Republican platform is 
not so blatantly religious but still contains appeals to religious conservatives. The 1996
'®Pomper argues that “There is a manifest continuity in each party from one 
election to the next. Changes o f emphasis and o f  specificity. . .  are evident, but there is 
no important change in direction” (1968,155). Pomper’s analysis ended with the 1964 
platform. This analysis suggests that 1992 is an exception to this rule.
213
Democratic platform makes appeals to “values” even more than the Republican platform. 
Even though they co-opt the language o f the 1992 Republican platform, the 1996 
Democratic platform is not appealing to traditionalists because o f the stances taken in the 
area o f civil rights and liberties. It does not include policy positions that warm the hearts 
o f religious conservatives. In addition, the use o f language, specifically appeals to values, 
in the 1996 Democratic platform could have turned many voters from its traditional base 
off
Conclusions
The analysis o f party platforms has turned up some very interesting findings. 
Platforms have indeed changed over time both in terms o f issues addressed and the 
positions taken. Party platforms were analyzed to see i f  there were any linkages to 
cleavage behavior in the 1990s hidden in the text A  plausible link to cleavage 
disintegration has been found.
In the decades prior to the 1990s, the two parties offered distinct choices on both 
political issues (the economy, social welfare policy, and government administration) and 
social or cultural issues (civil rights and liberties). 1984 was the last platform analyzed 
where polarization on both political and social issues was present. Beginning in 1976, it 
is evident from the analysis that there are partisan differences on cultural or social issues 
between the two platforms and these differences grow over time as the Republican 
platforms become more and more strident. 1992 marks the beginning  of significant 
changes in both parties’ platforms and the 1990s is when cleavage behavior imdergoes a 
change; many groups’ partisan distinctiveness begins to collapse while some groups
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maintain or strengthen their degree o f partisanship. In key policy areas such as 
federalism, social welfare, and bureaucracy the two parties are no longer polarized. The 
choice for voters to whom these policy areas are primary is smaller. This could account 
for the disaffection o f  some voters as the parties do not offer the choice they once did. 
Some voters could feel they are being offered an echo, not a choice. The parties’ stances 
are not identical in these areas but they are no longer polarized as in previous decades. In 
civil rights and liberties, however, there are very large choices given by the parties in the 
1990s.
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CHAPTERS
THE RAMIFICATIONS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE FOR
REALIGNMENT THEORY
Ronald Inglehart (1997) has long postulated that a value change is taking place in 
society that is profoundly affecting postindustrial politics. Inglehart believes one o f the 
consequences o f this value change is the declining partisanship o f  cleavages in society. 
His theory, like critical realignment theory, is built upon the behavior o f cleavages. 
Accordingly, this study began with an examination of cleavage voting behavior. Inglehart 
posits that traditional cleavages in society are becoming less and less important because 
o f  a changing value structure that is itself forming the basis for a new cleavage.
Individual voting behavior in his view will increasingly be based on value orientation 
which has fluid partisan attachments, rather than other characteristics that have 
traditionally been important determinants o f one’s partisan vote, such as social class and 
religion. Inglehart believes this new value cleavage crosscuts the old cleavages, 
rendering them less relevant to partisan vote choice. These two theories were examined 
in conjunction with one another because o f the link they have in their expectations of 
partisan cleavage behavior.
Upon examination, the partisanship o f  many groups in society was found to have 
decreased over time as Inglehart predicted, rendering the likelihood o f a critical 
realignment remote in the present electorate. However, certain aspects o f cleavage
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behavior did not correspond to Inglehart's expectations. First, the partisan disaffection on 
the part o f certain groups did not culminate in the 1970s as Inglehart postulated it would, 
but in the 1990s. In addition, while many cleavages dissipated, other cleavages endured. 
Religion, a cleavage Inglehart believes is fading in importance in postindustrial society, 
remained an important indicator of partisan vote choice and an enduring cleavage. 
Similarly, ideology was found to be a cleavage o f growing importance to partisanship. 
This is also contrary to Inglehart's expectations. Two cleavages that he believed would 
endure because of their link to postmaterialist values, age and education, also did not 
perform as he theorized.
Because o f the inconsistencies in the performance o f Inglehart's indicators, a test 
o f his theoretical assumptions was conducted. A lack o f congruence between Inglehart’s 
measure of values and his theoretical assumptions was indicated. Accordingly, another 
indicator of change, party platforms, was utilized. Chapter Four analyzed these 
documents to determine if  the behavior of the parties as manifested in their platforms was 
in some way connected to the partisan disaffection o f certain groups and the enduring 
nature o f the partisan attachments of other groups that was evident in the 1990s. The 
findings indicate a definite change in both parties' platforms beginning in 1992, the very 
time period when substantial changes were observed in cleavage behavior. It is now time 
to draw some conclusions from these findings.
The previous chapter found that, beginning in 1992, the two parties no longer 
polarized on important political issues, such as social welfare policy and governmental 
affairs. They did, however, continue to polarize on cultural issues, specifically civil
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rights and civil liberties. Thus, the choice for voters to whom traditional political issues 
are o f primary importance has become limited due to the fact the parties no longer 
polarize on these issues. Voters may increasingly cast ballots for candidates from either 
party because o f similar stances on these issues. Or, they may choose to abstain from 
voting. For voters to whom cultural issues are primary, there is significant polarization 
between the parties. The divide on cultural issues actually became significant in the 1976 
platforms. It was not until 1992, however, that polarization on many political issues 
ceased, leaving the parties polarized not on both political and cultural issues as in the 
past, but primarily on cultural issues.
Cultural issues hold more appeal for certain segments o f society, especially racial 
minorities, the ideological, and the religious. These are the very cleavages that the 
previous analysis showed were exceptions to the trend toward apartisanship that many 
other cleavages exhibited. When given real choices on issues that are conceivably of 
primary importance to them, these particular cleavages do partisanly divide and remain 
distinct. Therefore, it is plausible that the other dissolving cleavages o f the 1990s may be 
reacting to the smaller range o f choice that the parties offer on political issues. Since they 
are offered an echo, not a choice, they might respond by echoing back partisan 
ambivalence.
Party Platforms and Socjfl Change
While a previous chapter cast doubt on Inglehart’s version o f value change, the 
fiirther analysis afforded by party platforms indicates that there is a social change 
occurring that does comport to the very broad outlines o f  Inglehart’s conception of
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postmaterialist values. What he identifies as postmaterialist issues - issues o f equality, 
quality of life, and self expression - are coming to the fore. These are the issues on which 
the two parties polarize today. However, Inglehart’s theory does not allow for the 
different ways that one might express postmaterial concerns. He does not allow for 
supporters of the two sides o f the debate over issues such as abortion, afSrmative action, 
or the environment both to be classified as postmaterialists. Rather, the supporters o f the 
ideologically liberal side o f  the debate are termed postmaterial, but the supporters o f the 
ideologically conservative side are deemed to be holding onto materialist values. ‘ This is 
likely one of the reasons why Inglehart’s survey instrument fails to capture his conception 
of values and actually captures liberal ideology. Regardless o f the ideological side chosen 
in these cultural debates, these are certainly postmaterial issues, something that Inglehart 
does not accept. In addition, Inglehart fails to consider the unique role that religion plays 
in American society. This role has not faded as he predicted, but may in fact be 
strengthening. Because o f  these deficiencies in Inglehart’s theory, there may be other, 
better-suited explanations o f social change in the United States. Inglehart’s insights may 
be useful, but the theory must be refined before being applied to the case o f the U.S.
Others have remarked about the increasing bifurcation o f and attention to cultural 
values in the United States (Hunter 1991, 1994; Green, et al., 1996). And, given the 
faults with Inglehart’s theory and the refinement needed in it, it may be fruitful to look to 
these conceptualizations for a better-tailored theory of social change. Hunter’s 
proposition of a culture war (1991,1994) would seem to describe the state of
‘See Inglehart 1997, Chapter 9, and Appendix 3.
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contemporary American society more adequately than does Inglehart's conception of 
value change.
The battle lines in Hunter’s culture wars are drawn between two groups. One 
group he terms “orthodox” and is made up o f  religious conservatives. The other group, 
made up o f those who are religious liberals and the secular, is termed “progressive.” It 
would appear from the findings in Chapter Four that the culture war has manifested itself 
in the parties’ platforms.
This new  ^cultural division identified by Hunter is based upon religious outlook 
but does not follow religious denominational lines.^ Since this potentially new cleavage 
(orthodox versus progressive) cuts across religious denominations, identifying it is 
difficult. Frequency of attendance at religious services, rather than denomination, has 
been used as a means o f getting at this variable (Layman 1999).
Layman’s study of both parties’ national convention delegates from 1972-1992 
found that the culture wars were having an impact on the two parties (1999). Using 
survey data and relying on attendance at religious services, he found that delegates to the 
Republican national convention were increasingly made up of the religiously committed 
(as determined by frequent attendance) and Democratic delegates were increasingly made 
up of the secular and those who infrequently attend religious services. Since convention 
delegates have a hand in platform construction, it makes sense that if  the culture war is 
bifiircating delegates to the conventions, it will also bifurcate the platforms of the two
"This is another reason why Inglehart’s theory is a poor fit with the case o f the 
United States because he believes religion is becoming less important in post-industrial 
society.
2 2 0
parties. Hunter also observed that the culture war was being played out at the elite rather 
than mass level (1991, 1994). Platforms are constructed by party elites. From the 
platform analysis conducted here, it would appear that there is a culture war going on 
between the two parties’ platforms. Others have argued, however, that a minority of 
voters is concerned with the cultural issues around which the cultural wars are fought 
(Diorme 1991, Layman 1999). If only a minority is concerned with cultural issues, then 
the culture war is being fought by generals who have few foot soldiers to whom they can 
appeal.
The Culture War as a Limited War
It is possible to test the proposition that a  minority o f voters is primarily 
concerned with the issues over which the culture wars are being fought. One can look at 
the NES question that asks “What do you think are the most important problems facing 
this country?”  ^ For the years 1992 and 1996, the most important problem is seen as being 
in the area o f social welfare policy that encompasses population, child care, aid to 
education, the elderly, health care, housing, poverty, unemployment, ‘welfare,’ etc. In 
1992,37.2% of the sample said this area encompassed the most important problem; in 
1996, 39.3% said this area contained the most important problem. The NES category of 
“public order”encompasses most of the areas that fall under cultural issues. The public 
order category includes crime, drugs, civil liberties and non-racial civil rights, women’s 
rights, abortion rights, gun control, family/social/religious/moral ‘decay,’ and church and 
state, etc. Only 11.9% said issues within public order were the most important problems
^Sapiro, et al., 1998, v875.
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in 1992; by 1996, this had risen to 27.8% hut was still surpassed hy those believing that 
social welfare issues were more important. A plurality o f the public felt the most 
important problem in the 1990s was in the area of social welfare issues, one of the areas 
where the two parties offered more similar positions in the 1990s than ever before.
Therefore, the two parties presented the mass electorate in the 1990s with a 
culture war in which a substantial number of them were not involved. From these 
findings and the previous platform analysis it can be surmised that voters were presented 
with:
1. Less choice on issues o f primary importance to most voters; and,
2. More choice on issues o f  primary importance to select voters
The culture war is a war in which the mass electorate is not yet much engaged. The 
parties, however, are fully embroiled in the conflict by 1976 and by 1992 cultural issues 
are those on which the parties exhibit the most differences. Just the polarizing rhetoric on 
these cultural issues may be sufScient to turn off a portion o f the electorate so that they 
remove themselves fi"om the electoral fi-ay. Add to this, however, the fact that on 
traditional government issues, the parties are not polarized in the 1990s; these are the 
issues that matter to a plurality of voters. When not given a choice, many voters may stay 
home and those choosing to vote may increasingly split their ticket because of the lack of 
difference they see between the parties on the issues that matter most to them.
What does this mean for realignment theory? If there are fewer partisan 
cleavages, as was found in Chapter Three, there can be no critical realignment because 
cleavages make realignment meaningful. The electorate has changed. Many cleavages
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have begun to exhibit a partisan ambivalence in terms of their voting behavior. There 
would seem to be a  connection between the dissipation of many cleavages, the endurance 
o f other cleavages, and the way parties addressed issues in the 1990s. It is, however, 
impossible to establish causation with this analysis. One cannot say, based on the 
evidence presented here, that the political party platforms caused the peculiar cleavage 
behavior evident in the 1990s. Nor can we say that the electorate’s behavior caused the 
political parties to alter the way they addressed certain issues. Likely, the effects run both 
ways. What can be said is that critical realignments will not occur in an electorate that 
has insufScient enduring cleavages and where political parties do not polarize on many 
issues that substantial portions of the electorate feel are of primary importance.
It is up to future research to further illuminate the social changes that affect the 
American electorate and go beyond critical realignment theory. Especially important 
would be to incorporate the insights o f Hunter’s culture wars more fully with the broad 
outlines of Inglehart’s theory. There is a connection between the two theories that should 
be further explored; the broad outlines of Inglehart’s theory seems to contain a kernel of 
truth. Cultural issues do seem to be taking precedence over economic ones, at least to 
some. However, there are significant refinements that need to be made to Inglehart’s 
theory. The theoretical framework of Maslow (1954) on which Inglehart initially relies 
but then abandons should be re-established. Part o f the failure of Inglehart’s religious 
expectations might be alleviated by returning to Maslow. Inglehart fails to recognize that 
spiritual well-being is definitely a higher level need that those who have satisfied lower 
order needs will often pursue. For many, religion is a quality o f life issue. In addition,
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the role o f elites needs to be explored further. It could be that instead o f postmaterial 
values manifesting themselves in broad society, the elites (who will be the most likely to 
have satisfied lower level needs) will lead the way in formulating them and the masses 
may (or may not) follow.
In addition it would be instructive to combine Putnam’s documentation o f 
increasing social and political disconnectedness and investigate its affects on partisanship 
(2 0 0 0 ). The increasing apartisanship o f the electorate may be the result of d ec lin in g 
social capital. People have become unmoored from traditional forms of participation that 
may have reinforced certain partisan allegiances. Atrophied social networks and the 
partisan reinforcements they may have provided could be a  reason why partisanship has 
become increasingly unstable and fluid. In addition, it could be especially profitable to 
explore the effect declining social capital has had on the status o f critical realignment 
theory because one element o f  the theory, not explored here, is the criterion that a critical 
election will spark increased political participation.
Implications of the Absence of Critical Realignments 
So why should we care that critical elections and the realignments that cause them 
seem to have gone by the wayside, at least for the immediate future? Burnham believes 
that critical realignments are (or at least were) “the chief tension-management device 
available to [our] peculiar political system” (1970 , 181). The years preceding critical 
elections become increasingly unstable but critical realignments provided a means of 
dealing with the shocks and once again stabilizing the system. However, given the broad 
agreement today that the government should at least m in im a lly  be involved in the
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economy and prevent the large economic swings of previous eras, and given the fact that 
all previous critical realignments have had an economic element, critical realignments 
may not need to perform the stabilizing function they once did. It is probably more 
important that we should mourn the passing o f  critical elections because they necessarily 
involved the deep, intense, and high participation of the electorate (Key 1955) actively 
engaged int he debate over a critical issue (Sundquist 1983). As many have documented, 
this is not a characteristic o f today’s electorate, and democracy suffers when the electorate 
is disengaged.
For political scientists in particular, the passing o f the critical realignment 
framework may especially be missed because it has not only provided the paradigm for 
explaining electoral behavior and party systems, but it has provided extensive fodder for 
political scientists’ debates. Perhaps now more attention can be devoted to developing 
another organizing framework that fits the changes in the contemporary electorate.
Critical realignment theory can be placed upon a shelf, not to be taken down again until 
electoral conditions favor it.
If critical realignment theory is again to become relevant in American politics, the 
parties must be able to capture enough cohesive voting blocks to win an election 
overwhelmingly - and then be able to sustain their appeal. Currently within the American 
electorate there are not enough o f these groups on which a rea lig n m e n t  could be based. 
There also does not seem to be an issue on which sufficient numbers care about and 
polarize. The culture wars may yet provide the issues around which politics will one day 
revolve, but the mass electorate is not yet fully engaged in this war.
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APPENDIX 1
BREAKDOWN OF CATEGORIES UTILIZED FOR CLEAVAGE ANALYSIS
Race/Ethnicity (1952-96 v. 106 and 108; 1998 v. 673 and 659 )
Education (1952-96 v. 140; 1998 v. 577)
Grade school or less 8 grades or less
HS, no diploma 9-12 grades, no diploma/equivalency
HS graduate 12 grades, diploma/equivalency
some post HS ed HS diploma plus non-academic training and/or some
college, no degree 
college degree or + BA level degrees and advanced degrees
Place o f Residency (1952-96 v. I l l ;  1998 v. 99)
Rural rural, small towns, outlying and adjacent areas
Central city central city
Suburban Suburban
Income (1952-96 v. 114; 1998 v. 652)
Low 0-33 percentile
Middle 34-67 percentile
High 68-100 percentile
Union household (1952-96 v. 127; 1998 v. 649)
Ideology (1952-96 v. 804; 1998 v. 399)
Liberal extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal
Moderate moderate
Conservative extremely conservative, conservative, slightly conservative
Don’t know don’t know, haven’t thought much about it
Religion
Four category question (1952-96 v. 128; 1998 v. 546)
Multiple denominational distinctions (1960-88 v. 129; 1990-96 v. 152; 1998 v. 
569)
Value orientation (1952-96 v. 9019 and v. 9020)
Gender (1952-96 v. 104; 1998 v. 672)
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Age Cohorts (1952-96 v. 103; 1998 v. 571)
Cohort 1 bom 1959-80
Cohort 2 bom 1943-58
Cohort 3 bom 1927-1942
Cohort 4 bom 1911-26
Cohort 5 bom 1895-1910
Cohort 6 bom before 1895
Region o f Residence (1952-96 v. 901; 1998 v. 86)
Border DE, KY, MD, OK, WV
South AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA
North central EL, IN, lA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT
Mountain West AZ, CO, ID, MT, NY, UT, WY
Pacific West AK, CA, HI, OR, WA
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APPENDIX 2 
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONAL CODING
1960-1988
1. Secular
100 Protestant, no denomination given 
800 Agnostic, atheists
996 Refused
998 no preference
2. Evangelical Protestant
101 Non-denominational Protestant church
123 Baptist
126 Mennonite; Amish
127 Church of the Brethren
131 Church of God; Holiness
132 Nazarene; Free Methodist
133 Church of God in Christ
134 Plymouth Brethren
135 Pentecostal; Assembly o f  God
136 Church of Christ
137 Salvation Army
138 Primitive, Free Will, Missionary Fundamentalist, and Gospel Baptist
139 Seventh Day Adventist
140 Southern Baptist
141 Missouri Synod Lutheran 
149 Other fundamentalists
3. Mainline Protestant 102,110-16, 120, 122, 124, 125, 155
102 Community church (no denomination basis)
110 Presbyterian
111 Lutheran (exc. Missouri Synod or AME )
112 Congregational
113 Evangelical and Reformed
114 Reformed, Dutch Reformed or Christian Reformed
115 United Church o f Christ (not Church of Christ)
116 Episcopalian, Anglican, Church o f England 
120 Methodist
122 United Brethren
124 Disciples o f  Christ
125 ‘Christian’
155 Quaker
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4. Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 200,710-719 
200 Roman Catholic
710 Greek Orthodox
711 Russian Orthodox
712 Rumanian Orthodox
713 Serbian Orthodox
719 Other Eastern Orthodox
5. Jewish 
300 Jewish
1990-1998
1. Secular 
010 
800 
801 
995 
997
Protestant, no denomination given
Agnostics
Atheists
none, no preference 
other
2. Evangelical Protestant
020. Non-denominational Protestant 
100. 7th Day Adventist
102. Fundamentalist Adventists (Worldwide Church o f God) [1990 only]
109. Adventist (NFS)
120. American Baptist Association
121. American Baptist Churches U.S.A. (inaccurately known as "Northern 
Baptist")
122. Baptist Bible Fellowship
123. Baptist General Conference
124. Baptist Missionary Association of America
125. Conservative Baptist Association of America
126. General Association of Regular Baptist Churches (G.A.R.B.)
127. National Association o f Free Will Baptists (United Free Will 
Baptist Church)
128. Primitive Baptists
133. United Free-Will Baptist Church [1990 only]
134. Reformed Baptist (Calvinist)
135. Southern Baptist Convention
147. Fundamental Baptist (no denom. ties)
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148. Local (independent) Baptist churches with no denominational ties 
or links to a national fellowship
149. Baptist (NFS)
160. Church o f the Brethren
161. Brethren (NFS)
162. Mennonite Church
163. Moravian Church
164. Old Order Amish
166. Evangelical Covenant Church (not Anabaptist in tradition)
167. Evangelical Free Church (not Anabaptist in tradition)
168. Brethren in Christ 
170. Mennonite Brethren
180. Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA)
181. Church of God (Anderson, IN)
182. Church o f the Nazarene
183. Free Methodist Church
184. Salvation Army
185. Wesleyan Church
186. Church of God of Findlay, OH
199. Holiness (NFS); Church of God (NFS); R  not or NA whether R 
Pentecostal or Charismatic
200. Plymouth Brethren
201. Independent Fundamentalist Churches o f America
219. Independent-Fundamentalist (NFS)
221. Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod; LC-MS
222. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod; WELS
223. Other Conservative Lutheran
240. Congregational Methodist (Fundamentalist)
250. Assemblies o f God
251. Church o f God (Cleveland, TN)
252. Church o f God (Huntsville, AL)
253. International Church of the Four Square Gospel
254. Pentecostal Church of God
255. Pentecostal Holiness Church
256. United Pentecostal Church International
260. Church o f God of the Apostolic Faith
261. Church of God in Prophecy*
262. Vineyard Fellowship
267. Apostolic Pentecostal
268. Spanish Pentecostal
269. Pentecostal (NFS); Church of God (NFS); R not or NA whether R 
Pentecostal or Charismatic
271. Cumberland Presbyterian Church
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272. Presbyterian Church in American (PCA)
275. Evangelical Presbyterian
276. Reformed Presbyterian (NFS)
291. Christian Churches and Churches of Christ
292. Churches o f Christ; "Church of Christ" (NFS)
3. Mainline Protestant
030. Community church
040. Inter-denominational Protestant
110. Episcopalian; Anglican
111. Independent Anglican, Episcopalian
150. United Church o f Christ (includes Congregational, Evangelical 
and Reformed)
151. Congregational Christian
165. Quakers (Friends)
220. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (formerly Lutheran Church 
in America and The American Lutheran Church); ELCA
229. Lutheran (NFS)
230. United Methodist Church; Evangelical United Brethren 
234. Primitive Methodist
249. Methodist (NFS)
270. Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
279. Presbyterian (NFS)
280. Christian Reformed Church (inaccurately known as "Dutch 
Reformed")
281. Reformed Church in America
282. Free Hungarian Reformed Church
289. Reformed (NFS)
290. Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
293. Christian Congregation
4. Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 400, 700-08, 719
400. Roman Catholic
700. Greek Rite Catholic
701. Greek Orthodox
702. Russian Orthodox
703. Rumanian Orthodox
704. Serbian Orthodox
705. Syrian Orthodox
706. Armenian Orthodox
707. Georgian Orthodox
708. Ukranian Orthodox
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719. Eastern Orthodox (NSF)
5. Jewish
500. Jewish, no preference
501. Orthodox
502. Conservative
503. Reformed
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APPENDIX 3
CODING OF NES VARIABLES USED IN LOGIT ANALYSES
Dependent Variable
Postmaterialism (coded from v9019 & 9020)
I - postmat
0 - other
Independent Variables
Age (recoded from v. 103)
1 those socialized after WWn (bom 1943 >
0 those socialized before WWn (bom before 1943)
Education (recoded from vI40)
1 no high school diploma or equivalency
2 high school graduates
3 some post high school training, some college
4 college degree and higher
Religious attendance (recoded from vl30)
1 no religious preference, never, few times a year
0 once or twice a month, almost every week, every week
Ideology (recoded from v803)
1 conservative (extremely conservative, conservative, slightly 
conservative)
2 moderate, middle o f the road
3 liberal (extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal)
4 don’t know, haven’t thought much about it
Partisanship (recoded from v. 305)
1 strong partisans
2 weak partisans
3 apolitical, independent, leaning independent
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APPENDIX 4
CONTENT ANALYSIS FORM FOR PARTY PLATFORMS
Year
Party___________________ Ticket.
total number of paragraphs______________
Policy Areas
Foreign policy ^ devoted to ____________  Placement in platform.
diplomacy. United Nations, foreign aid, collective security agreements (unless exclusively military in 
nature), policy toward specific nations, trade
Defense devoted to ____________  Placement in platform_______
conduct o f war and military strategy, draft, living conditions o f military personnel, weapons systems, 
military research, civil defense. United Nations armed forces, disarmament, testing o f nuclear weapons, 
intelligence, in f I terrorism
Economic policy ^ devoted to ____________  Placement in platform________
control o f business cycles, federal fiscal policy and taxation, regulation o f business, distribution o f military 
procurement contracts, science and nonmilitary research, transportation (including mass transit and 
rivers and harbors), depressed areas, infrastructure, technology
Labor ^ devoted to _______________ Placement in platform_______
Regulation o f labor unions, employment conditions, minimum wage, retraining programs, employment 
services, farm  workers, standards in govt contracts other than nondiscrimination
Agriculture ^ devoted to ____________  Placement in platform
Farm commodity, storage, loan, and income policies, food  reserves, foreign distribution o f agricultural 
surpluses, agricultural research, production and marketing controls, rural electrification
Resources devoted to ____________  Placement in platform_______
policies relating to minerals, fuels, and other raw materials, depletion allowances, water, forest, and game 
policy, air and water pollution, conservation and recreation, atomic energy fo r  domestic purposes, 
regional development, electrical and hydroelectric power policy (excluding rural electrification), fisheries
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Social Welfare ^  devoted to   Placement in platform.
all programs related to health, hospitals, education, and social welfare, social security, unemployment 
insurance, programs fo r the aged and handicapped, constmer protection, housing, urban planning and 
renewal (other than transportation). Dept o f  Urban affairs, veterans, rent control, food stamp programs, 
school lunches
Government ^ devoted to _____________ Placement in platform,
Administration, loyalty programs, management o f the civil service, federalism (including programs o f 
federal-state tax adjustment), federal budgeting and spending levels apart from  particular programs, the 
national debt, statehood govt o f territories and DC, regulation ofelections, legislative apportionment, 
congressional procedures (other than Senate cloture), crime (administration o f Justice)
Civil Rights/Civil lib f  devoted to ____________  Placement in platform________
all provisions related to discrimination against minorities (including segregation in the armed forces, 
schools, etc), social welfare programs specifically designed to deal with racial discrimination. Senate 
cloture, immigration policy, American Indians, discrimination against women, sexual minorities, disabled, 
civil liberties
‘The following modifications were made to Pomper’s original categories. 
(Pomper 1968,277-279).
1.Trade included under foreign policy. It was not specifically listed in Pomper’s 
categories
2. Fisheries was moved from Agriculture to Resources
3. Civil liberties - moved from government to civil rights/civil liberties
4. To the area of civil rights, discrimination against sexual minorities, and the 
disabled were added
5. Crime and the administration o f justice was added to governmental affairs
6. Food stamps and school lunches was moved from agriculture to social welfare
7. Equal pay for women was moved from labor to civil rights/civil liberties.
8. Intelligence was added to defense
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